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SURVEY
2009 ANNUAL SURVEY:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPORTS LAW*
INTRODUCTION
This survey encapsulates sports-related cases adjudicated between January
1 and December 31, 2009. It does not include every decision associated with
sports; rather, it is intended to summarize only those cases involving
compelling issues that could have an impact on the development of sports law
in the coming years. The survey is designed to give the reader brief insight
into how much the field has grown and highlight buzzworthy topics. For easy
browsing, the survey is divided into sections based on the specific area of the
law that applies to the primary issue in each case.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative law governs the actions of government agencies on local,
state, and federal levels. These actions can vary from rule-making to engaging
in contractual negotiations to enforcing a regulatory system. Very few major
sports law cases involve this body of the law, but, as shown in the following
case, the consequences of an agency's decision can have a powerful impact on
the future of a community.
Lynwood Redevelopment Agency v. Angeles Field Partners, LLC'
Angeles Field Partners, LLC (AFP) appealed a trial court's decision to
invalidate the Lynwood (California) Redevelopment Agency's (LRA)
approval of two agreements related to a redevelopment project proposed by
AFP that included a new football stadium that could be used to lure a National
Football League (NFL) team back to Los Angeles. During the contract
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1. No. B210165, 2009 Cal. App. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9770 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2009).
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
negotiations, four members of the LRA were also sitting on the Lynwood City
Council. Subsequently, the city's electorate voted to recall those individuals.
But before new council members could be sworn in, the outgoing members
voted to approve the agreements with AFP. Once they were gone, the newly-
constituted LRA sought to invalidate its prior approval of the project.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the agreements were valid under
state law. It emphasized that (1) the four outgoing members of the city council
were still active when the agreements were approved; (2) the LRA did not
have standing to sue itself for violating California's open meetings law, even if
it did not give properly notify the public that it would be voting on issues
related to the redevelopment project; and (3) the agreements were not
unconscionable. In making its third conclusion, the court noted that the LRA
was attempting to use a contract theory to try to vindicate social policy, which
was impermissible under contract law.
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Alternative dispute resolution is an extrajudicial method of settling
potentially litigious issues between parties. It usually involves the use of
mediation and arbitration, the latter of which is often relied upon to resolve
disagreements between employers and employees. Almost every collective
bargaining agreement between a professional sports league and a players'
union includes a provision requiring the arbitration of certain types of
disputes. The following materials demonstrate some of the issues that courts
have faced when assessing settlements between parties or the legal effect of a
contractual arbitration provision. This section also includes the cases tackled
by the American Arbitration Association in its designated role as the exclusive
body to resolve disputes related to athlete-eligibility under the Ted Stevens
Amateur Sports Act. (Stevens Act).
Bennett v. U.S.A Water Polo, Inc.2
Former Team USA water polo coach Alex Bennett moved to remand his
lawsuit against USA Water Polo to state court after it was removed when the
national governing body claimed there was a federal question as to whether
Bennett's tort claims were pre-empted by the Stevens Act. The court held it
did not have federal question jurisdiction, but granted leave to USA Water
Polo to conduct discovery as to whether the amount-in-controversy
requirement was satisfied in order to establish diversity jurisdiction. The court
emphasized that federal question jurisdiction does not exist if removal is based
2. No. 08-23533-CIV-KING, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37753 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2009).
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on a law that creates an internal mechanism to resolve disputes arising under
it. The court noted that the Stevens Act provided that type of mechanism to
USA Water Polo, and even allowed for possible appeals through arbitration.
Cayo v. Valor Fighting & Mgmt. LLC 3
After the court denied an insurance broker and insurance company's
motion to dismiss claims brought against them by mixed martial arts (MMA)
fighter Richard Cayo, the broker moved for a determination that its subsequent
settlement agreements with Cayo and MMA event organizer Valor Fighting &
Management (VFM) were made in good faith, thereby satisfying claims that
had been or could be brought against it due to its alleged failure to procure a
policy that would cover any liabilities associated with a VFM-sponsored
event. Cayo brought claims against VFM, the broker, and two insurance
companies after he suffered injuries in a match at the event and VFM failed to
assume liability for them, which was required under their contractual
agreement. His claims against the broker arose out of a separate contract
between VFM and the host facility, under which VFM was obligated to obtain
insurance coverage for any liabilities associated with the event. Cayo alleged
he was the intended beneficiary of their agreement, and that he could recover
against the broker in tort if it had, in fact, failed to procure a policy for the
promoter. However, due to uncertainty about whether a policy had been
secured, Cayo also brought breach of contract claims against the insurance
companies, who opposed the broker's motion.
The court granted the motion. In approving the settlement with Cayo, the
court emphasized that the insurance companies were not challenging the good
faith of the agreement, only the broker's proposed order to bar any future
claims against it. The court noted that state law already protected the insurance
companies' interests by continuing to allow claims based on express
indemnity agreements. In approving the settlement with VFM, the court
concluded that state law did not require the promoter to file a cross-claim
before settling with a co-defendant, and that the insurance companies failed to
show the combined amount of the settlements was not rationally related to the
broker's share of Cayo's injuries.
Crowell v. U.S. Equestrian Fed'n4
Former Olympian Dorothy Crowell appealed a U.S. Equestrian Federation
3. No. C 08-4763 CW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48201 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2009), settlement
approved, No. C 08-4763 CW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103067 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2009).
4. AAA 77 190 E 00193 09 (May 3, 2009).
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hearing panel's decision to disqualify her from being able to participate in an
upcoming event. The national governing body's rules provide that riders and
horses must meet qualifying requirements in order to participate at certain
levels of competition. One of those rules stipulates that any rider who falls
from the same horse twice in a twelve-month period will cause the horse to
lose its qualification to compete at the level of the event in which the second
fall occurred. In September 2008, Crowell's horse, Radio Flyer, became
entangled in a fence at an event, forcing her to dismount. The governing body
labeled the incident a fall. Eight months later, Crowell fell from Radio Flyer in
another event, causing the horse to lose its qualification. Crowell argued the
rule was being applied retroactively because it did not become effective until
December 2008. An American Arbitration Association panel upheld the
decision, determining that the rule was not applied retroactively to her
September 2008 fall, but following her second fall, which occurred after the
rule was enacted. Examining relevant cases under New York law, which was
used to interpret the rules, the panel noted that courts have consistently held
that a rule is not retroactive simply because its application is based in part on
events that ocurred prior to its effective date.
Grillier v. CSMG Sports, Ltd. 5
After losing its motion for a separate trial on the issue of arbitrability, an
athlete representation agency moved to compel arbitration of breach of
contract claims brought against it by athlete-agent Kim Grillier after he failed
to receive a percentage of the fees generated by National Basketball
Association (NBA) clients that he recruited to the agency. The parties
executed a written consulting agreement when Grillier originally joined the
agency as an independent contractor. The agreement stated that any dispute
over its provisions had to be settled in arbitration. But three years later, Grillier
allegedly became an official employee under an oral contract. He claimed the
contract was consistent with the agency's prior promise to pay him a
percentage of the fees generated by the clients that he recruited, but that it did
not provide for arbitration of disputes arising under it. Fees were allegedly
generated from ten different players, five of whom signed after Grillier
became an employee.
The court granted the motion on the claims for compensation for players
that Grillier recruited as an independent contractor, but denied it on the claims
premised on the alleged oral contract. The court found the arbitration clause in
5. No. 08-CV-12449, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2168 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 12, 2009), motion to compel
arbitration granted in part, No. 08-CV-12449, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50476 (E.D. Mich. June 16,
2009).
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the consulting agreement contemplated any dispute related to compensation,
so it was broad enough to encompass claims related to the agency's alleged
promise. The court also noted that any doubt over whether the arbitration
clause continued to apply once Grillier became an employee had to be
resolved in favor of arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act; however, it
concluded that the language of the written agreement did not contemplate any
dispute related to compensation earned by Grillier if he became an employee.
Hennefer v. U.S. Sailing6
Sailboat captain James Hennefer appealed a U.S. Sailing protest
committee's decision not to modify the results of a race in the 2009 World
Championship Qualifying Series for the International One Design after three
other boats sailed the wrong course on San Francisco Bay. In addition to a
change in the scores, Hennefer sought a Racing Rules of Sailing (RRS) report
of bad sportsmanship because the other boats failed to withdraw after learning
of their mistake. After conducting a hearing, the protest committee upheld the
decision of the race officer not to change the results because all but one boat
had sailed off-course and their errors were not prejudicial. In that situation,
race officials are taught to let the results stand.
An American Arbitration Association panel determined that it could not
modify the results because the United States Olympic Committee (USOC)
Bylaws prevent overturning field of play decisions. It emphasized that the
race officer's ruling on whether to disqualify the three boats was a judgment
call based on his subjective assessment of the conditions, and that there was no
evidence that he acted inappropriately in making his decision. The panel also
found that the requested change in scores would not be sufficient to remedy
the error committed. It noted that the confusion caused by the race
committee's instructions had caused all but one boat to sail the wrong course,
and that the RRS require any protest committee changes to be as fair as
possible to all boats effected. The panel also concluded that no boat could be
found guilty of violating the sportsmanship rule because none of them
believed they had committed a mistake.
Hicks v. HSInternational Sports Mgmt., Inc. 7
A California-based sports management company and one of its agents
moved to compel arbitration of claims brought against them by a client,
professional track and field athlete Kevin Hicks, when they failed to enter him
6. AAA 77 190 00252 09 (June 25, 2009).
7. No. 09-6185-HO, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103138 (D. Or. Oct. 27, 2009).
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in enough events to satisfy his endorsement contract with Nike, and retained
and cashed a $12,000 payment that he had received after he had unilaterally
terminated their representation agreement. The agent first approached Hicks
following a collegiate track race in Florida, and later induced him to give up
his remaining amateur eligibility and turn pro. Hicks signed a representation
agreement with the management company that entitled it to keep fifteen
percent of his earnings from competitions, appearance fees, bonuses, and
endorsement deals. However, the agreement also allowed Hicks to terminate
the arrangement at any time. Subsequently, the management company
negotiated a long-term endorsement contract with Nike, under which Hicks
would earn at least $450,000 if he competed in a designated number of
sanctioned events. After they failed to enter him in enough events to satisfy
the Nike agreement, Hicks informed them that they could no longer endorse
checks on his behalf. One month later, he terminated the representation
agreement. The court granted the motion, holding the arbitration clause in the
representation agreement was sufficiently broad to encompass Hicks's claims
regarding its enforceability, not just his claims arising out of it. The court
emphasized that Hicks failed to argue that the arbitration clause was void;
rather, he claimed the entire agreement was void, and the clause's language
covered that type of dispute.
Hunter v. U.S. Amateur Boxing, Inc. 8
Michael Hunter appealed a U.S. Amateur Boxing committee's decision to
disqualify him for using an illegal hand wrap during his victory over Lenroy
Thompson in one of the national governing body's sanctioned tournaments. A
U.S. Amateur Boxing technical rule dictates that hand wraps can be no longer
than fifteen yards in length, and one of Hunter's wraps admittedly exceeded
that standard. However, the rule does not prescribe any consequences for its
violation. An American Arbitration Association (AAA) panel reinstated the
decision of the match's referee because the governing body did not have the
authority to disqualify Hunter. The panel emphasized that Hunter was entitled
to know the consequences for violating a rule before sanctions could be
imposed. It also found that U.S. Amateur Boxing violated its own rules by (1)
failing to supervise the wrapping, (2) failing to provide a mechanism to appeal
the committee's decision, and (3) failing to provide due process to either of the
affected athletes. The panel noted that the violation would not have occurred if
the first rule had been followed, and the referee's decision would not have
been overturned if the other rules had been followed.
8. AAA No. 77 190 E 00279 09 (June 16, 2009).
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Jeffers v. D'Alessandro9
Former professional football player Patrick Jeffers appealed a trial court's
decision that compelled arbitration of his claims against the Carolina Panthers
and the court's subsequent judgment that affirmed an arbitrator's award
dismissing those claims, which arose out of the surgery performed on his
knees by the team's physicians. Jeffers tore the ACL in his right knee during a
preseason game before the 2000 season, and agreed to allow one of the team's
physicians to repair the tear and a second team physician to perform minor
arthroscopic procedures on his other knee. Following the procedure, Jeffers
was able to rehabilitate his right knee, but suffered weakness in his other knee,
and pain and swelling in both knees. After playing in a few games the
following season, he was released by the Panthers in August 2002. Jeffers
brought tort claims against the team for its decision to retain the second team
physician, who allegedly performed additional, unauthorized procedures
during the surgery that resulted in the deterioration of his knees and
prematurely ended his career. After the trial court granted the team's motion to
compel arbitration, an arbitrator dismissed Jeffers's grievance because it was
not filed within the time limit set forth in the National Football League (NFL)
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
The appellate court affirmed, holding that Jeffers's claims were pre-
empted by the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and subject to
arbitration under the terms of the CBA. The court emphasized that any state
law claim that was substantially dependent upon the application of the
provisions of the CBA was pre-empted by the LMRA, and determined that
Jeffers's claims were entirely dependent upon a duty allegedly violated by the
team's physician that did not exist independent of that agreement. It reasoned
that any duty the Panthers had to use reasonable care in retaining the physician
arose only because the team hired him, and that the duty to hire him arose
solely from the CBA. The court also noted that Jeffers did not have to contend
that the team failed to comply with the specific provisions of the CBA in order
to find his claims were pre-empted, emphasizing that most labor contracts
include implied rights and that an arbitrator would likely conclude that the
agreement at issue required teams to not only retain physicians, but competent
physicians. Finally, the court found there was no reason why the arbitration
award should not be confirmed, noting Jeffers's claims were subject to
arbitration because they involved the application of the CBA's medical rights
provision.
9. 681 S.E.2d 405 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
2010]
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Pressler v. Duke Univ. 10
Duke University and one of its employees appealed a trial court's order
that denied their motion to stay proceedings pending the arbitration of
defamation claims brought against them by former Duke lacrosse coach Mike
Pressler. The university and Pressler entered into a three-year contract in June
2005 that incorporated by reference the school's dispute resolution policy.
Under the policy, all disputes arising out of Pressler's employment were
subject to arbitration. However, in 2006, Pressler resigned in the midst of
allegations that members of the lacrosse program had raped a stripper at a
team party. As part of Pressler's settlement package, all obligations arising
from earlier agreements between the parties were cancelled, and both parties
agreed not to make disparaging comments about one another. None of the
terms in the package mentioned the arbitration of any claims arising in the
future or the school's dispute resolution policy. Subsequently, a University
employee made allegedly slanderous remarks about Pressler to a reporter, and
another unnamed school official made allegedly false statements about his
employment to the Associated Press. The appellate court affirmed, holding
there was competent evidence to support the conclusion that there was no
longer a valid arbitration agreement between the parties when the alleged
defamation took place. It emphasized that Pressler's settlement package
included a mutual release cancelling all obligations arising out of his 2005
employment contract, and that the coach could only be subject to the
University's dispute resolution policy through the now-cancelled agreement.
Streeter v. Oakland RaidersII
The Oakland Raiders and franchise owner Al Davis appealed a trial
court's decision to deny their motion to compel arbitration of claims brought
against them by former Raiders employee George Streeter after the team fired
him just eight months after it had allegedly offered him the position for a term
of one year. After he was fired, Streeter sought to find out if he had any legal
recourse against the team. A friend within the NFL put him in contact with the
league's counsel on litigation matters. There was a factual dispute over how
much Streeter was informed about the league's dispute resolution process
during their conversation, but he was advised to write a letter to NFL
Commissioner Roger Goodell. Streeter complied with that request, informing
the commissioner that he was seeking relief under guidelines established by
the league to protect employees. Shortly afterwards, the league's counsel
10. 685 S.E.2d 6 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
11. No. A122994, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8260 (Oct. 16, 2009).
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wrote to Streeter and the Raiders, with the subject line of the letter entitled
"Dispute Certified for Arbitration." The letter claimed that Streeter's
correspondence to the commissioner had requested arbitration of their
employment dispute. Just over a month later, the league's counsel emailed
Streeter to inform him that an arbitrator wanted to schedule a conference call.
Streeter claimed this email made him realize that his dispute would be
resolved through a procedure that he did not want to use. He hired an attorney,
who informed the arbitrator that the NFL did not have jurisdiction over
Streeter's dispute with the Raiders. Less than three weeks later, Streeter filed
the instant suit.
The appellate court affirmed, holding there was no error in finding that
Streeter had not agreed to submit his dispute to the league's dispute resolution
process or waived his right to object to it. The court found that Streeter did not
have a pre-dispute understanding that his grievances would be submitted to
arbitration, noting that there was no written agreement governing the terms of
his employment. It also determined that his communications with the NFL did
not show an intent to initiate the dispute resolution process. Even though he
had referred to the league's "guidelines" in his letter to the commissioner, he
did not refer to the league's policy, let alone indicate that he agreed to it.
Finally, the court concluded that Streeter's delay in objecting to the process
was justified, emphasizing that his early communications with the league's
counsel had convinced him that the league's dispute resolution guidelines
were not binding.
U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Brunemann 12
Former National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) swimming
champion Emily Brunemann tested positive for a substance banned under the
International Swimming Federation (FINA) rules in August 2008. It was her
first anti-doping violation. After returning from a trip to Mexico, the soon-to-
be University of Michigan senior ingested a pill from a bottle containing her
mother's prescription medication. She thought the pill was a laxative, but it
was actually medication prescribed to treat a condition of which Brunemann
was unaware. The label on the bottle clearly stated that the pills contained the
banned substance and Brunemann did not consult any USADA materials,
check the USADA website, or call the USADA drug hotline before taking one.
The USADA argued for a two-year ban under the 2009 World Anti-Doping
Code. Brunemann argued the 2003 version of the code should apply based on
when the violation occurred. Under the older version, an athlete that tested
12. AAA No. 77 190 E 00447 08 (Jan. 26, 2009).
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positive for a substance that was particularly susceptible to anti-doping
violations could receive no more than a one-year ban for her first violation if
the use of the substance was not intended to enhance performance.
The North American Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) panel
determined that Brunemann should receive a six-month ban under the
provisions of the 2003 WADA Code. It emphasized that the doctrine of lex
mitior required it to use the version with the less severe sanction. In
determining the period of ineligibility, the panel noted that other athletes had
received sanctions of less than six months for accidently ingesting banned
substances, including the diuretic at issue. However, the panel also found that
Brunemann had failed to take basic steps to avoid ingesting it. After
comparing her degree of fault to the degree of fault of the other athletes, the
panel determined that she should be punished more harshly, but that her
inexperience with the USADA testing procedures, her lack of individualized
training in anti-doping matters, and her lack of intent to cheat made the
maximum ban too severe to impose.
U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. 0 'Nei113
Judo star Joshua O'Neil tested positive for a ritilanic acid, a substance
contained in the prescription drug Ritalin and banned under 2009 WADA
Code. It was his first anti-doping violation. O'Neil took a Ritalin tablet two
days prior to the competition in which he tested positive. He claimed that he
took the drug to prepare for an upcoming firefighter examination. He sought a
reduction of the standard two-year suspension handed out for first offenses,
arguing that (1) he did not take the drug with the intent to gain a competitive
advantage and (2) the proposed sanction disproportionately affected his chance
to qualify for the 2012 Olympics. The North American CAS panel upheld the
USADA's imposition of a two-year suspension, but applied it retroactively to
the date when the violation occurred. The panel was not convinced that O'Neil
did not know that Ritalin was banned, emphasizing that he could have logged
onto the USADA's website and discovered that the agency had clearly
established that the drug was prohibited. The court also found that the sanction
was proportionate to his violation, noting that the WADA Code prohibited it
from considering the schedule of sporting events in determining the length of a
suspension. The ban was applied retroactively because O'Neil admitted his
mistake and was forthright with the panel in his testimony.
13. AAA No. 77 190 00384 09 (Dec. 9, 2009).
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US. Anti-Doping Agency v. Page14
Cyclo-cross athlete Jonathan Page failed to report for a drug test following
a World Cup event, which constituted an anti-doping violation in the absence
of a compelling justification under the International Cycling Union's (UCI)
rules. Prior to the event, Page was chosen as a reserve rider that might have to
provide a drug sample. That selection required him to report to the anti-doping
control station within thirty minutes of the end of the race. His rider number
was posted to indicate his selection in accordance with the UCI rules. The
USADA argued for a two-year ban, even though Page would not have been
tested. Page argued that exceptional circumstances should excuse his absence.
He also claimed that the USADA notified the UCI as early as 2007 that it
would only pursue charges against reserve riders who would have actually
been tested.
The North American CAS panel determined that Page did not commit a
doping violation. It noted that Page was obligated to report regardless of
whether he would be tested, but held he had demonstrated compelling
justifications for his absence. During the race, Page had suffered a concussion
and other injuries in a crash, which forced him to pull out before finishing. In
addition, the two backup individuals that he normally designated to look at the
numbers posted at the anti-doping control station had failed to check on his
status. Finally, a number of other personal circumstances leading up to the
race also prevented him from being as attentive to the anti-doping
requirements. The panel emphasized that there was no evidence that Page was
aware of his selection or had deliberately avoided a potential test.
U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Hardy15
World record-holding swimmer Jessica Hardy tested positive for a banned
substance under FINA rules during the U.S. Olympic Trials in July 2008. It
was her first anti-doping violation. During the trials, the 21-year-old was
tested on three separate occasions. The results from the first test and third test
came back negative, but the second test came back positive. After being
notified of the result, Hardy decided to withdraw from the U.S. Olympic team.
Subsequently, the USADA was informed that the samples in her other two
tests revealed the presence of suspect transitions of the banned substance.
Hardy had been taking supplements manufactured by AdvoCare in 2007. The
USADA literature warns against taking supplements, and Hardy was aware of
the danger that they could be contaminated. However, she diligently
14. AAA No. 77 190 16 09 (Feb. 4, 2009).
15. AAA No. 77 190 00288 08 (May 2, 2009).
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researched AdvoCare's products and received assurances from the company
that they were safe. Following the positive test, Hardy sent supplements from
the same batch that she was taking to two different drug-testing laboratories.
Both labs determined that one of the products was contaminated with the
banned substance. The USADA argued for a two-year ban. Hardy argued that
her sanction should be reduced, and that the International Olympic
Committee's (IOC) recent amendment to Rule 45 of the Olympic Charter
should not be applied to her case. The amendment provided that any athlete
who received a ban of more than six months for a doping violation could not
participate in the Olympic Games that followed the expiration of that sanction.
If applied, it would have also made Hardy ineligible to compete in the 2012
Olympics.
The North American CAS panel determined that Hardy's ban should be
reduced to one year because she showed no significant fault or negligence in
taking the banned substance. It noted that Hardy had taken far more
precautions than other athletes sanctioned for using contaminated
supplements. Not only had she checked the label of the bottle, she had spent a
significant amount of effort determining that the source of the supplements
was not connected with banned substances. The panel recognized that there
were questions as to whether the small amount of the banned substance found
in the supplement could have caused the positive result; however, it
emphasized that Hardy did not have to prove a correlation between the
concentration of the banned substance in her sample and the actual amount
found in the supplement. In assessing the impact of Rule 45, the panel found
that its application under the circumstances would violate the doctrine of
proportionality. It also noted that the rule unilaterally altered the sanctions
imposed on athletes for their doping violations, which contradicted the IOC's
obligations under the World Anti-Doping Code. The panel refused to reduce
Hardy's ban based solely on the rule's effect, But after noting that the IOC
could appeal a decision that derogates from its rules, the panel allowed Hardy
to apply for a waiver, a remedy not provided by the Olympic Charter. The
panel gave her until July 31 to make a submission, and claimed that its
continued jurisdiction depended on the IOC's response.
ANTI-TRUST LAW
Antitrust laws are designed to protect consumers by either promoting or
maintaining market competition through the regulation of anti-competitive
conduct. That conduct is controlled at the federal level through the Sherman
Antitrust Act, which has been applied to sports entities to prevent conspiracies
to restrain trade or monopolistic practices. However, not all agreements that
[Vol. 20:2
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appear to be anti-competitive have been found illegal. In fact, courts have
recognized that teams in professional sports leagues must engage in certain
levels of cooperation in order to provide their product. In addition, those
leagues and other associations have been allowed to enact rules that govern the
conduct of athletes in order to ensure health and safety and access to an equal
playing field. The following cases demonstrate how courts typically assess
antitrust issues, whether they are dealing with internal league conduct or
conduct as it relates to a third party.
Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc. 16
The ATP Tour moved for an award of attorneys' fees after successfully
defending itself against antitrust claims brought by the national governing
bodies for tennis in Germany and Qatar. There was no allegation that those
claims were frivolous or filed in bad faith. However, shortly after the lawsuit
was initiated, the ATP Tour enacted a new bylaw purporting to entitle it to
attorneys' fees if it was victorious in legal disputes with its members. The
court denied the motion, holding that the association's bylaw did not fit in the
narrow contractual exception to the general rule governing attorneys' fees,
especially when it would be contrary to the policies underlying antitrust laws.
The court emphasized that it could find no cases in which a bylaw could form
the basis for awarding attorneys' fees when the bylaw itself was not even at
issue in the dispute. More importantly, it could find no cases in which a court
awarded attorneys' fees to a private defendant in an antitrust lawsuit. The
court noted that treble damages had been authorized by statute to encourage
private enforcement of antitrust laws and that allowing defendants to obtain
attorneys' fees would thwart the effect of that incentive.
Pecover v. Elec. Arts Inc. 17
Electronic Arts Inc. (EA) moved to dismiss federal and state law claims
brought against it by two individuals after EA allegedly cut off competition in
the market to produce interactive football software by acquiring the exclusive
rights to create video games using the intellectual property of the NFL, the
NCAA, and the Arena Football League (AFL). The court granted the motion
in part and denied it in part. It noted that the individuals had no standing to
bring claims under the laws of states other than the states in which they
purchased EA's Madden NFL games. However, the court held that the
individuals' allegations were sufficient to support their claims that EA violated
16. No. 07-178, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97851 (D. Del. Oct. 19, 2009).
17. 633 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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the Sherman Act, as well as California antitrust, unfair competition, and unjust
enrichment laws. In assessing the individuals' claim under section two of the
Sherman Act, the court emphasized that the "indirect purchaser" doctrine"
only bars antitrust claims for damages, not injunctive relief, and that the
alleged product market was plausible if there was no market for software with
a fictitious football setting. The court also found that EA could not rely on the
Seventh Circuit's holding in American Needle v. Nat'l Football League
because the exclusive contract in that case involved only one provider, while
the case at issue involved a number of providers. In assessing the individuals'
state antitrust claim, the court noted that California courts had previously
determined that vertical restraints of trade-like exclusive licensing
agreements-could violate the law under a rule of reason analysis.
Ky. Speedway, LLC v. Nat'l Ass 'n of Stock Car Auto Racing18
The entity that owns the Kentucky Speedway appealed a district court's
decision to grant summary judgment to NASCAR and one of its affiliated
companies on an antitrust claim brought against them by the entity after they
refused to schedule a Sprint Cup race at the track. The entity built the
Kentucky Speedway specifically for the purpose of hosting NASCAR races;
however, it, it was unable to secure one of the prestigious Sprint Cup races,
which are handed out by NASCAR through its affiliated company. The Sixth
Circuit affirmed, holding that the entity failed to define an appropriate product
market or show that they had suffered an antitrust injury. The court
emphasized that the market testimony of the entity's expert witnesses did not
satisfy the reliability requirements of the Daubert test and that the entity could
not demonstrate that the defendants colluded in choosing not to award it a
Sprint Cup race. The court found that the entity could show nothing more than
the fact that it was a victim of the defendants' business judgment.
Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n 19
After prevailing on the Warrior Sports, Inc.'s earlier motion for a
preliminary injunction, the NCAA moved for summary judgment on antitrust
and tortious interference claims brought against it by the lacrosse equipment
manufacturer after the association decided to change the rule dictating the size
of lacrosse sticks that may be used in intercollegiate competition. The NCAA
first changed the rule in 2007, which rendered all of the equipment
18. 588 F.3d 908 (6th Cir. 2009).
19. No. 08-14812, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7717 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2009), motion for summary
judgment granted, No. 08-14812, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25700 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2009).
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manufacturer's sticks illegal to use in competition. However, a stick made
under the new rule's minimum dimensions would have violated a patent on a
head design owned by the equipment manufacturer. The NCAA asked the
company if it was willing to provide other manufacturers with a license to use
the patent. When the company said it would not agree to license its patent in
the abstract, the NCAA decided to change the rule again, reducing the
minimum dimensions for the front of the stick head.
The court granted the motion, holding that the equipment manufacturer's
Sherman Act claim failed because the rule was not commercial in nature, and
that its tortious interference claim failed because the change was not made for
an unlawful purpose. In assessing the antitrust claim, the court found that the
rule did not relate to the NCAA's business activities; instead, it was directed
towards increasing the quality of play on the field. The court also found that
the change between the old rule and new rule did not restrict commerce
because all sticks permitted under the old rule were still permitted under the
new rule, and some sticks not previously permitted were made legal. It
dismissed the tortious interference claim on a similar note, concluding that the
latest rule change was made to increase the number of sticks that would be
allowed.
BANKRUPTCY LAW
Bankruptcy law emerged as a prominent force in the sports world this
year. In general, these laws are designed to balance the competing interests of
creditors and debtors; they help creditors recoup some of their sunken
investments in individuals and organizations while ensuring that debtors
emerge with their financial health intact. But as shown in the following cases,
both teams and individuals are attempting to use these laws to avoid their
obligations in profound and often historic ways.
In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC
20
After the court denied a motion for an order that would allow the then-
owners of the Phoenix Coyotes to sell the franchise out of bankruptcy free and
clear of all encumbrances, the NHL and a limited partnership owned by
Canadian billionaire Jim Balsillie made separate bids to purchase the club. The
NRL's bid was $140 million, reduced by funds that the league had advanced
to the franchise since late 2008 in order to pay its operating losses. The league
also promised to keep the franchise playing at its current home through the
2009-10 season while it looked for a local purchaser. Balsillie's bid ran
20. 406 B.R. 30 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009), sale denied, 414 B.R. 577 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009).
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anywhere from $52.5 million to $72.5 million dollars higher than the NHL's
bid, depending on whether the City of Glendale accepted his $50 million offer
to terminate their facility lease agreement so he could move the franchise to
Hamilton, Ontario. Although Balsillie originally wanted to move the team
prior to the 2009-10 season, he subsequently indicated that he would be
willing to keep it in Arizona until the following year. However, awarding the
team to Balsillie without approval of the league would circumvent the NHL
Bylaws, which prohibit the transfer of ownership or relocation of a franchise
without the consent of at least seventy-five percent of the league's owners.
Balsillie sought approval in the months prior to the auction date, but the
league rejected his application, citing character issues. It claimed that he had
engaged in bad faith negotiations during two previous attempts to acquire a
franchise, and that his conduct during the bankruptcy litigation had subjected
the NHL to public ridicule. But even if the league had approved his
application, there were doubts about whether he could still relocate the
franchise. In addition to the restrictions in the bylaws, the NHL Constitution
gives each club the right to veto any proposed relocation that would infringe
upon its territorial rights, which extend to any area within fifty miles of the
city where it is located. Under that definition, the Toronto Maple Leafs appear
to have territorial rights over Hamilton, which is located just forty miles from
the provincial capital. Unless Balsillie's $50 million offer was accepted, the
facility lease agreement also appeared to lock the Coyotes into playing in the
desert through 2035. It provided that the City of Glendale would be able to
seek specific performance to ensure the team's home games were played in its
new arena, which was built in exchange for the franchise's commitment to
stay in Arizona.
The court denied Balsillie's bid with prejudice and denied the NHL's bid
without prejudice. In assessing Balsillie's bid, the court noted that the
bankruptcy laws allowed it to sell an asset free and clear of any purported
interests that were subject to a "bona fide dispute." However, even assuming
that the interests of the NHL and the City of Glendale were subject to such a
dispute, the court could not accept his bid. It emphasized that other laws
required courts to provide adequate protection to all interests at stake, and that
the proceeds of a sale would not protect the league's right to determine who
can own a franchise and where those franchises will be located. In turning
down the NHL's bid, the court emphasized that the league could not select the
unsecured creditors it would pay in full, thereby preventing the debtor and
former Coyotes coach Wayne Gretzky from recouping their personal loans to
the team. It found the proposed distribution inconsistent with one of the policy
of treating similar creditors equally, and that the league had failed to give a
compelling reason for its exclusions.
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Top Rank, Inc. v. Ortiz (In re Ortiz)21
Boxing match promoter Top Rank, Inc. appealed a bankruptcy court's
decision to grant summary judgment to boxer Victor Ortiz on his claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief from the promoter's attempt to enforce their
executory contract with an exclusivity clause. The bankruptcy court held that
it rejected the contract was rejected by law because the trustee failed to assume
the boxer's obligations under it. Ortiz claimed the Top Rank, Inc. interfered
with his efforts to enter into a contract with Golden Boy Productions, another
boxing promoter, by asserting that its agreement was still valid. The district
court reversed, holding that the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that the
trustee's decision terminated the contract under state law and that the
exclusivity provision was unenforceable as an unreasonable restraint of trade.
The district court emphasized that the trustee's decision had no effect on the
contract's continued existence; therefore, Top Rank, Inc. could seek damages
against Ortiz's estate or any number of equitable remedies if monetary
payments were not a viable alternative. The court concluded that the
reasonableness of the exclusivity provision should not have been addressed
because Top Rank, Inc. had no notice that its enforceability was at issue, and
there was not enough evidence to make a reasoned determination.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Constitutional law provides individuals with varying types of protection
from the acts of the government, whether at the federal or state level. Most of
the constitutional issues in the field of sports law arise out of disputes
involving government entities, educational institutions, athletic associations,
and student-athletes. However, courts have firmly established that
participation in high school or collegiate athletics is not a protected interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment. This area of the law is also rarely applied to
the decisions of private associations and leagues. In the absence of search and
seizure issues, courts have almost always deferred to their judgment and
allowed them to conduct their business in any manner they see fit. The
following cases provide a broad glimpse at how constitutional issues have
been tackled, including those arising out of the federal government's high-
profile investigation of steroid abuse in Major League Baseball.
21. 400 B.R. 755 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
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Cornerstone Christian Sch. v. Univ. Interscholastic League22
A parochial school, one of its student-athletes, and the student-athlete's
parents appealed a district court's decision to grant the University
Interscholastic League's (UIL) motion to dismiss their claims that the athletic
association violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment when it denied the
school an opportunity to become a member. The school had previously been a
member of the Texas Association of Private and Parochial Schools, but that
organization voted not to renew its annual contract with the school after
discovering that the school had committed various recruiting infractions. The
UIL rules prohibited non-public schools from applying for membership unless
they could establish that they did not qualify for membership in any similar
organization and they had not had their right to participate revoked by a
similar organization for violating that organization's rules.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the UIL rule did not infringe the
plaintiffs' First or Fourteenth Amendment rights because it was a neutral
regulation that just happened to place an incidental burden on the free exercise
of religion. In assessing the First Amendment claim, the court emphasized that
the rule did not distinguish between different types of non-public schools and
did not deny any students the right to practice their faith. After assessing the
Fourteenth Amendment claims, the court concluded that the rule did not
unduly restrict the student-athlete's parents' substantive due process right to
control the education of their child because it did not prohibit them from
enrolling the child at the parochial school or place any restriction on the
exercise of that choice. The court found that the rule did not violate equal
protection mandates because its distinction between public and non-public
schools was not based on a suspect classification and was rationally related to
a legitimate state interest.
Jones v. Wash. Interscholastic Activities Ass 'n
23
A public high school football coach appealed a district court's decision to
grant summary judgment to the Washington Interscholastic Activities
Association (WIAA) on the coach's claim that the association's out-of-season
coaching rule violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the rule was subject to
rational basis review and passed muster under that standard because it was
rationally related to the WIAA's legitimate state interest in creating equitable
competition among student-athletes. In assessing the type of scrutiny to apply
22. 563 F.3d 127 (5th Cir. 2009).
23. 342 Fed.. Appx. 264 (9th Cir. 2009).
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to the rule, the court emphasized that the plaintiffs contractual right to coach
football did not equate to a fundamental right, and that football coaches were
not a suspect class subject to extra protection. The court also noted that any
disparity between the treatment of public and private school coaches under the
rule was permissible because parallel regulatory schemes do not have to be
identical; as long as the schemes were both rationally related to legitimate
state interests, public school coaches could be forced to work within smaller
geographic boundaries.
Ladd v. Uecker 2
4
Ann Ladd appealed a trial court's decision to deny her motion to vacate or
modify an injunction issued by a court commissioner that barred her from
attending baseball games being called by Milwaukee Brewers radio
broadcaster Bob Uecker. The injunction was issued after Uecker obtained a
temporary restraining order to prevent Ladd from continuing to stalk him. She
claimed that the order violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to travel. The
appellate court affirmed, holding that the injunction was reasonable given
Ladd's repeated harassment of Uecker. The court emphasized that restrictions
on an individual's right to travel do not violate the federal constitution as long
as they are narrowly crafted to protect the person being harassed.
Lopera v. Town of Coventry25
Four police officers employed by the Town of Coventry moved for
summary judgment on Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and state
law claims brought against them by former members of a high school boys
soccer team after the officers subjected them to a search for allegedly stolen
property in front of an angry mob of students and adults following a road
game at another high school. The Town and its current and former police
chiefs also moved for summary judgment on Fourteenth Amendment claims
brought against them for failing to train the officers. Following the game, the
team's coach was intercepted on his way to the team's bus by a large group of
the other school's football players, who then accused members of the team of
stealing electronic devices from a locker room. The coach responded by
searching the bags of every member of the team on the bus, but none of the
allegedly missing items were discovered. However, by the time the search was
completed, the football players had been joined by at least thirty more
24. No. 2009AP444, 2009 Wis. App. LEXIS 931 (Dec. 8, 2009), af'd, 2010 Wis. App. LEXIS
60 (Jan. 27, 2010).
25. 652 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.R.I. 2009).
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individuals, made up of the other school's students and several adults. The
mob began shouting racist remarks at the team, and claimed it would not
disperse until the missing items were turned over. Shortly afterwards, the four
defendant police officers arrived on the scene. The coach brought the officers
up to speed on the situation, including his search of the players' bags.
However, the officers wanted to conduct their own investigation, and the
coach consented to another search of the team. The players were ordered off
the bus and told to stand with their backs against the bus while the officers
searched their belongings. Some members of the team were also subjected to
pat downs. The entire search lasted approximately one hour, but at no point
during that time did the officers make an effort to disperse the mob, which
continued verbally assaulting the players. Once again, none of the allegedly
missing items were discovered.
The court granted the motions on all of the plaintiffs' claims. It held the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment and
state law invasion of privacy claims, and that a reasonable jury could not
conclude their conduct was racially motivated, which foreclosed the plaintiffs'
§ 1983 equal protection claim and state law racial profiling and ethnic
intimidation claims. In assessing the Fourth Amendment and invasion of
privacy claims, the court found that the law regarding permissible public
school searches was not so clearly established as to give the officers notice
that a chaperoning coach could not consent to a search of his players in loco
parentis. It emphasized that the officers could have reasonably believed that
they could rely on the coach's consent, so they were entitled to immunity from
liability for their subsequent acts. The court also noted that a written police
policy and a state law regulating the interrogation of minors could not clarify
the state of federal constitutional law. In assessing the equal protection and
state law claims based on racial discrimination, the court found that nothing
could be inferred from the facts that suggested the officers singled out the
plaintiffs. It noted that the coach had informed the officers that the team was
under suspicion, and the search only took place following his consent. The
court held the police chiefs could not be found liable for failing to train the
officers because, even assuming a constitutional violation occurred, there was
no history of abuse in conducting searches of public school students that
would suggest they were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs' rights.
Finally, the court held the Town of Coventry could not be found liable for
failing to train the officers because, again, assuming a constitutional violation
occurred, there was no evidence that the officers' actions were dictated by a
known, widespread policy or custom that was deliberately indifferent to the
plaintiffs' rights.
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Mancuso v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass 'n26
High school swimmer Elizabeth Mancuso appealed a judgment affirming
the Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association's (MIAA) decision to
deny her a waiver to compete on her high school's team as a senior because
she had repeated her freshman year after transferring from another school. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the MIAA did not deny
Mancuso due process in declaring her ineligible or violate her right to equal
protection in applying its fifth-year student rule. In dismissing the due process
claim, the Court emphasized that Mancuso had no property interest in
participating in interscholastic athletics. In dismissing the equal protection
claim, the Court found that she was not treated differently from similarly-
situated high school swimmers because there was no evidence that swimmers
previously granted waivers had attended high school for five years. Even if
Mancuso was treated differently, the Court determined that she was not
subjected to invidious discrimination because there was no evidence that the
MIAA denied the waiver solely because she had competed for a private swim
club during her freshman year at her previous school. Finally, the Court held
that the MIAA restitution and seeding rules did not violate Mancuso's rights
under the state's civil rights legislation because they did not constitute
unlawful means of discouraging her from litigating the eligibility dispute.
Sala v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist.2
A public school district, its superintendent, and its high school football
coach moved for summary judgment on claims brought against them by the
father of one of the high school's football players after his son was dismissed
from the team in the middle of the season and then sparingly played when he
was later reinstated through a court order. The dismissal took place after the
player had run-ins with both law enforcement and school authorities earlier in
the season. In the first incident, the player and three of his teammates were
caught in possession of a small amount of marijuana and drinking at his
parents' home. When none of his teammates claimed ownership of the drug,
the player was arrested and later suspended from the team for the remainder of
the season. Following an appeal, the district and the player's father entered
into a settlement agreement, reducing the suspension to four weeks as long as
the player adhered to the school's code of conduct. However, just a few weeks
later, the player was observed speeding in the school's parking lot following a
game. When a school employee urged him to slow down, the player allegedly
26. 900 N.E.2d 518 (Mass. 2009).
27. No. 06 CV 8185 (HB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67353 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009).
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responded in a profane manner. Later, he was ticketed for remaining in the lot
past curfew. The following week, the coach kicked the player off of the team.
On another appeal to the district, the player's father was given an opportunity
to defend his son's latest actions. But, he failed to present any evidence to
support his arguments, and the superintendent sustained the decision.
Subsequently, the player's father filed the instant lawsuit and obtained a
permanent injunction that forced the school to place his son back on the team.
The school complied with that order, but the coach chose to limit the boy's
playing time despite previously acknowledging him as one of the stars of the
team.
The court granted the motion for summary judgment, holding that the
player's father could not prove his constitutional rights were violated or that
the defendants breached their settlement agreement. In assessing the
procedural due process claims, the court did not discuss whether the player
had been deprived of a protected interest because the defendants had afforded
his father "all the process that was due." It determined that he had been given
an opportunity to be heard throughout the appeals process and that he had been
properly notified of the reasons supporting the district's decision. In assessing
the substantive due process claims, the court emphasized that the player did
not have a constitutional right to participate in interscholastic athletics, and
that, even if he did, the defendants' conduct was not egregious enough to be
actionable. After assessing the First Amendment retaliation claim, the court
concluded that there was no evidence linking the father's decision to initiate
the lawsuit and the coach's later decision to limit the boy's playing time. It
noted that the coach had provided legitimate reasons for his decision, which
were entitled to a large degree of deference from the court. Finally, in
dismissing the breach of contract claim, the court emphasized that the
settlement agreement only created only conditions precedent to the player's
reinstatement, not a bar that immunized him from his future transgressions.
Sharon City Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass 'n28
High school basketball player Brittany Benedetto and her local school
district moved for a preliminary injunction in a lawsuit that they brought
against the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association (PIAA) after it
allegedly violated the federal and state constitution when it suspended
Benedetto for her school's first playoff game. Benedetto had been ejected
from the school's previous contest for her role in an altercation with an
opposing player, and the PIAA rules dictated that any player tossed from a
28. No. 9-213, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13037 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2009).
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game for unsportsmanlike conduct was disqualified from participating in her
school's next contest. Benedetto claimed that the penalty was arbitrary and
capricious because she was only acting in self-defense and that she was not
given due process because the rules did not provide an opportunity to appeal.
The court denied the motion, holding ineligibility for participation in
interscholastic athletics alone does not constitute the irreparable harm needed
to grant an injunction. The court also emphasized that the school district had
no underlying property interest in its reputation for winning games, and that
Benedetto's reputation could be restored during trial if she was actually acting
in self-defense.
Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd.29
Two San Francisco 49ers season-ticket holders appealed a decision
affirming a judgment that dismissed their claim that the team violated their
state constitutional right to privacy by implementing an NFL policy requiring
all fans to submit to a pat-down prior to entering a stadium. The California
Supreme Court reversed, holding that there were not enough facts in the
complaint to establish that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action. The
Court noted that the policy was likely implemented to enhance spectator
safety, but found that it could not rule on whether there was a significant
intrusion on the plaintiffs' privacy interests because it had to determine if they
had a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances. The Court
also concluded that the record lacked enough facts to find that the plaintiffs
consented to the search policy when they purchased the season tickets because
a person can only consent to intrusions that are reasonable, which requires a
court to balance the intrusion against the team's proffered justifications
according to a variety of different factors.
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.30
The federal government appealed three district court orders related to its
seizure of drug testing records and urine samples for hundreds of Major
League Baseball (MLB) players from an independent business that
administered the MLB drug testing program approved in the 2002 collective
bargaining agreement. Under the program, all urine samples and drug testing
records were to remain anonymous and confidential, and unless more than five
percent of the players tested positive for performance-enhancing substances
during the first year of the program, there would be no testing in future
29. 201 P.3d 472 (Cal. 2009).
30. 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009).
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seasons. However, that same year, the government began investigating the Bay
Area Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO), which was later found to have
provided performance-enhancing substances to several prominent athletes.
During that investigation, the government was notified of several players who
had tested positive under the MLB program. Subsequently, it obtained two
warrants. The first warrant, issued in the Central District of California (CDC),
allowed it to search the drug testing administrator's facilities, but was limited
to the drug testing records of the ten players as to whom the government had
probable cause. The second warrant, issued in the District of Nevada, allowed
the government to seize the urine samples of players from a laboratory in Las
Vegas. The government also obtained subpoenas, issued in the Northern
District of California, which demanded that the drug testing administrator
produce the records that had already been seized. Because the government
exceeded the scope of the CDC warrant, both the drug testing administrator
and the MLB Players' Association (MLBPA) moved for the return of the drug
testing records and urine samples--except for the materials related to the ten
previously identified players-and to squash the subpoenas. The courts in all
three districts granted the motions, chastising the government for failing to
follow the procedures specified in the CDC warrant.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed two of the orders and dismissed the third order
as untimely. However, in assessing the CDC's order, the court noted that all
factual determinations and issues resolved against the government were
binding in the other two jurisdictions. In that case, the court held the
government did not comply with the directive to segregate all information
related to the ten players as to which it had probable cause from information
related to other players because the initial screening of the data on the drug
testing administrator's computers was conducted by the investigating agents
instead of specially-trained computer personnel. In affirming the order from
Nevada, which mandated the return of the urine samples, the court emphasized
the preclusive effect of the CDC order and a previous order from the Northern
District of California that found the failure to segregate information covered
by the warrant from information that was not covered by the warrant was
illegal when both types of data were included in a directory viewed by case
agents. The court determined that the plain view doctrine could not apply to
the information contained in the directory because the government would have
an incentive to seize as much material as possible, and that the plaintiffs could
rely on Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to obtain the
return of seized material. The court noted that the MLBPA was likely to suffer
irreparable damage if the additional seized materials were not placed back
under lock and key, and that the government could not benefit from its own
wrongdoing by retaining illegally-obtained evidence. Finally, in affirming the
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order to quash the subpoenas issued in the Northern District of California, the
court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in finding them
unreasonable in light of the illegally-obtained evidence. It also recognized that
the subpoenas were only an insurance policy designed to keep the plaintiffs
from litigating the legality of a previously-obtained order that purported to
give the government access to all drug testing records and urine samples in the
drug testing administrator's possession.
CONTRACT LAW
Contract law is a creature of the centuries-old common law system that
has been preserved in many states' statutory schemes. It is also the most
important body of law in the world of sports. All relationships between
athletes, coaches, leagues, and schools are governed by contractual terms, as
are their relationships with outside parties. They are particularly important
when assessing whether liability can be imposed for tortious conduct and, if
so, whether the risk of incurring it can be shifted to another legal entity. The
follow cases deal with a host of contract issues that have challenged courts in
2009.
Balyszak v. Siena Col. 31
The United States Volleyball Association (USVBA) and its insurers
appealed a trial court's decision to partially grant Siena College's motion for
summary judgment on its cross claim for indemnification in a negligence
lawsuit brought against it by an individual that suffered injuries when a
referee's platform collapsed during a USVBA-sponsored tournament at the
school. The USVBA rented the tournament facility under a contract that stated
that the association would indemnify the school for any claims of injury
arising out of the rental period and provide it with a certificate of insurance
that named the school as an additional insured entity on its liability policy. The
certificate issued stated that the school was insured only against claims arising
out of the USVBA's negligence. There were genuine issues of fact as to
whether negligence by the school or the USVBA was the cause of the
plaintiffs injuries. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the facility rental
agreement required the USVBA to indemnify the school in the event of future
liability caused by either of their negligence. The court noted that language in
similar agreements had also been interpreted to extend indemnification even if
the party being indemnified was at fault. Finally, the court found that the
contractual liability provision in the USVBA's insurance policy gave rise to a
31. No. 506012, slip op.882 N.Y.S.2d (App. Div. June 18, 2009).
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duty to indemnify Siena. The provision provided coverage for contractual
duties to indemnify that were later assumed by the USVBA.
Bill A. Duffy, Inc. v. Scott32
Athlete-agent Merle Scott moved for partial summary judgment in a
lawsuit brought against him by the athlete representation agency that used to
employ him. The agency also moved for partial summary judgment on Scott's
counter-claims for tortious interference with his alleged contractual
relationships with NBA player Leandro Barbosa and tortious interference with
his prospective economic relationship with NBA player Brandon Wright. Scott
had induced Barbosa to enter into a standard representation agreement and
negotiated an endorsement deal on his behalf while he worked at the agency.
The agency's claims arose out of Scott's decision to keep all of the payments
provided for under those contracts even though his understanding of his oral
agreement with the agency was that they would split the payments down the
middle. In the event of a dispute, the NBA Players' Association (NBPA) rules
dictate that all payments under player contracts should be made to the agent of
record. Scott was the agent of record in the standard representation agreement,
but not in the endorsement deal.
The court granted Scott's motion on the agency's conversion claim, but
denied the agency's claims for money had and received and constructive trust.
In dismissing the conversion claim, the court concluded that the agency only
had a contractual right of payment, not a property interest. But in upholding
the agency's remaining claims, the court emphasized that the NBPA rules do
not establish that the agent of record is entitled to keep all payments under
player contracts and that the endorsement deal actually stipulated that the
commission was to be paid to the agency. The court also granted the agency's
motion on both of Scott's counter-claims. In assessing whether the agency
tortiously interfered with his alleged contractual relationships with Barbosa,
the court concluded that the agency did not disrupt the standard representation
agreement because Scott continued to receive his payments from the player
and could not have disrupted the endorsement deal because he was never a
party to it. In assessing whether the agency tortiously interfered with the
prospective economic relationship with Wright, the court noted that the
alleged conduct had to be independently wrongful for a claim to be actionable
, and found that Scott had failed to establish the acts of agency employees
during a meeting with Wright, his mother, and his college coach violated any
law.
32. No. C-08-00878 EDL, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35667 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2009).
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Bires v. WalTom, LLC 33
An auto racing team that runs a driver development program moved for
summary judgment on seven of eight claims brought against it by current
NASCAR Nationwide Series driver Kelly Bires after the team allegedly
entered into an oral driving agreement with Bires and then later forced him to
enter into a written agreement with different terms, including a provision that
entitled the team to twenty-five percent of all royalties earned or received by
Bires as a result of his activities in the racing industry over the next ten years.
Bires also moved for judgment on the pleadings on four of those claims. Bires
joined the team's program in late 2005 in hopes of securing a driver position
in the ASA Late Model Series (LMS) the following season. In December
2005, Bires signed an agreement that prohibited him from negotiating for a
driving position on another team for a period of forty-five days. He alleged
that he had no choice but to sign the agreement based on the surrounding
circumstances. As a result, Bires claimed that he forfeited opportunities to
secure other employment. Later that month, Bires received a telephone call
from the team's owner that purportedly included a formal offer to drive for the
team the following season. He claimed that later conversations solidified the
terms of that offer, and altogether resulted in an oral contract to drive in the
LMS in 2006. According to Bires, the team never indicated that its promises
would not be binding until a written agreement was signed, or that he would
have make future royalties payments. Nevertheless, the team presented him
with a written driving agreement late the following month. Bires initially
refused to sign it, but later relented because it would have been too late to find
another full-time driving position for the 2006 season. After capturing Rookie
of the Year honors in his only season with the team, Bires made over $850,000
with other outfits over the next two years, when he competed in the high-level
NASCAR series.
The court granted the team's motion in part and denied it in part, and
granted Bires's motion in part and denied it in part. After assessing Bires's
claim under the Illinois wage assignment statute, the court granted the team's
motion, emphasizing that the royalties provision was not a wage assignment
because it was not used to secure an existing debt. However, the court granted
Bires's motion on his ensuing two claims, holding that the contract was null
and void because it lacked adequate consideration and constituted an illegal
restraint of trade. It found the royalties provision amounted to a restrictive
covenant under state law, and that Bires's one-year tenure as a team driver was
insufficient consideration for that type of clause. More importantly, the court
33. 662 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
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determined that the covenant itself was unreasonable, rendering the provision
illegal under state law. It emphasized that the royalties provision imposed a
large penalty upon Bires if he continued to compete as a driver, and that its
scope was not properly limited. Not only did it extend the covenant for up to
nine years beyond the term of his employment with the team, but also applied
it to activities that were not directly connected with the team's racing
activities. In addition, the covenant failed to include a geographic restriction,
and there were doubts as to whether it actually served to protect the team's
legitimate business interests. The court moved on to deny the team's motion
on Bires's unconscionability claim, noting there was a dispute over the costs
incurred by the team during the 2006 season, as well as its motion on Bires's
claim under Illinois's consumer fraud statute, which was not based exclusively
on the alleged breach of the oral agreement between the parties. Finally, based
on its previous conclusion that the entire contract was null and void, the court
directed the parties to file position papers as to how the remaining claims
would be affected.
Brotherson v. Prof'l Basketball Club, L.L. C. 34
Former season-ticket holders of the Seattle Supersonics moved for
summary judgment on claims that they brought against the Supersonics after
they entered into contracts giving themfans the right to renew their tickets for
future seasons and then the team moved to Oklahoma City following the 2007-
08 campaign. The team also moved for summary judgment on those claims.
The contracts were allegedly formed in the spring of 2007, although there
were doubts at that time as to whether the team would remain in Seattle. The
state legislature had denied a proposal to finance a new basketball facility in
the city, and there were reports that the team was considering relocation.
Nevertheless, the Sonics sent out brochures to current season ticket holders
with an offer to join its newly-created Emerald Club. By renewing their tickets
for the 2007-08 season, those ticket holders would lock in 2006-07 ticket
prices for the next three years and receive a number of fringe benefits. The
brochure acknowledged that there was uncertainty as to whether the team
would remain in Seattle beyond the 2009-10 season, but did not suggest the
Sonics might relocate prior to the expiration of their lease of Key Arena.
The court granted the ticket holders' motion on contract liability in part,
holding that they had entered into valid contracts that gave them the option of
renewing their tickets for future seasons at 2006-07 ticket prices. The court
emphasized that the brochure failed to mention if the tickets were revocable,
34. 604 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (W.D. Wash. 2009).
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and that the license printed on them only allowed the team to revoke access on
a per-game, post-entry basis. It also concluded that uncertainty over the team's
future did not create a condition precedent to the ticket holders' right to
exercise their options and that the ticket holders' doubts as to whether the team
would stay did not affect the validity of the contracts. The court could not
determine whether the team breached those contracts because the ticket
holders may have waived or forfeited their options by not indicating that they
intended to exercise them. However, it denied the team's motion on contract
damages, emphasizing that the ticket holders could have sold the tickets for
games in Oklahoma City. Finally, the court granted the team's motion on the
ticket holders' prayer for specific performance and claim under Washington's
consumer protection law. It noted that the ticket holders only wanted the
ability to purchase tickets in order to resell them to Oklahoma City fans, so
damages were an adequate remedy. In assessing the state law claim, the court
determined that the ticket holders were not entitled to a refund of the purchase
price for their 2007-08 tickets because they were able to attend the games and
take advantage of the Emerald Club benefits.
Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc. v. Tindall Corp.35
The Charlotte Motor Speedway (CMS) appealed a trial court's decision to
grant the Tindall Corporation's motion to dismiss indemnification claims
brought against it by the CMS after the CMS was found liable for injuries
suffered by pedestrians when a walkway attaching the speedway to a parking
area collapsed during a NASCAR race in May 2000. The construction contract
entered into by the CMS and the Tindall Corporation included a clause that
required the contractor to indemnify the CMS against liability arising out of
personal injury claims, but only during the performance of the work. The
appellate court affirmed, holding that the express indemnification provision in
the contract barred the CMS from bringing a claim based on an implied-in-law
theory of indemnification. The court also emphasized that the CMS was found
liable to the pedestrians on purely contractual bases. Trial courts had held that
the CMS was responsible for their injuries for breaching a non-delegable duty
and its agreement with the North Carolina Department of Transportation. The
latter agreement required the CMS to construct the walkway in accordance
with state standards, and the pedestrians were considered third party
beneficiaries of that agreement.
35. 672 S.E.2d 691 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
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Edwards v. Doug Ruedlinger, Inc.3 6
A school board appealed a trial court's decision to grant summary
judgment to a high school football coach's professional liability insurer on its
cross-claim for indemnification in a personal injury lawsuit brought against
the coach and others by a high school football player who was rendered a
quadriplegic following a collision during a game. Louisiana law provided that
school boards had to subrogate and indemnify any public school employee
sued for damages by a student for injuries caused by the employee's acts or
omissions in the proper course of his duties. However, the defendant school
board relinquished its defense to the insurance company, and the coach
subsequently entered into a consent judgment with the player for $550,000.
The appellate court affirmed, holding that the insurance company could be
subrogated to the coach's right of indemnification, even through a consent
judgment. The court noted that the school board's legal obligations were not
strictly personal or conditioned upon the absence of personal malpractice
coverage. It concluded that the settlement was reasonable under the
circumstances.
Front-Line Promotions & Mktg., Inc. v. Mayweather Promotions, LLC 37
Mayweather Promotions, LLC and six-time world boxing champion Floyd
Mayweather, Jr. moved for partial summary judgment on breach of contract
claims brought against them by two marketing companies after the companies
and the defendants allegedly entered into a deal requiring Mayweather to
appear at an event during NBA All-Star Weekend in New Orleans in 2008 and
Mayweather failed to show. In a later action, Mayweather also moved for
partial summary judgment on a negligence claim that the companies brought
solely against him. The marketing companies had previously entered into an
agreement to produce the event, and each of them was required to procure the
attendance of certain celebrities. Front-Line Promotions & Marketing (Front-
Line) agreed to secure Mayweather, and signed a deal with a woman who
worked for Mayweather Promotions, LLC and purported to be the boxer's
talent representative.
The District Court denied the motion on the breach of contract claims
brought by Front-Line, but granted the motion on the breach of contract claims
brought by the second marketing company. The court found that the second
36. 2008-0772 (La.App. 4 Cir. 03/11/09); 9 So. 3d 279. 3d 279 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
37. No. 08-3208 SECTION 114, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27136 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2009),partial
summary judgment granted by No. 08-3208 SECTION 1/4, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34809 (E.D. La.
Apr. 24, 2009).
[Vol. 20:2
ANNUAL SURVEY
marketing company did not have standing to bring its claims because there
was no indication that the defendants knew they were contracting with a
partnership. In assessing the claims brought by Front-Line, the court
concluded that there was a genuine issue as to whether the woman who
purported to be the boxer's talent representative had the authority to book
appearances on his behalf. In the later action, the court granted the motion on
the negligence claims brought against Mayweather, emphasizing that the
boxer could not be held liable in tort unless he owed a legal duty that was
independent from any duty created by the alleged contract. It held that Front-
Line's claim was merely co-extensive with its breach of contract claim, and
that Mayweather did not owe a duty to the second marketing company.
Giacomelli v. Scottsdale Ins. Co. 
38
Two horse racing jockeys appealed a trial court's decision to grant
summary judgment to an insurance company in their action for a judgment
declaring that the company had to indemnify the lessee of a horse racing
facility and the county that owned the facility against liability incurred in a
lawsuit filed by the jockeys after they were injured during a race. The policy
issued by the insurance company claimed to except "special event
participants" and "athletic or sports participants" from coverage. The jockeys
settled their lawsuit with the lessee and the county. Under that agreement, the
lessee and the county consented to the entry of judgment against them, but the
jockeys agreed not to enforce those judgments. Instead, the lessee and the
county assigned any claims that they had against insurance company to the
jockeys. The jockeys claimed that a Montana law required entities that were
licensed to conduct horse races to have insurance that covers jockeys, which
would have invalidated the two exceptions in the lessee's policy as violations
of public policy. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term
"exhibitor" in the state statute that applied to entities licensed to conduct horse
races did not cover jockeys because they were participants in the race. The
Court emphasized that the exceptions in the insurance policy were not
ambiguous and that it was not reasonable for the lessee or the jockeys to
expect the insurance to cover the jockeys' injuries in light of those exceptions.
Giuliani v. Duke Univ. 39
Duke University and its men's golf coach moved to dismiss claims
brought against them by former Duke golfer Andrew Giuliani after he was
38. 2009 MT 418, 354 Mont. 15, 221 P.3d 666221 P.3d 666 (Mont. 2009).
39. No. 1:08CV502, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44412 (M.D.N.C. May 19, 2009).
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dismissed from the team and barred from the program's practice facilities.
Giuliani committed to Duke while the team was still being coached by Rod
Myers, who allegedly promised Giuliani lifetime access to the program's
facilities and the opportunity to compete for an NCAA championship.
However, Giuliani never signed a letter of intent or received an athletic
scholarship. The court granted the motion, holding Giuliani did not have a
valid contract to play on the team or use the program's facilities. It
emphasized that he could not rely on the provisions of non-binding student
policy manuals, which could not create a legally binding agreement under
North Carolina law because they could be unilaterally altered by the university
at any time.
Halpern v. Greene40
Undefeated middleweight boxer Joe Greene and his father moved to
dismiss claims brought against them by the boxer's unlicensed former
managers after Greene allegedly breached their management agreement to
allow his father to take over as his manager. The plaintiffs met Greene in 2005
when he was an aspiring amateur boxer. Shortly afterwards, they induced him
to enter into a management agreement, under which they provided him with
substantial financial assistance and professional support over a two-year term.
During that time period, Greene boxed his way into the top ten of the world
rankings. In 2007, the parties renewed the management agreement for another
three years, under which the plaintiffs agreed to pay Greene's father over
$20,000 for his involvement his son's career. Later that year, the plaintiffs
sought to hire a promoter to give Greene better exposure in the boxing
community. However, Greene's father persuaded the boxer to demand a
$40,000 signing bonus, and the promoter balked. As a result, the plaintiffs had
to secure the requested bonus from another source. Over the next year,
Greene's father took steps to supplant the plaintiffs as his son's manager,
minimizing contact between the parties and dealing with the promoter without
the plaintiffs' assistance. At one point, he also prohibited the plaintiffs from
seeing his sons following a fight in Madison Square Garden. Nevertheless, the
plaintiffs continued to pay the boxer's training expenses. By the time Greene
cut off communications with the plaintiffs, they had spent more than $225,000
on his career, and had not yet received any commissions under the renewed
agreement.
The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. First, it held that
the plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with
40. 24 Misc. 3d 1251A (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
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contract were barred because the management agreements could not be
enforced. The court emphasized that state law required all boxing managers
and promoters to be licensed, and that all contracts entered into with
unlicensed individuals were void as a matter of law. It noted that licensing
requirements enacted to generate revenue would not defeat a contract, but that
the regulations at issue were not designed for that purpose; instead, they
paralleled the Muhammad Ali Act, which was designed to protect professional
boxers from exploitive and unethical management practices. However, the
court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim, emphasizing
that some of their financial contributions were allegedly unconnected to their
role as Greene's managers. If true, those payments would be recoverable,
because the state regulations were designed "to act as a shield, not as a sword
for the boxer's personal gain."
Luchs v. Pro Tect Mgmt. Corp 41
Athlete-agent Joshua Luchs (Luchs) appealed a trial court's decision to
enter judgment on a verdict in favor of the a now -defunct athlete
representation agency, Pro Tect Management Corporation (PTMC). and its
sole shareholder, athlete-agent Gary Wichard (Wichard), on Luchs's claim
against PTMC for breach of contract. Under their employment agreement,
Luchs recruited NFL players to PTMC , and PTMC paid him a percentage of
the commissions on any players that it retained, minus any stipulated
expenses. A non-compete provision barred Luchs from retaining the players
that he recruited if he left PTMC, unless he received written approval from the
shareholder. The commission arrangement was to remain in place for the
players that he recruited as long as either Luchs or PTMC continued to
represent them. When Luchs left the agency, two players that he had recruited
subsequently fired PTMC and retained him; however, Luchs had not received
approval to sign them. Soon after, PTMC terminated its agreement with
Luchs, claiming that he had forfeited his right to future commissions because
he breached the non-compete provision and failed to forward a payment that
was due from one of the two players that he had lured away.
The appellate court affirmed, holding there was no error in (1) refusing to
enter a default judgment against PTMC, (2) instructing the jury regarding the
legal relationship between the corporation and its shareholder, and (3) finding
the verdict was supported by substantial evidence. In assessing whether the
default judgment should have been entered or whether the jury was incorrectly
instructed, the court noted that PMTC was the Wichard's alter ego, so
41. No. B201186, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3893 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. May 18, 2009).
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PTMC's liability was dependent upon Wichard's liability. The court
emphasized that Luchs proceeded to trial only against Wichard, and that
Wichard agreed to be personally responsible for any judgment against the
agency. In assessing whether the verdict was adequately supported, the court
found ample evidence to back the conclusion that PMTC was entitled to
terminate Luchs's employment agreement for cause.
Luzzi v. A TP Tour, Inc. 42
The ATP Tour (ATP) moved to dismiss claims brought against it by
several European tennis players after they signed a brief consent form that the
players thought pertained only to the ATP anti-doping policy, but actually
purported to bind them to the ATP's rulebook, which was later relied on to
suspend them from competition and fine them for gambling on the sport.
After acquiring the players' online wagering records, the ATP began
administrative proceedings against them, including two hearings in Florida.
After the conclusion of those hearings, the players sued in the Southern
District of Florida, seeking a declaratory judgment that (1) the consent form
did not bind them to all of the provisions in the ATP rulebook, (2) they did not
enter into a contract with the ATP, and (3) the ATP breached its fiduciary duty
to them.
The court denied the motion, holding that the players sufficiently alleged
that venue was proper in the Southern District of Florida and that the ATP had
and breached a fiduciary duty to them and breached that duty.. In assessing
whether the venue was proper, the court noted that the ATP was a Delaware
corporation and that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the players'
claims occurred in the Middle District of Florida. However, the fact that ATP
members sponsor two yearly tournaments in the Southern District appeared,
-- on the surface, -to be sufficient evidence under the state's venue statute.
In assessing the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court concluded that the
argument that the ATP was formed to protect the players' interests and
intended to educate them about its rules was enough to survive the motion;,
especially when the existence of a duty depends heavily on the relationship of
the parties and the type of transaction involved.
Mayer v. Belichick43
The New England Patriots, Patriots's head coach Bill Belichick, and the
National Football League moved to dismiss claims brought against them by a
42. No. 09-61031-Civ-CohniSeltzer, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87405 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2009).
43. Civil Action No.: 07-4671 (GEB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23052 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2009).
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New York Jets's season ticketholder after the Patriots were caught videotaping
the Jets' signals and visual coaching instructions during a game. Recording
another team's signals is a violation of the league's rules. The court granted
the motion, holding that the ticketholder got what he contracted for: a license
to enter the stadium and watch the game. The court noted that previous cases
had recognized that ticket purchases do not create an obligation to satisfy
spectators' subjective expectations about how a game will be played, even if it
involves cheating.
M'Baye v. World Boxing Ass 'n44
The World Boxing Association (WBA), a boxing match promoter, and a
boxer's attorney moved for summary judgment on claims brought against
them by the number one rated contender for the WBA super lightweight title
after he was not given the opportunity to fight for the championship within the
period of time stipulated by the WBA's rules. The rules provide that a WBA
champion must periodically defend his title against the number one rated
contender . The rules also and prevent him from signing an agreement to
defend the title or actually defending the title against another boxer within
sixty days prior to the date he must engage in a mandatory defense. However,
champions may avoid the mandatory defense rules by seeking a permit to
schedule a non-mandatory fight from the WBA championship committee. The
committee may issue a permit if the non-mandatory fight would unify the
world titles of various associations or be of great significance to the boxing
world. Souleymane M'Baye brought his claims after being denied the
opportunity to box foT the title on three separate occasions due to the WBA's
decision to issue special permits to the super lightweight division champion.
On the first two occasions, boxers represented by the defendant match
promoter were allowed to fight for the title instead. On the third occasion, the
then-champion was represented by the defendant match promoter, and signed
an agreement to fight a unification bout within the sixty-day period in which
he was supposed to engage in a mandatory defense without first seeking a
WBA permit. The WBA championship committee later voted to grant a
permit on the same day the request was made. M'Baye sought to enjoin the
third fight in state court. After the suit was removed, the attorney for the then-
champion claimed his client did not sign the contract to participate in the
match until the WBA issued its permit.
The court granted the WBA's motion in part and denied it in part, but
44. No. 05 Civ. 9581 (DC), 06 Civ. 3439 (DC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69139 (S.D.N.Y. July 29,
2009).
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granted the motions of the promoter and the attorney on all of the claims
against them. In assessing the WBA's motion, the court first concluded that
M'Baye did not have a valid claim under the Muhammad Ali Act because the
law only bars associations from arbitrarily changing a boxer's ranking, not
from granting exceptions to allow other fighters to box for the title instead.
However, the court refused to dismiss M'Baye's breach of contract claim,
determining a reasonable jury could find that the WBA was not allowed to
issue permits for the latter two fights or that M'Baye's right to box for the title
was adversely affected and that his reasonable expectations were not met by
being repeatedly bypassed. The court emphasized that there was significant
evidence suggesting that the WBA acted in bad faith in interpreting its own
rules. In granting the promoter's motion, the court found that the promoter
could not be held liable for tortious interference with a contract because there
was no evidence to suggest he intentionally and illegally convinced the WBA
to breach its own rules and permit other boxers to fight for the title ahead of
M'Baye. In granting the attorney's motion, the court also found there was no
evidence to suggest tortious interference with a contract, and dismissed the
state law claim related to the attorney's misrepresentation about when his
boxer signed the contract for the unification bout because M'Baye could not
demonstrate he was harmed by the statement. The court emphasized that its
decision to deny M'Baye's request to enjoin the fight did not rely on the
attorney's representation.
Montclair United Soccer Club v. Count Me In Corp. 45
The CEO of the defendant corporation, Count Me In Corporation (CMI),
which provides online registration services for youth sports organizations,
moved for summary judgment on claims brought against him by a New Jersey
youth soccer organization after the funds owed to the organization were
commingled with CMI's own operating funds and CMI failed to pay
remittances to the organization when they became due. In the alternative, the
CEO also moved for partial summary judgment on the organization's claim for
unjust enrichment and for a declaratory judgment that punitive damages were
not available on the organization's claim for tortious interference with its
contract with CMI. Finally, the organization moved for partial summary
judgment on its claims for conversion, unjust enrichment, and deceptive trade
practices under state law. Under its client service contract with the
organization, CMI was supposed to collect all of the organization's activity
registration fees and then remit those payments twice a month, minus agreed-
45. No. C08-1642-JCC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83535 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 14, 2009).
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upon transaction fees. However, CMI failed to remit approximately $210,000
in fees paid during the spring, summer, and fall of 2008. When organization
officials contacted CMI in October 2008, the CEO informed them that the
corporation was having cash flow problems, but expected to remit the fees it
collected through August within a week. Shortly thereafter, the CEO informed
the corporation's employees that clients' funds had been commingled with
CMI's own operating funds in order to pay operating expenses. Those
expenses were primarily tied to developing a new software technology. CMI
eventually forwarded some of the promised fees to the organization, but was
still $117,000 short when this lawsuit was initiated. As part of the lawsuit, the
organization also brought claims against CMI and its parent company, but they
were stayed after the corporation filed for bankruptcy. The software
technology developed by CMI was later sold to a new company, but the CEO
was still able to benefit from it because he was a part owner of that entity,
deriving a salary of approximately $180,000 per year.
The court granted the CEO's motions in part and denied them in part, and
denied the organization's motion without prejudice. In assessing the CEO's
motion for summary judgment, the court held there was a genuine issue of fact
as to whether he could be shielded from personal liability by the common law
"business judgment" rule. The court emphasized that there were doubts about
whether the CMI CEO's management decisions were made in good faith and
with the reasonable care, skill, and diligence required to demonstrate proper
oversight of CMI's finances, noting that (1) he failed to submit evidence
showing that he had discussed the commingling and use of client funds with
his advisors; (2) he used client funds for a project that he stood to benefit
from; (3) he knew about CMI's remittance problems at least one year prior to
disclosing them to clients; and (4) he lied to the plaintiff organization about
the reason for the remittance problems. However, in assessing the CEO's
alternative motion for partial summary judgment, the court found the
organization's claim for unjust enrichment was barred. It emphasized that
those claims had to arise out of a valid contract under state law, and that the
organization did not have the requisite direct contractual relationship with the
CEO. The court also concluded that the organization could not collect
punitive damages on its tortious interference claim, noting that those damages
were unavailable unless authorized by a state statute. Finally, in assessing the
organization's motion, the court noted that the CEO might be held liable for
conversion and deceptive trade practices under the common law "responsible
corporate officer" doctrine. However, those claims required the court to assess
CMI's liability, which it could not do while the bankruptcy stay remained in
place.
2010]
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Oshinsky v. N.Y Football Giants, Inc.46
The New York Giants, the New York Jets, and the entities responsible for
developing their new football stadium moved to dismiss claims brought
against them by a class of the teams' existing season ticketholders after they
required those ticketholders to buy personal seat licenses (PSLs) in order to
guarantee the right to purchase season tickets to games at the new venue,
which is slated to open in the fall of 2010. The ticketholders claimed that the
PSL requirement (1) breached their implied option to continue to renew their
season tickets, (2) violated New Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act, and (3)
violated section one of the Sherman Act. The court granted the motion in part
and denied it in part. After assessing the breach of contract claim, the court
concluded that the ticketholders had sufficiently alleged that they owned the
right to renew their season tickets and that the defendants had breached that
right. Relying on other cases that had addressed season ticket renewals, the
court determined that it was not inconceivable that implied rights may exist.
However, the court found that the class's allegations failed to state a claim
under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, emphasizing that there was no
evidence that the defendants intended to defraud the class by omitting material
terms of the PSLs, even if those terms, when supplied, cause the PSLs that are
purchased to drop in value. Finally, the court dismissed the class's antitrust
claims, noting that it failed to demonstrate (1) how tying season tickets to
PSLs constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade on any market, especially
when the defendants already had a monopoly in the New York Metropolitan
area, and (2) how the defendants colluded in marketing and selling PSLs,
especially when the teams had different purchase prices.
Provoncha v. Vt. Motocross Ass 'n, Inc.47
Motocross athlete Clint Provoncha and his wife appealed a trial court's
decision to grant summary judgment to the Vermont Motocross Association
(VMA) and the owner of a local racetrack on negligence claims that the
Provonchas brought against them after Provoncha suffered injuries when he
was struck by another rider while warming up for a race. The collision took
place after a race official failed to display a caution flag to warn other riders of
the dangerous conditions created when Provoncha fell off his bike. The day
before the accident, Provoncha had signed an entry form that purported to
exculpate the VMA and the owner of the racetrack from any claims arising out
of their negligence in conducting the race-day activities. Provoncha was aalso
46. Civil Action No.: 09-cv-1 186 (PGS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107608 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2009).
47. 974 A.2d 1261 (Vt. 2009).
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aware that the VMA used young people as flaggers and that they were often
incompetent. However, he ignored any increased risk of injury and continued
to race at the track. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
entry form released the VMA and the owner of the racetrack from liability
because it was sufficiently clear to put Provoncha on notice of the risks that he
assumed and it did not violate public policy. Although the entry form did not
specifically include the word "negligence," the court found it clearly described
that the defendants were immune from all types of injury claims in any way
connected with the event. In assessing the form's public policy implications,
the court noted the races were not of great importance to the public or open to
all persons. In fact, only the 300-plus members of the VMA could participate.
PTR, Inc. v. Forsythe Racing, Inc. 48
Forsythe Racing, Inc. (FRI) and its controlling owner moved to dismiss
claims brought against them by Paul Tracy Racing (PTR) after they joined
other Champ Car Series owners in selling the organization's assets to the Indy
Racing League, filed for bankruptcy protection, and then refused to pay PTR
the termination fee stipulated in their driver services agreement. In the
alternative, the defendants moved to strike certain allegations made in PTR's
complaint that referred to contract negotiations between the parties. The court
denied both motions. In turning down the motion to dismiss, the court held
PTR's allegations were sufficient to support findings that a second extension
of the driver services agreement was executed by the defendants, and that
FRI's controlling owner was acting solely for his own gain when he chose not
to pay the termination fee. The court noted that unsigned agreements might be
barred by the Illinois Statute of Frauds, but determined that the mere fact that
PTR had attached an unsigned copy of the second extension to the complaint
did not mean that it had not been signed by the defendants. In turning down
the motion to strike, the court noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence
prohibit using evidence of settlement negotiations to determine the validity of
a claim, but emphasized that the impact of evidentiary rules should be
addressed when considering admissibility at trial.
SB Belkin, LLC v. HTPA Holding Co.4 9
Steve Belkin, a minority investor in the holding company that owns the
National Basketball Association's (NBA) Atlanta Hawks and the National
Hockey League's (NHL) Atlanta Thrashers, sued the company in the midst of
48. No. 08 C 5517, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48090 (N.D. I11. June 9, 2009).
49. Civil No. 266748-V, 2009 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 6 (Sept. 10, 2009).
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proceedings designed to evaluate the company's value, which would then be
used to determine the payment owed to him as part of a buyout agreement.
The parties negotiated the agreement (PSA) after it became clear that Belkin
could no longer remain an owner due to a dispute with the company's other
stakeholders. The dispute centered on Belkin's decision to veto a trade for
NBA player Joe Johnson, even though the majority of the other owners
approved of the trade. Belkin had the power to reject the deal because the
other owners had previously designated him as the Hawks' "Governor", an
NBA-mandated position that comes with the sole authority to conduct
transactions on behalf of a team. Following the veto, the other owners sought
to remove Belkin from that position. Although he was able to obtain an
injunction barring that action, it was lifted when NBA Commissioner David
Stem submitted an affidavit that approved of his removal. The parties
executed the PSA shortly thereafter. According to its terms, anywhere from
one to three investment banks would be used to determine the company's
value. However, it limited the list of potential appraisers to a small group of
firms with experience in mergers and acquisitions of professional sports
franchises, and those firms were required to make a neutral evaluation of the
company's worth. Belkin had the right to select the first eligible firm. Upon
receipt of its appraisal, either party had the right to object within five days by
delivering written notice to the other party. If neither party objected, then that
appraisal would set the company's value. But if either party objected, the
objecting party would then select a second banker to conduct another
appraisal. If either party then objected to the second appraisal, the NBA
would select a third banker for one final appraisal. If the third appraisal was
higher than both of the previous appraisals, the higher of the previous
appraisals would establish the company's value. If it was lower than the
previous appraisals, then the lower of the previous appraisals would establish
the value. Once the price of Belkin's interest was determined, the holding
company had sixty days to buy him out, or he would have the option of
turning the tables and buying out the other owners.
Upon Belkin's selection of the first appraiser, both parties made their best
efforts to cloud its judgment, making it difficult for the firm to remain neutral.
In addition, both parties vigorously tried to determine the exact time that the
appraisal would be communicated. That legleg work paid off for Belkin. Just
one minute after receiving the report, he formally objected to it, reasoning that
by being able to select the first two banks, the first two appraisals were likely
to be high, thereby mitigating the impact of a third evaluation. However, a
short time later, the company also objected, notifying Belkin of the firm that it
had selected as the second banker. That same day, Belkin filed suit, claiming
he was allowed to select the second banker under the terms of the PSA. While
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his claim was pending, he notified the company that he was hiring another
banker to conduct the second appraisal. That appraisal ultimately valued the
company at a price more than ten percent higher than the first appraisal. The
company responded by notifying Belkin that it would not recognize the second
report as a valid appraisal under the PSA. The trial court concluded that there
was no ambiguity in that agreement the PSA and that Belkin, as the first party
to object, was allowed to select the second banker. Subsequently, Belkin
obtained a summary judgment that the holding company had breached the
PSA by either failing to jointly engage a third banker or failing to buy out his
interest. An appellate court reversed, holding the terms of the PSA were
ambiguous as to how the parties were to proceed if both parties objected to an
appraisal. It remanded to the trial court to determine the intent of the parties in
drafting those terms.
After examining the surrounding circumstances and all available extrinsic
evidence, the court held that the PSA was void and unenforceable because the
parties did not come to a meeting of the minds on how to proceed if both
parties validly objected to an appraisal. The court concluded that the
individuals who negotiated the PSA never discussed the possibility of both
parties objecting to the same appraisal, emphasizing the lack of provisions
governing how appraisals were to be communicated or how a party could
object to them. In fact, there was nothing in the negotiations between the
parties that suggested a race to object would determine the second appraiser.
The court also refused to interpret any post-contract actions in assessing
whether it should supply missing terms. It emphasized that both parties sought
to influence the outcome of the appraisal process, which made the right to
select future bankers a material issue. Because the conditions precedent to
determining the buyout price had not been satisfied, the court left the parties to
figure out how to proceed with the sale of Belkin's interest.
Southshore Baseball, LLC v. Aramark Sports & Entm 't Servs., LLC 5°
The entity that runs the Gary Southshore Railcats minor league baseball
team (Southshore) moved for summary judgment on a petition for declaratory
relief that would allow it to unilaterally terminate its concession services
agreement with Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services, LLC (ASES) in
exchange for a stipulated termination payment. Southshore made its decision
to terminate the contract just one day after the start of a new season. The court
denied the motion, holding that the language of the agreement could not be
construed to show that the parties intended that Southshore could terminate it
50. Civil Action No. 2:08-CV-313 JVB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17561 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2009).
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for any reason solely in exchange for a termination payment. The court found
that two provisions in the contract provided termination rights, but that
Southshore was relying on a third provision to terminate the agreement.. That
provision limited ASES's remedies to a termination payment only if
Southshore terminated the agreement for cause under one of the other two
provisions. The court also emphasized that ASES would not have given
Southshore the right to immediately terminate the agreement without cause in
the midst of a season while simultaneously retaining the right to receive notice
and the opportunity to cure had it actually been in breach.
Team Gordon, Inc. v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc.51
The NASCAR team owned by driver Robby Gordon and Fruit of the
Loom, Inc. (FOL) filed cross-motions for summary judgment on claims and
counter-claims asserted in a lawsuit brought by the team after FOL chose to
sever their three-year sponsorship agreement with one year remaining. The
agreement was the product of a plan hatched by the team's CEO and
motorsports marketer, Larry Camp, in order to find a sponsor. Camp
contacted Speedway Motorsports (SMI), a NASCAR-apparel distributor,
which was seeking to enter into an exclusive arrangement with an apparel
manufacturer, provided that the manufacturer also sponsored a NASCAR
team. Subsequently, Camp contacted FOL about becoming a team sponsor
and SMI's exclusive apparel provider. In the summer of 2003, Camp entered
into a confidential agreement with Gordon's team. The agreement stipulated
that if Camp helped the team secure the FOL sponsorship, the team would pay
him a percentage of the fees received during the first three years of the deal.
Two weeks later, Camp entered into a separate commission arrangement with
FOL, guaranteeing him approximately $700,000 over three years in exchange
for helping to develop FOL's motorsports marketing program. That deal also
required him to negotiate the terms of its sponsorship of Gordon's team on the
company's behalf. In early fall, FOL entered into an agreement to sponsor
Gordon's team in the Busch Series. Although the agreement stipulated that it
could last up to three years, FOL was given the opportunity to evaluate the
deal each year and could decline to extend it to subsequent seasons if the
entire program failed to substantially meet its reasonable expectations.
Another provision in the contract required Gordon's team to return $50,000
every time that it failed to qualify for a race that FOL sponsored. Finally, the
agreement included a "morals" clause that would allow FOL to terminate the
sponsorship if the team's conduct reflected unfavorably upon the company.
51. No. 3:06-cv-201-RJC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169171691716197 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 19, 2009).
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Following the first season under the agreement, Gordon's team chose to
move up to the Nextel Cup Series. As a result, the parties transformed their
twenty-four-race sponsorship into a ten-race sponsorship. However, Gordon's
team struggled the following season, failing to qualify for seven races and
finishing thirty-seventh in the points standings. Although the sponsorship
agreement was never amended, FOL sought to increase the $50,000 non-
qualifying penalty into the standard $150,000 penalty used at the Nextel Cup
level. But it took months of negotiating before Gordon's team agreed to pay
the standard refund for failing to qualify for a race in early 2005. During that
time, FOL informed the team that it would not renew its sponsorship for the
final year of the deal. The parties were still negotiating the refund penalty in
September when the FOL declined to make a required payment under the
sponsorship agreement. FOL sought to split up the payment to ensure that
Gordon's team qualified for the four remaining FOL-sponsored races. Later
that month, Gordon wrecked his car in a collision with Michael Waltrip at a
race in New Hampshire. Gordon became so incensed that he threw his helmet
at Waltrip's car and called him a curse word on live national television.
Subsequently, NASCAR fined Gordon's team and placed Gordon on
probation for the remainder of the season. The next day, FOL informed the
team that it was terminating its sponsorship immediately under the "morals"
clause in their agreement.
The court granted the team's motion in part, but denied FOL's motion on
all of its counterclaims. In assessing the team's motion on its 2005 breach of
contract claim, the court concluded that FOL's failure to make its required
payment under the sponsorship arrangement was a material breach, even
though the team's subsequent breach of the "morals" clause discharged FOL's
later payment obligations. However, the court refused to award the team the
requested $600,000 in damages at the summary judgment stage because there
was a genuine issue as to whether the team's mitigation efforts were
reasonable. The court also granted the team's motion on FOL's breach of
contract counterclaim related to the 2005 season because the contract did not
guarantee that FOL would be entitled to a refund of part of its sponsorship fees
when it unilaterally terminated the agreement under the "morals" clause. In
denying FOL's motion on the team's 2005 breach of contract claim, the court
found there was a genuine issue as to whether FOL's NASCAR program
failed to substantially meet its reasonable expectations under the sponsorship
agreement, which was required before FOL could choose not to renew the
deal. Finally, the court granted the team's motion -and denied FOL's motion
-on the company's state law claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices,
which was based on the team's undisclosed confidential relationship with
Camp. The court noted that Camp did not have the authority to enter into the
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sponsorship agreement on FOL's behalf, and did not have any fiduciary
relationship with FOL at the time he entered into his arrangement with the
team. It also emphasized that Camp had touted two other NASCAR teams
over Gordon's team during the sponsorship negotiations, indicating that he did
not give Gordon's team an una fair advantage.
Wolff v. Zip. ca, Inc. 52
Canadian Am. Ass 'n of Prof'l Baseball, Ltd. v. Ottawa Rapidz53
In companion cases, the court assessed motions in lawsuits involving
parties associated with the Canadian American Association of Professional
Baseball (CAAPB). In the first case, Canadian corporation Zip.ca moved to
dismiss a breach of contract claim brought against it by the owner of Ottawa
Professional Baseball, Inc. (OPBI) on jurisdictional grounds. The owner was
also the commissioner of the CAAPB, which was based in North Carolina.
OPBI had leased the right to field a CAAPB team in Ottawa, and the owner
entered into an agreement that gave Zip.ca the right to manage that
membership. In exchange, Zip.ca was required to indemnify the owner for up
to $216,000 in costs that he might accrue in satisfying a personal guarantee
that he had made to the Canadian city. The cause of action arose when Zip.ca
failed to reimburse him for the cost of the annual rent to use the city-owned
baseball stadium. However, the court granted the motion, holding that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens required the dispute to be heard in Ottawa.
It found the public interests strongly favored the alternative forum because (1)
the indemnity clause in the agreement applied to costs that the plaintiff might
accrue as the owner of a league membership, not as the league commissioner;
(2) all the events leading up to the dispute took place in Ottawa; and (3) Zip.ca
had a lawsuit pending against the plaintiff in an Ontario court. More
importantly, the agreement stipulated that Canadian law would govern its
terms and that both parties would submit to jurisdiction in an Ottawa court
with respect to any matter arising out of it.
In the second case, the CAAPB and the OPBI moved to remand the
CAAPB's petition to confirm an arbitration award that denied the Ottawa
Rapidz's request to voluntarily withdraw from the league for financial reasons
and found that the club had violated its affiliation agreement by failing to field
a team in 2009. The violation automatically terminated the club's membership
in the league, and, more importantly, allowed the league to draw upon its letter
of credit. The OPBI was a named defendant in the petition, but had not
52. No. 1:09CV92,2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48570 (M.D.N.C. June 10, 2009).
53. No. 1:09CV93, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49410 (M.D.N.C. June 11, 2009).
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consented to removal. The club and its individual directors claimed that the
OPBI was fraudulently joined in order to prevent the court from asserting
diversity jurisdiction. They argued that the interests of the CAAPB and the
OPBI were not adverse because the owner of the OPBI was also the league's
commissioner, and that subject to realignment the court could assert
jurisdiction. The OPBI claimed it was adverse because the result of the
arbitration cost the organization its leased membership rights in the league.
The court granted the motion, holding that the defendants had failed to
demonstrate that the OPBI was fraudulently joined or that one of the
exceptions to complete diversity applied. Contrary to the defendants'
arguments, the court found that the CAAPB was able to assert a cause of
action against the OPBI because that organization retained a property interest
in the club. Although it had previously sold its management rights to Zip.ca,
which effectively owned the club, the OPBI still controlled the lease on the
league membership, and the club knew that fact when it volunteered the letter
of credit. Only by terminating the lease was the CAAPB able to draw upon it.
COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT
The Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) was established by the
International Olympic Committee in 1984 as an independent alternative forum
for resolving international sports disputes. The CAS is based in Switzerland
and its procedural are governed by statutes enacted by the International
Council of Arbitration for Sport. The CAS applies the substantive law chosen
by the parties that have agreed to submit to its jurisdiction. Those parties
include every national or international governing body that is a member of the
Olympic Movement. The CAS is limited to adjudicating commercial, civil
liability, and disciplinary disputes; however, its decisions have created a
unique body of law known as lex sportiva. The following materials
showillustrate that the majority of cases that the CAS tackles involve player-
team contract disputes and doping-related sanctions.
Al-Hilal Al-Saudi Club v. FIFA54
Saudi Arabian soccer club Al-Hilal Al-Saudi appealed the date when a
suspension imposed on Libyan soccer player Tareq Eltaib by the FIFA Dispute
Resolution Chamber (DRC) could take effect. Eltaib entered into a contract to
play for Al-Hilal Al-Saudi in July 2006, after a previous CAS panel stayed the
execution of a DRC decision that found him in breach of his employment
agreement with another team in Turkey. The CAS panel eventually upheld the
54. CAS 2008/A/1674.
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decision and remanded the matter back to the DRC to determine the
compensation owed to Eltaib's former club and whether any sporting
sanctions should be handed down against the player or Al-Hilal Al-Saudi. In
November 2007, the DRC decided to suspend Eltaib for four months. Al-Hilal
Al-Saudi argued the suspension should not take effect in September 2008,
which marked the beginning of the Saudi Arabian Football Association
(SAFA) soccer season, because the club was not notified of the DRC's
decision until November and FIFA rules prevented sporting sanctions from
taking effect until the start of the following season. The CAS panel held the
suspension could not take effect until the beginning of the next soccer season
in the SAFA or any another league in which Eltaib might play. It determined
Al-Hilal Al-Saudi's interpretation of FIFA rules was correct and had to be
considered in conjunction with the delayed communication of the DRC's
decision. The DRC decision stated that the sanctions would not take effect
until the decision was communicated, so the rules could only be applied when
Al-Hilal Al-Saudi received the news of Eltaib's suspension.
Anderson v. Int'l Olympic Comm. 55
Members of the 2000 U.S. Olympic Track and Field team appealed the
International Olympic Committee's (IOC) decision to strip them of the medals
that they won while participating on relay teams with former world-record-
holding sprinter Marion Jones, who later admitted that she was doping during
the Games. Rule 25.2.2.4 of the 2000 Olympic Charter provided, that "no
decision taken in the context of the Olympic Games [could] be challenged
after a period of three years from the day of the closing ceremony of such
Games." The CAS panel upheld the IOC's ruling, concluding that the
decision to award the athletes medals in the 2000 Olympic Games was not a
decision by the IOC "taken in the context of the Olympic Games." Instead,
the CAS panel held that the individual international federations made the
decision as a consequence of determining the results of the competition. The
panel emphasized that the IOC was merely adhering to the rankings and
results from the international federations. As a result, the three-year rule did
not prevent it from requiring the athletes to return their Olympic medals under
the provision of the 2000 Olympic Charter.
55. CAS 2009/A/1545.
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Deutsche Reiterliche Vereinigung e. V, v. FE156
Ahlmann v. FE15
7
In combined cases, both the national governing body for equestrian sports
in Germany and German show-jumping rider Christian Ahlmann appealed the
International Equestrian Federation (FEI) Tribunal's decision to suspend
Ahlman for four months after finding that he broke medication control rules
but did not commit an anti-doping violation when he used an ointment
containing a hyper-sensitizing agent on his horse prior to an event in the 2008
Olympics. Ahlmann had previously competed on the German team in the
2004 Olympics, when it won gold. However, the athletes' medals were
revoked after another rider tested positive for a banned substance. During the
2008 Games, Ahlmann filled out forms to receive authorization to use
medication on his horse but failed to mention that he was treating the animal
with the hyper-sensitizing agent. Following the Team Jumping Final, the
horse was given a doping test and the results confirmed the agent's presence.
The FEI Tribunal concluded that the agent could qualify as both an illegal
doping substance and a banned medication under the national governing
body's rules. However, it held that the international federation had to prove a
horse's legs were actually hyper-sensitized to find an athlete guilty of a doping
violation. Because that fact was not proven, the FEI Tribunal determined that
Ahlmann only breached the medication rules.
The CAS panel reversed, concluding that Ahlmann violated the national
governing body's anti-doping rules and should be suspended from competition
for eight months. The panel determined that the rules created a system in
which the mere presence of a banned substance constituted an infraction. In
assessing the appropriate sanction, the panel emphasized that, under most
circumstances, Ahlmann could have been suspended for up to two years, and
that he should have exerted more care under the circumstances, especially
after having his medal revoked at the previous Olympics. However, the panel
could only suspend him for an additional four months because the CAS was
prohibited from imposing a larger penalty than the one requested.
FC Midtjylland A/S v. FIFA58
Danish soccer club Midtjylland A/S appealed the FIFA Players Status
Committee's decision to reprimand it for violating a FIFA rule by
systematically transferring minor players to Denmark under an agreement with
56. CAS 2008/A/1700.
57. CAS 2008/A/1710.
58. CAS 2008/A/1485.
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a Nigerian club. The agreement gave Midtjylland A/S a purchase option on
some of the Nigerian club's best talent and allowed it to enroll players under
the age of eighteen in its soccer academy. Midtjylland A/S registered six
minor players from the Nigerian club as amateurs under the definition
provided by the Danish Football Association (DFA), the national governing
body for soccer in Denmark. The players were also granted residence permits,
but they did not include the right to work. FIFA charged Midtjylland A/S with
violating its rule prohibiting the international transfer of minor players, and the
Players Status Committee eventually found the club guilty. Midtjylland A/S
argued that the rule did not apply to the players at issue. In the alternative, it
claimed that the players were workers under European Union (EU) law and
that FIFA violated that law by discriminating against Nigerian citizens living
legally in Denmark.
The CAS panel upheld the decision, determining that the FIFA rule
applied to the amateur players and that none of its listed exceptions could be
used in this case. Although FIFA had previously allowed international
transfers when the players could establish that they were attempting to further
their education, the evidence here indicated that the main reason for the
transfers was to help Midtjylland A/S find the next soccer star. The panel also
concluded that EU law was not binding on the CAS because the arbitration
agreement provided that the FIFA Statutes would govern the dispute. But
even if the CAS had to apply EU law, the panel found that the FIFA rule was
perfectly legal. It emphasized that the EU's agreement with Nigeria protects
citizens against discrimination in working conditions, not actual access to
employment, and that the players in this case were not employed.
FC Shakhtar Donetsk v. Francelino da Silva
59
Francelino da Silva v. FC Shakhtar Donetsk
60
In combined cases, both Ukrainian soccer club Shakhtar Donetsk and
Brazilian soccer player Matuzalem Francelino da Silva appealed the FIFA
Dispute Resolution Chamber's (DRC) decision that ordered Francelino da
Silva to pay Shakhtar Donetsk E6.8 million for breaching their employment
contract. Shakhtar Donetsk acquired Francelino da Silva from an Italian club
in June 2004, for E8 million. In addition to the transfer fee, it paid E3.75
million in agent fees and over C221,000 to two Brazilian clubs to comply with
the solidarity mechanism. Later that month, the club signed the player to a
five-year, E8 million contract, which included a clause that required Shakhtar
59. CAS 2008/A/1519.
60. CAS 2008/A/1520.
[Vol. 20:2
ANNUAL SURVEY
Donetsk to transfer Francelino da Silva to another team if it received an offer
of at least €25 million. The contract was slightly amended on several
occasions prior to July 2007, when another Italian club offered Shakhtar
Donetsk E7 million for Francelino da Silva. Shakhtar Donetsk turned down the
offer, and a few days later Francelino da Silva informed the club that he was
unilaterally terminating his employment contract under FIFA rules. The club
responded by informing him that it would initiate disciplinary sanctions if he
signed with another club unless he paid a buyout of E25 million, which was
allegedly stipulated in the contract. A few weeks later, Francelino da Silva
signed a contract with the Spanish club Real Zaragova, which subsequently
loaned him to another Italian club, SS Lazio, after Shakhtar Donetsk brought
its claim. The loan was free, but SS Lazio had an option to pay a £13 million
or E 15 million fee to make the transfer permanent, depending on whether Real
Zaragova was found jointly and severally liable for Francelino da Silva's
breach of his employment agreement with Shakhtar Donetsk. The DRC
concluded that Real Zaragova was liable, but not for the amount requested. It
held the contractual provision that required Shakhtar Donetsk to transfer
Francelino da Silva if it received an offer of at least E25 million could not also
be interpreted as a buyout clause. However, the DRC still ordered Francelino
da Silva and Real Zaragova to pay £6.8 million in compensation for his
breach.
The CAS panel modified the penalty imposed by the DRC, raising the
amount of compensation owed to more than £11.8 million. The panel made its
calculation after considering a series of factors listed in the FIFA rules, which
did not allow it to consider the transfer offer made to Shakhtar Donetsk just
prior to Francelino da Silva's breach. The panel concluded Francelino da
Silva's services were worth just over E1 1.2 million over the final two years of
his contract. The total was the average sum of his worth to Real Zaragova and
SS Lazio over the two-year period, taking into account his salary and the
option clause in their loan contract, minus the remaining amount on his
employment contract with Shakhtar Donetsk. The total did not take into
account the non-amortized transfer fee paid by Shakhtar Donetsk to acquire
Francelino da Silva, which was incorporated into the value of the player's
services to Real Zaragova and SS Lazio, or any other transfer payments, which
were a cost of doing business. Although it had the option, the panel also
decided not to attach any liability for Shakhtar Donetsk's cost of acquiring a
replacement player. However, it did hand out a sporting sanction of £600,000,
penalizing Francelino da Silva for breaching the contract (1) with two years
remaining; (2) just after receiving an increase in his salary; (3) without
previously indicating he wished to look for other opportunities; and (4) just
before Shakhtar Donetsk began the qualifying rounds for the UEFA
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Champions League.
Federazione Italiana Giuoco CalcioFIGC v. World Anti-Doping Agency
61
The national governing body for soccer in Italy appealed a previous CAS
award that imposed a one-year suspension on Italian soccer players Daniele
Mannini and Davide Possanzini for violating the Italian Olympic Committee's
anti-doping rules, claiming that new evidence had become available and if the
previous CAS panel had known this evidence, its decision would have been
different. Both Mannini and Possanzini were selected to take a drug test
following a soccer match involving their team, Brescia, in "Serie B." But
before the players were able to report to the anti-doping control station, the
team's coach and president ordered them into the locker room for an important
meeting. The anti-doping control officer was invited to join them, but the door
was blocked from the inside. The meeting lasted between ten and twenty-five
minutes, after which the players proceeded to the control station and provided
samples. Both tests were negative. Taking into account the provisions of the
operating instructions of the Olympic committee's anti-doping commission
and the WADA International Standard for Testing, the previous CAS panel
determined that athletes may violate the committee's anti-doping rules if they
do not promptly report to the control station and fail to remain within sight of
their chaperone during a delay. It noted any other interpretation of the rules
would give athletes an easy excuse to show up late and ample time to cheat.
The panel concluded Mannini and Possanzini violated the rules because the
control officer did not agree to allow them to attend the team meeting without
supervision. It also concluded that the players' dilemma did not constitute a
compelling justification for the delay, even though it would have been illegal
to punish the players for skipping the team meeting to comply with the rules.
The new CAS panel vacated the previous award, re-confirming the
decision of the Olympic committee's appeals panel that held only that the
national governing body erred in determining Mannini and Possanzini could
not be sanctioned for violating the operating instructions of the anti-doping
commission and imposed a fifteen-day suspension on the players. First, the
panel determined the conditions for revising the previous award were met
because the evidence was produced to show there was a lack of understanding
and confusion about the requirement that players immediately proceed to the
anti-doping control station while being continuously chaperoned. The panel
found that evidence could have an impact on the outcome of the case because
whether the anti-doping control procedures that the previous panel deemed
61. CAS 2008/A/1557, vacated, CAS 2008/A/1557.
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applicable were properly applied and understood at the time of the test was
relevant to whether an anti-doping violation occurred. Applying the test of
diligence, the panel also found that the players were unable to produce that
evidence in the previous proceedings without any negligence on their part. It
emphasized that the players were not aware that the Olympic committee's
anti-doping commission was interpreting the in-competition testing procedures
as "advance notice" tests that did not require chaperoning until after the
previous award had been published. Further investigation stemming from that
discovery also revealed that, as a general matter, Italian soccer players were
not aware of their relevant obligations during the anti-doping control process
and anti-doping control officers had previously tolerated delays in testing and
non-continuous chaperoning. Applying the anti-doping rules to a broader set
of facts, the panel concluded that it should modify of the previous award. It
noted that neither of the players clearly understood whether they were being
subject to an in-competition "advance notice" test or an out-of-competition
test, or whether they had a duty to proceed to the doping control station and
stay in contact with the chaperones at all times. The panel also emphasized
that the players could not be held responsible for their lack of knowledge
because the anti-doping control procedures were combined in the operating
instructions of the anti-doping commission and the WADA International
Standard for Testing in a manner that was not easy to comprehend and the
players were not educated about those rules by the national governing body or
their union.
Hoch v. FIS6 2
Cross-country skiing coach Emil Hoch appealed the International Ski
Federation (FIS) Doping Panel's decision to declare him ineligible to
participate in any FIS-sanctioned event for life for helping Austrian athletes
commit anti-doping violations during the 2006 Olympics. Hoch was the coach
of the Austrian team at those Olympics and stayed at a private apartment
situated a short distance from the athletes' quarters in Italy. In the middle of
the festivities, the Italian police raided both locations and seized a variety of
items used to commit blood doping. The police found some of those items
were found in a bag in Hoch's room and found others in a dustbin at the
entrance to the apartment. Hoch admitted collecting the items found in his bag
from the athletes' quarters in order to dispose of them. Immediately following
the raid, Hoch drove home to Austria. The FIS instituted disciplinary
proceedings, bringing charges against the athletes and the team's support
62. CAS 2008/A/1513.
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personnel, including Hoch. The FIS Doping Panel convicted Hoch of
violating two different anti-doping rules;, including one that prohibited
assisting others commit or cover up anti-doping violations. Because those
conspiracies are considered far more serious than individual violations, they
carry the possibility of a lifetime ban.
The CAS panel partially upheld the decision, concluding that Hoch
participated in a doping conspiracy but that his the ban should be reduced to
fifteen years, which was roughly two-thirds of the number of years that he had
remaining before retirement. After noting that Hoch could only be charged
with one anti-doping violation under FIS rules, the panel determined that he
knew about the athletes' doping practices and acted with the intent to cover
them up. It noted that some of the medical items found in his bag could not be
used for permitted purposes and that he had failed to explain how the other
items were needed under the circumstances. The presence of similar medical
items in the dustbin and Hoch's rush to return to Austria following the police
raid were other facts to support that conclusion. However, the panel reduced
his penalty after determining a lifetime ban would violate the principle of
proportionality, especially when there were doubts about his role in the
conspiracy. The panel noted that the Austrian team had a history of doping
issues prior to his arrival as coach, which suggested other high-ranked officials
migh have been involved.t
Int'l Ass 'n of Athletics Federations v. Real Federacion Espanola de
Atletismo63 RFEA
64
In consolidated appeals, the IAAF sought to overturn decisions of the
national governing body for track and field in Spain that Spanish hurdler
Josephine Onyia did not commit anti-doping violations when she tested
positive for an allegedly prohibited substance following a third-place finish in
a race in Switzerland and for a different, undisputedly prohibited substance
following a first-place finish in a race in Germany eleven days later. The drug
test that took place in Switzerland revealed the presence of an analogue of a
banned stimulant; however, the WADA-accredited laboratory that conducted
the test was unable to report its finding to the IAAF until after Onyia had
participated in the second event in Germany. The drug test that took place in
Germany revealed the presence of a negligible amount of clenbuterol, a steroid
that is expressly included on the WADA Prohibited Substances List. Onyia
requested her "B" samples be opened, but testing only confirmed the presence
63. CAS 2009/A/1805; CAS 2009/A/1847.
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of the prohibited substances in both cases. Under IAAF rules, both adverse
findings were brought in front of the national governing body's disciplinary
committee; however, the committee refused to sanction the athlete. After
assessing the Swiss finding, the committee concluded that the substance
detected could not be considered a banned substance under the Prohibited List.
More importantly, it found that Onyia could not be suspended even if the
substance was banned. The committee emphasized that the drug would have
to be classified as one of the Prohibited List's "Specified Substances," and that
Onyia satisfied her burden of establishing that the use of the substance was not
intended to enhance her performance. After assessing the German finding, the
committee concluded that the banned substance was not detected at the level
required by the WADA technical documents and that its presence could have
been caused by Onyia's ingestion of contaminated meat.
The CAS panel reversed, holding that Onyia committed a single anti-
doping violation when she tested positive for both substalces and was
therefore suspended from competition for two years. In assessing the Swiss
finding, the panel emphasized that the substance detected did not have to be
expressly included on the Prohibited List to be illegal, and found that it was
analogous to a listed substance because it had a similar chemical structure and
related biological effects. The panel noted that the substance detected could
not be considered a "Specified Substance" merely because it was analogous to
a substance that was; however, it determined that Onyia would not be entitled
to a reduced sanction in any event because she failed to establish how the
substance entered her body. In assessing the German finding, the panel
emphasized that the presence of clenbuterol at any level would result in an
adverse finding, and that the national governing body had misinterpreted the
WADA technical documents. It noted that the documents only established the
minimum levels of substances that laboratories would have to detect to
maintain their accreditation, and that the German laboratory had detected
clenbuterol at an even lower concentration than was required. Finally, the
panel found that Onyia could not argue that exceptional circumstances
mandated a reduced sanction because there was no evidence to suggest the
banned substance entered her body through contaminated meat.
Int'l Ass 'n of Athletics Federations v. Athletic Fed'n of Slovn. 65
Slovenian long-distance runner Helena Javornik tested positive for a
substance banned under IAAF rules. However, the anti-doping commission of
the national governing body for track and field in Slovenia concluded that she
65. CAS 2008/A/1608.
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did not violate any anti-doping rules because her test results did not meet the
criteria required by a WADA technical document to declare them valid. The
commission also emphasized that the antibodies used to detect the substance
were not meant to be used in diagnostic testing. The CAS panel reversed,
determining that Javornik committed an anti-doping violation and should be
suspended from competition for two years. It emphasized that the test results
met the necessary criteria to make a valid finding under the "direct detection"
method, and the antibodies used were the type required under the WADA
technical document. The panel also concluded that the testing procedures did
not materially deviate from the IAAF guidelines or the WADA standards, and
the condition in which Javomik's sample was stored could not have tainted the
results in the manner that she claimed.
Int'l Tennis Fed'n v. Gasquet66
World Anti-Doping Agency v. Gasquet67
In consolidated appeals, the International Tennis Federation (ITF) and
WADA appealed the ITF Tribunal's decision to suspend professional tennis
player Richard Gasquet for only two-and-a-half months after he violated ITF
anti-doping rules by testing positive for a trace amount of cocaine. Gasquet
sought to uphold the ITF Tribunal's decision, claiming that the positive test
was the result of spending the night prior to his drug test at various nightclubs
in France and kissing a woman who had been a habitual cocaine user. The
CAS panel upheld the ITF Tribunal's decision, relying on the "balancing the
probabilities" test to conclude that the only logical explanation for the drug in
Gasquet's system was his interaction with the cocaine user. This finding ruled
out the possibility that one of his drinks had been spiked and an assessment of
whether he bore significant fault or negligence for letting the drinks out of his
sight. Instead, the panel concluded that he bore no fault or negligence because
he did not suspect, nor could he have known with the utmost caution, that he
had ingested the drug. However, the panel had to uphold the ITF Tribunal's
conclusion that Gasquet bore no significant fault or negligence because he had
challenged only the ITF's appeal, not the original decision to suspend him for
two-and-a-half months.
Kurten v. FE168
Show-jumping rider Jessica Kurten appealed the International Equestrian
66. CAS 2009/A/1926.
67. CAS 2009/A/1930.
68. CAS 2008/A/1569.
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Federation (FEI) Tribunal's decision to suspend her from competition for two
months after finding that she broke medication control rules when her horse
tested positive for an anti-inflammatory drug following an event in France.
Following the analysis of the "A" sample, Kurten requested that the FEI
conduct an the "B" analysis of the "B" sample in the presence of her appointed
witness at a different WADA-accredited European laboratory. When
informed that not all of the WADA laboratories test equine samples and that
the other three FEI-approved laboratories were located outside Europe, she
chose to have the sample analyzed in the U.S. However, the U.S. laboratory
notified the FEI that it was not yet prepared to carry out the type of analysis
requested. Therefore, the analysis took place at the same French lab that
examined the "A" sample. Kurten's appointed witness was not allowed to
view the actual analysis of the sample because he did not satisfy the
requirements promulgated by the FEI under the WADA Code. The analysis
confirmed the presence of the anti-inflammatory drug, but rather than accept
administrative sanctions that did not include a suspension, Kurten appealed.
The CAS panel upheld the decision, concluding that a two-month
suspension was not disproportionate when compared to the offense. It noted
that the WADA Code partially delegated the implementation of the rules for
horse doping to international federations like the FEI. As a result, the FEI
could not only require both sample analyses to take place at FEI-accredited
laboratories, it could also insist that both analyses takes place at the exact
same laboratory. The panel also determined that the FEI had a good reason for
not allowing the U.S. laboratory to conduct the analysis of the "B" sample and
found no problem with the test method or validation procedures used by the
French lab. Finally, it held Kurten's right to be heard was not violated
because she had plenty of time to find another expert that was qualified to
observe the whole analysis of the "B" sample and she did not have a
convincing reason for refusing to sign a confidentiality agreement that was
required to gain access to her requested documents. The panel found that the
sanction was appropriate because the FEI rules stipulate that she could have
been suspended for up to one year and she was unable to establish any basis
for reducing or eliminating that penalty.
Montcourt v. Ass 'n of Tennis Professionals69
Now-deceased French tennis player Mathieu Montcourt appealed an ATP
Tour hearing officer's decision to fine and suspend him for gambling on the
sport. The tour's rules prohibit players that compete in any ATP event from
69. CAS 2008/A/1630.
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wagering on the outcome of any tennis match, amateur or professional. Those
rules are found in the ATP Official Rules Book, and Montcourt signed a
document agreeing to be bound by them in both February 2003, and February
2005. But between June 2005, and September 2005, he bet on several matches
through an online organization. The CAS panel upheld the fine, but reduced
the length of the suspension by three weeks. It emphasized that Montcourt
had been de facto suspended for one week prior to the appeal, which forced
him to miss a tournament and the French Tennis Federation to award a
wildcard spot at the U.S. Open to another player. Accordingly, the panel gave
that week triple weight. In addition, it delayed the imposition of the
suspension until July because Montcourt was ready to have his appeal heard in
2008, and it would not be just for organizational delays to cause him to miss
Grand Slam events.
Mutu v. Chelsea Football Club Ltd.70
Romanian soccer player Adrian Mutu appealed a decision of the FIFA
Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) that ordered him to pay English Premier
League soccer club Chelsea over €17 million as compensation for breaching
his employment contract without just cause during the protected period when
he tested positive for cocaine in October 2004. Chelsea acquired Mutu from
an Italian club under a transfer agreement in August 2003, for E22.5 million
Euros. Subsequently, Mutu and the club entered into an employment contract
running from August 2003, until the end of June 2008. The contract included a
signing bonus of C330,000, to be paid in five installments, of which two were
made prior to Mutu's breach. Chelsea also agreed to pay Mutu's agent
C500,000, also to be paid in five installments, of which two were made prior to
the breach. One week following the positive drug test, Chelsea terminated
Mutu's contract. Shortly afterwards, the English Football Association, the
national governing body for soccer in England, suspended him for seven
months. FIFA adopted the sanction in order to give it worldwide effect.
Chelsea sought damages from the DRC for the wasted costs of acquiring
Mutu, the cost of replacing him, the unearned portion of his signing bonus,
and various other benefits that he had received. Applying Article 22 of the
FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, the DRC assessed the
objective criteria listed, and concluded that the unamortized cost of the
transfer payment, the unamortized amount of the signing bonus, and the
unamortized amount of the full agent's fee should be added together to
determine the appropriate amount of compensation owed. Although it also
70. CAS 2008/A/1644.
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could have considered the remaining value of Mutu's employment contract,
the DRC declined to add it to the amount of compensation owed because
Chelsea had immediately terminated his contract. The DRC also declined to
impose a sporting sanction based on the specificity of the sport, noting that
Chelsea's final compensation request did not incorporate such an award. It
calculated the amount of compensation owed at just less than E 17.2 million.
The CAS panel upheld the DRC's determination of the total amount of
compensation owed, but its calculations differed in a material manner. First,
the panel determined that applying the criteria listed in Article 22 was
consistent with English law, which also governed the dispute pursuant to the
employment contract. It noted that English law allows compensation for costs
incurred by clubs that reasonably rely on a promised performance, but end up
wasted when a breach occurs. The panel pointed out that the loss incurred was
not remote because it was within the reasonable contemplation of both parties
when the contract was executed. It also found that Chelsea's claim was not
precluded by its choice to terminate the contract because English law does not
limit an innocent party's choice of remedies following the other party's
breach, and the duty to mitigate damages only arises after a decision is made.
Finally, the panel emphasized that the criteria listed in Article 22 was not
contrary to European Community law, and even if it was, Mutu would still be
liable for damages under English law. It determined that applying the criteria
could not constitute a discriminatory measure based on nationality because the
FIFA Regulations do not consider the nationality of a player involved as a
triggering element, and could not constitute an anti-competitive practice
because large compensation payments are directly proportional to the amount
of damage caused. The panel also noted that large payments do not prevent
players from exercising their freedom of movement. In calculating the amount
of compensation owed, the panel affirmed that the unamortized cost of the
transfer fee, the unamortized amount of the signing bonus, and the
unamortized amount of the agent's fee were appropriate criteria to consider.
However, it calculated the amounts due under each of those criteria differently
than the DRC. First, it noted that the contract only covered fifty-eight-and-a-
half months, not the full five-year period applied by the DRC. Thus, all of the
unamortized amounts used had to be increasedraised accordingly. However,
the panel also recognized that when an installment method is provided, only
the unamortized amount of the payments actually made can be used to
determine the compensation owed. As a result, Mutu's liability on the signing
bonus and agent's fee would actually be reduced. But the panel also found
that the DRC failed to consider other unamortized acquisition costs, such as
portions of the club's solidarity contribution, transfer levy, and fees to its own
agents. Therefore, it concluded that it could still grant the relief requested by
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the club: the full amount of compensation already awarded by the DRC.
Neth. Antilles Olympic Comm. v. Int'l Ass 'n of Athletics Federations71
The Netherlands Antilles Olympic Committee (NAOC) challenged an
IAAF Jury of Appeal's decision that Netherlands Antilles sprinter Churandy
Martina committed a lane violation during the 200-meter final at the 2008
Olympics. As a result, Martina was stripped of his silver medal, which was
subsequently awarded to U.S. sprinter Shawn Crawford. Crawford's
teammate Walter Dix was also bumped up and received the bronze medal.
The NAOC argued that Martina should not have been disqualified because the
USOC failed to file its protest within thirty minutes of the final announcement
of the results of the race, which was required under the IAAF rules. It also
claimed that the USOC did not have Crawford's authorization to file the
protest. Both the IAAF and the USOC argued that the CAS did not have
jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
The CAS arbitrator determined he could hear the appeal under the
Olympic Charter, which provides the CAS with jurisdiction over any dispute
that arises out of the Olympic Games and cannot be inhibited by the rules of
an international federation. However, the arbitrator concluded that both the
IAAF rules and the "field of play" doctrine barred him from overturning the
decision of the Jury of Appeal. After examining other CAS cases, he
determined that the scope of the IAAF rules and the doctrine could be
expanded to include decisions related to the timely filing of a protest or the
authority of a committee to lodge an appeal. The arbitrator noted that the
IAAF rules provided no grounds for challenging the decision of a Jury of
Appeal, which not only rules on the merits of a protest, but whether the
organization filing it complied with all procedural requirements. Both of those
evaluations make up a "field of play" decision about an event and its results,
which cannot be overturned by CAS panels.
NOC of Swed. v. Int'l Olympic Comm. 72
The Swedish Olympic Committeecommittee (SOC) and Swedish Greco-
Roman wrestler Ara Abrahamian appealed the IOC Executive Board's
decision to accept the recommendation of an IOC disciplinary commission to
strip him of the bronze medal that he won at the 2008 Olympics after he
engaged in a symbolic protest during the medal ceremony. During the second
period of a semifinal match, the referee indicated that he wanted to give a
71. CAS2008/A/1641.
72. CAS 2008/A/1647.
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warning to Abrahamian, the silver medalist at the 2004 Games. That decision
would have cost Abrahamian a point and given a point to his opponent.
However, the ringside judge opposed the award by lighting a white lamp,
which required the mat chairman to make a deciding vote on whether a
warning should be issued. But the mat chairman failed to intervene, and the
period continued. Under FILA rules, a chairman's failure to intervene should
be interpreted as agreeing with the ringside judge, so no warning was given.
Abrahamian finished the period leading in points 2-1, tying the bout at and
forcing a third and deciding period. But before the match resumed, a bout
official determined that Abrahamian should have been given a warning. The
second-period score was re-adjusted and, as a result, Abrahamian's opponent
was declared the winner. SOC officials immediately protested the decision,
asking for a video check under FILA rules. But the federation's officials did
not comply with the request. The SOC appealed to the CAS Ad Hoc Division,
complaining that the actions of the bout officials and the committee's lack of
an appeals mechanism violated FILA rules and Abrahamian's right to know
the standing of the bout at all times. Abrahamian, the two-time world
champion, went on to win the bronze medal. However, he protested FILA's
actions during the awards ceremony by stepping off the podium, placing his
medal on the floor, and walking away. An IOC disciplinary commission
investigated the ceremony incident and set up a hearing to allow Abrahamian
to explain his actions. He told the commission that he was not disrespecting
his fellow competitors or the Olympic Movement, but reacting to the way that
FILA broke its own rules during and after his semifinal match. The
commission concluded that an alleged judging mistake could not justify his
behavior, and the IOC Executive Board accepted its recommended sanction.
One week later, the CAS Ad Hoc Division ruled on the SOC appeal, finding
that FILA failed to follow its own rules by not providing Abrahamian with an
appropriate appeals mechanism. That decision prompted the SOC to ask the
IOC to reconsider the penalty assessed against Abrahamian and to return the
bronze medal. The IOC denied the request, prompting this second CAS
appeal.
The CAS panelist upheld the IOC's decision, emphasizing that the
Olympic Charter bifurcated the jurisdiction of the IOC and the international
federations, so the IOC was only required to focus on the events at the medal
ceremony when assessing the sanction. Thus, although the allegations of rules
violations by FILA could have been used to evaluate Abrahamian's conduct,
the IOC did not have to consider them. However, the panelist noted that the
IOC actually took an expanded view of the circumstances by recognizing the
allegations that were made in its decision. Finally, the panelistpanelists
concluded that the IOC's sanction was not disproportionate because
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Abrahamian's conduct was inappropriate, regardless of his motivation.
Although it was easy to empathize with him due to the errors committed in the
match, those errors did not justify usurping the medal ceremony. The
panelistpanelists also determined that Abrahamian rejected his medal by
placing it on the floor; therefore, it was not unjust to force him to live with the
consequences of that decision.
SC. Fotbal Club Timisoara S.A. v. FIFA73
S.C. Fotbal Club Timisoara S.A., a Romanian soccer club, appealed a
FIFA decision that ordered the Romanian Football Federation (RFF), the
national governing body for soccer in Romania, to deduct six points from the
total the club earned in the 2008-2009 Romanian Liga 1 season for failure to
comply with a CAS award that ordered the club to change its color scheme by
a designated deadline for violating the intellectual property rights of SC FC
Politehnica Timisoara S.A., another Romanian soccer club, as well as the RFF
decision that implemented the FIFA order. In 2006, CAS settled an
intellectual property dispute between the appellant, then acting under the name
CS FCU Politehnica Timisoara, and SC FC Politehnica Timisoara S.A. by
ordering the appellant to change its name and color scheme because they
created a risk of confusion between the two clubs. The appellant changed its
name, but not in a manner that satisfied SC FC Politehnica Timisoara S.A.
Thereafter, FC Politehnica filed a complaint with FIFA. After When FIFA
dismissed the complaint, FC Politehnica again appealed to CAS, which
applied Article 71 paragraph 1 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code (FDC) and
imposed a fine on the appellant. The CAS panel also ordered the appellant to
change its name and eliminate violet from its color scheme by June 30, 2008,
or six points would be deducted from the team's total pursuant to FDC Article
71 paragraph 2. Subsequently, the appellant adopted its current name and, five
days before the deadline, requested uniforms with a new color scheme, which
replaced the violet with mauve. It also instructed its online manager to
substitute the new name and color scheme on the club's official website,
although the change was not made until the fall.
On July 5, the RFF confirmed the changes in the club's name and color
scheme and told club representatives to inform FIFA about the club's
compliance with the CAS award. However, five days later, the deputy
secretary to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee sent a letter to the appellant that
claimed it had been informed that the club had not complied with the CAS
award. Both the RFF and the appellant responded by faxing letters to FIFA
73. CAS 2008/A/1658.
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that claimed the club was in compliance. Without referring to those letters,
FIFA asked the RFF to forward the club's official uniform. The RFF
complied with the request, but sent the wrong kit, even though the appellant
had previously provided the governing body with one of its new uniforms.
Shortly afterwards, the deputy secretary sent a letter to the RFF that claimed
an analysis of the club's uniforms and official website revealed that the club
had failed to properly change its color scheme. The letter asked the RFF to
deduct six points from the total that the team earned during the Romanian Liga
1 season. One day later, the RFF issued a decision implementing the FIFA
request. The appellant appealed the "decision" of the deputy secretary to the
CAS, as well as the RFF decision that implemented it. Subsequently, the
appellant also filed an appeal with the FIFA Appeal Committee. That
committee rejected the appeal because the club did not file it within the time
limit provided by the FDC and failed to pay the appeal fee.
The CAS panel reversed the decisions of FIFA and the RFF, and ordered
the RFF to restore six points to S.C. Fotbal Club Timisoara S.A.'s league total.
First, the panel determined it had jurisdiction to rule on the appeal against the
FIFA decision, finding the deputy secretary's letter constituted a formal
"decision" made by the FIFA Disciplinary Committee and qualified as a
"final" decision subject to appeal because all of the club's internal remedies
were exhausted under the FDC. The panel noted that any FIFA decision
issued under Article 71 could be immediately appealed to the CAS. Second,
the panel set aside the FIFA decision, emphasizing that the decision was
enforceable, but that the club had complied with its obligations under the prior
CAS award in time. It found that there was a discrepancy between the club's
stated obligations in the 2006 CAS award and the later award that established
the June 30 deadline, and concluded that the club's compliance could only be
measured by whether its new color scheme eliminated violet, regardless of
whether the move to mauve was a practically indiscernible change. The panel
also noted that FIFA was provided with the wrong kit to evaluate, and that the
club had informed its online manager that its website needed to be changed
prior to the deadline. Finally, the panel set aside the RFF decision, noting its
effect was inexorably tied to the FIFA decision.
Seroczynski v. Int'l Olympic Comm. 74
Polish kayaker Adam Seroczynski tested positive for a banned substance
following his fourth-place finish in an event at the 2008 Summer Olympics in
Beijing. It was his first anti-doping violation. Subsequently, an IOC
74. CAS 2009/A/1755.
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Disciplinary Committee disqualified him from the race and ordered the
International Canoe Federation to modify the results of the event. The CAS
panel upheld the IOC Disciplinary Commission's sanction, concluding
Seroczynski's procedural rights were not violated and that the analytical
findings did not indicate a "false positive." After assessing various witnesses'
statements and testimony, the panel determined that the Beijing laboratory did
not depart from the WADA International Standard for Testing, and that the
low concentration of the banned substance in the athlete's body could not be
the result of tainted food. It noted that the food controls performed during the
Games were immaculate, and that Seroczynski was the only athlete to test
positive for the designated substance. But more importantly, the panel
emphasized that IOC rules mandated the disqualification of his results, even if
there was an absence of fault or negligence on the athlete's behalf.
Varis v. Int'l Biathlon Union75
Finnish biathlete Kaisa Varis tested positive for a substance banned under
IBU rules. She had previously been suspended for two years for using the
same substance, so the IBU Executive Board imposed a lifetime ban from
competition. Varis appealed, arguing that the test results should be discarded
because the IBU did not reasonably attempt to accommodate her request to
postpone the analysis of her "B" sample so she could have her nominated
biochemical expert observe the proceedings. Under the international
federation's rules, Vais had the right to request the analysis of her "B" sample
and to have a representative observe the analysis after she was notified that her
"A" sample had tested positive. But the rules also dictated that the analysis
could take place up to three weeks after the notification. This requirement
conflicted with the new 2008 version of the WADA International Standard for
Laboratories (ISL), which stated that the analysis should be completed within
seven working days. The IBU scheduled the analysis of the "B" sample seven
days after Vais was notified. The Secretary General of the IBU claimed that
he told Varis that the analysis had to be conducted sooner due to the change in
the ISL, but did not confirm that notification in writing. Varis denied the
conversation took place. The day before the scheduled analysis, Varis made
an official request to postpone the date for at least one week because her
designated expert was not yet available. The IBU turned down the request and
stated, stating it would appoint an independent party to observe the procedure,
although both its rules and the ISL required reasonable attempts to
accommodate requests by an athlete when her representative was not free on
75. CAS 2008/A/1607.
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the scheduled date. The IBU eventually appointed one of its own employees
as an independent observer and conducted the analysis on the following day.
The "B" sample also came back positive.
The CAS panel reversed the decision of the IBU Executive Board,
determining that Varis had not committed an anti-doping violation because the
results of the "B" sample were invalid. It held that the IBU violated its own
rules and the ISL in a fundamental manner by failing to reasonably
accommodate Varis's request. The panel emphasized that athletes have
limited rights in the testing process, and that the right to be given a reasonable
opportunity to observe the analysis is so important that the outcome of the test
can be discarded, even if the departure from the rules did not cause the adverse
finding. In this situation, the panel concluded that there was not enough
evidence to find that the IBU was aware of the change in the ISL prior to
conducting the analysis; thus, both the federation and the athlete were
proceeding on the basis that the three-week window still governed. Pushing
back the scheduled date of the analysis within that window was a perfectly
reasonable request because Varis's sample would not have been compromised
by the delay. Moreover, even if the IBU was aware of the change, the panel
found that its accommodations were lacking because it did not schedule the
analysis seven working days after notifying Varis and it failed to recognize
that the WADA standards allow for later testing due to technical or logistical
problems.
Volandri v. Int'l Tennis Fed'n76
Italian tennis player Filippo Volandri tested positive for a high
concentration of salbutamol, which is a banned substance under ITF rules. It
was his first anti-doping violation. Volandri had a Therapeutic Use
Exemption (TUE) to use a salbutamol-based medicine to treat his asthma, but
the presence of the substance in excess of 1,000 ng/ML was considered a
violation unless an athlete proved the high concentration was the consequence
of a necessary therapeutic dose. On his application form for the TUE,
Volandri indicated he would inhale two 100 mcg puffs of the medicine twice
daily, but also stated that he may need two additional puffs in an emergency
situation. In March 2008, Volandri was awakened by a serious asthma attack
just hours prior to his first match at a tournament in California. He summoned
his trainer to his room, but did not follow the trainer's suggestion to go to the
hospital, believing he could regain control of his breathing on his own.
Volandri took between ten and twenty puffs of the medicine over a two-hour
76. CAS 2009/A/1782.
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period before his breathing finally stabilized. Later that day, he lost his first-
round singles match and was subjected to a doping test. The results indicated
he had a concentration of salbutamol in excess of 1,000 ng/ML. The ITF's
anti-doping tribunal held that the high concentration was not intended to
enhance his performance and chose not to disturb the match results that
Volandri had obtained prior to the date that he became aware of a possible
violation. Nevertheless, it disqualified his results from the California
tournament and the other toumaments in which he participated after July 2008,
when he was made aware of his positive test, and also imposed a three-month
suspension from competition.
The CAS panel modified the penalty imposed by the tribunal. It
determined that the tribunal's decision was arbitrary because the TUE and
Global Initiative for Asthma (GIA) guidelines should have been interpreted to
allow Volandri to take up to thirty-two puffs of his medication between the
evening prior to the attack and his first-round match. The panel also disagreed
with the tribunal's conclusion that Volandri had a life-threatening attack and
should have sought medical assistance. It emphasized that he was alone and
far from home when the attack occurred; therefore, he was in the best position
to determine what was right for him. Combining that conclusion with the fact
that Volandri barely exceeded the concentration threshold and could not be
faulted for playing after traveling to California, the panel used its discretion to
eliminate the suspension. In addition, it found that the ITF committed
unacceptable mistakes during the process of bringing the doping charge. The
panel emphasized that Volandri was not notified of a possible violation until
five months after the California tournament, and he was not adequately
informed of the consequences of continuing to compete. Therefore, it decided
that the results from all tournaments except the March event in California
should be reinstated. However, it upheld the doping violation, finding that
Volandri failed to meet his burden of producing evidence that showed how the
concentration of the banned substance found in his doping test could be the
result of his therapeutic use.
World Anti-Doping Agency v. CON177
The WADA challenged an Italian Olympic committee appeals panel's
decision that held the national governing body for soccer in Italy erred in
determining professional soccer player Nicolo Cherubin could not be
sanctioned for violating the operating instructions of the Olympic committee's
anti-doping commission prior to a drug test but did not address the national
77. CAS 2008/A/1551.
[Vol. 20:2
ANNUAL SURVEY
governing body's failure to charge him with violating the Olympic
committee's anti-doping rules. Cherubin was selected to take a drug test
following a soccer match involving his team, Reggina Calcio S.p.A., in "Serie
A," the top professional Italian league. After arriving at the anti-doping
control station, he left to go to the locker room without providing a sample.
After arriving at the locker room, he participated in a team meeting resulting
in the termination of the Reggina Calcio coach, and then showered.
Approximately thirty minutes later, he returned to the anti-doping control
station and provided his required sample. The test turned out negative. The
Olympic committee's anti-doping prosecutor investigated the incident and
charged Cherubin with violating the committee's operating instructions for
showing a lack of cooperation in the completion of the anti-doping procedures.
He sought a one-month suspension from competition. The national governing
body dismissed the charges, finding that the operating instructions did not
provide an explicit sanction that could be imposed. But more importantly, it
failed to address the prosecutor's decision not to charge Cherubin with
violating the Olympic committee's anti-doping rules, which penalize athletes
for refusing or failing to submit to an anti-doping test without compelling
justification. The committee's appeals panel reversed the national governing
body's decision and suspended Cherubin for one month, emphasizing that the
operating instructions included a specific provision allowing players to be
sanctioned. However, like the national governing body, it failed to consider
whether Cherubin violated the Olympic committee's anti-doping rules. The
CAS panel upheld the decision, determining that the testimony of the national
governing body's officials did not establish that Cherubin was actually told not
to leave the anti-doping control station when he first arrived. The panel
emphasized that Cherubin was at the location for less than a minute and that,
during that time, he witnessed officials take two players from the opposing
team to go take a shower before submitting to a test, while the remaining
officials were all busy with one of Cherubin's teammates. Based on those
facts, the panel found Cherubin was not on notice that leaving the anti-doping
control station could result in being sanctioned, so he did not actually refuse or
fail to submit to a drug test in the manner proscribed by the Olympic
committee's anti-doping rules.
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World Anti-Doping Agency v. Int'l Ice Hockey Fed'n78
World Anti-Doping Agency v. DEB79
In combined cases, the WADA appealed (1) the International Ice Hockey
Federation's (1114F) decision to decline to initiate a disciplinary proceeding
against German hockey player Florian Busch on procedural grounds after the
national governing body for hockey in Germany chose not to suspend him for
refusing to take an unannounced out-of-competition anti-doping test, and (2)
the decision of the ad-hoc-Court of Arbitration of the German Olympic Sports
Confederation (GOSC) to decline to suspend Busch from competition after it
held that there was no legal basis to sanction him. Busch refused to take an
unannounced anti-doping test after a anti-doping control officer showed up at
his home. The control officer warned him that refusing to take a test could
result in disciplinary sanctions and offered to conduct the test at another
location. Busch declined this proposal, and the officer left the home after
getting him to secure his position in writing. Less than five minutes later,
Busch called the German National Anti-Doping Agency (NADA) and
explained what had happened. An hour later, he contacted the NADA again,
announcing that he had changed his mind and would go ahead with the test.
The NADA informed him that a later test was not possible because it would
defeat the purpose of unannounced visits. Busch then called his national
governing body, which quickly arranged for him to take an anti-doping test
later that afternoon. The test was conducted by the same control officer that
had shown up at his home four-and-a-half hours earlier. The results did not
reveal the presence of any banned substance. The NADA informed the
national governing body that Busch had violated the NADA Code for refusing
a doping test and was subject to a two-year suspension. But the national
governing body committee in charge of sanctioning players for missed tests
refused to suspend him. The NADA informed the WADA, which asked the
IIHF to initiate a disciplinary proceeding and sanction Busch with a two-year
suspension for violating the international federation's rules. However, the
IIHF claimed that it could not initiate a proceeding because the appeals
process laid out in the NADA Code had not been exhausted. The WADA
treated the IIHF's response as a "decision" under the international federation's
rules that allowed it to appeal to the CAS. It also submitted a list of questions
to the national governing body to determine if it had the right to appeal the
governing body's decision to the CAS under the NADA Code. The governing
body claimed its decisions could only be appealed to the German National
78. CAS 2008/A/1564.
79. CAS 2008/A/1738.
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Court of Arbitration for Sports (GNCAS). However, that court had not yet
been established. Therefore, it claimed any appeal had to be made to GOSC's
ad-hoc court.
The CAS panel dismissed the appeal against the decision of the GOSC's
ad-hoc court, emphasizing that the NADA Code only provided the WADA
with the right to appeal the national governing body's decision to the GNCAS,
even if it was not yet established. Therefore, the panel treated the response of
the national governing body to the WADA's list of questions as an offer to
enter into a special arbitration agreement, and nowhere in that agreement was
the WADA given the right to appeal to the CAS. The panel held the WADA
accepted that agreement by filing the appeal with the GOSC's ad-hoc court,
which issued an order prior to the case that confirmed its award would be final
and binding. However, panel set aside the IIHF's decision and suspended
Busch for two years for violating the WADA Code by refusing to submit to
the unannounced out-of-competition test. The panel concluded that the CAS
had jurisdiction to hear the dispute because the WADA had timely submitted
its request that the IIHF initiate disciplinary proceedings and the international
federation's response constituted a final decision on the matter. Although that
response did not address the merits of the dispute, the panel determined that it
was a unilateral act intended to produce legal effects and left the WADA
without further internal remedies. It emphasized that the IIHF rules did not
require the WADA to appeal to the GOSC's ad-hoc court, regardless of
whether the national governing body had adopted a national anti-doping code
with alternative appeals procedures. Finally, the panel noted that the question
of whether Busch could effectively mask a prohibited substance during the
period of time before he finally submitted to a test had no legal relevance
under the circumstances. It also refused to give Busch full credit for not
participating in events sponsored by the national governing body or the IIHF
since the incident because he was still playing in the German professional
league, and the WADA Code prohibited an individual declared ineligible due
to an anti-doping violation from playing his sport altogether. However, Busch
was given credit for two months of service because he had been prevented
from engaging in international competitions and sanctioned in other manners
by the national governing body.
CRMjNAL LAW
While there are very few criminal laws that directly address the world of
sports, neither amateur nor professional athletes are immune from being
punished for acting outside the bounds of legally-acceptable behavior. Or to
put it more succinctly, criminal laws do not distinguish one class of
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individuals from another; everyone is in the same boat. The following cases
show that crimes can be committed on as well as off of the field of play, and
that leagues may have legal recourse against sports figures that cross the line.
In re J.S.I., Child80
A high school wrestler appealed a trial court's decision adjudicating him
to be a delinquent after he was charged with fifth-degree assault for striking an
opponent with a closed fist during a match. The appellate court affirmed,
holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the decision because the
testimony of witnesses, the referee's report to the state's high school athletic
association, and a video recording of the match indicated that the defendant
was not attempting a wrestling move but deliberately trying to inflict bodily
harm on his opponent.
People v. Phillips8'
Former professional football player Lawrence Phillips appealed a trial
court's decision to deny his motion to vacate a judgment confirming his
agreement to plead guilty to two criminal charges filed against him and his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Phillips was charged with committing
seven state crimes after he pushed, slapped, and strangled his girlfriend during
an argument, then threatened to kill her. After posting bail, Phillips missed his
original trial date because his attorney advised him that it was not set for
another six days. But after learning that a warrant had been issued for his
arrest, Phillips flew to Los Angeles and surrendered to the court the next
morning. Although Phillips was not at fault, the court indicated that it would
remand him into custody. Phillips lacked the financial resources to post bail
again, and going to jail would have cost him the ability to play for the now-
defunct XFL team in Las Vegas in the upcoming season. Therefore, he agreed
to plead no contest to two of the charges, including one that carried a strike
penalty. He was sentenced to 180 days in jail, but the sentence was suspended
until the end of the XFL season.
The appellate court affirmed, holding there was no abuse of discretion in
finding that Phillips's plea was valid and that his attorney's actions were based
on an informed tactical choice. In assessing the plea agreement, the court
found that Phillips knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement
and was aware of the fact that it included a strike. The court also noted that
Phillips had never previously indicated that he wished to withdraw his plea
80. 2009 Minn. App. LEXIS 140 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2009).
81. 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 1845 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2009).
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and that the prosecution's failure to disclose evidence relating to the victim did
not prejudice him. In fact, Phillips could have discovered that evidence prior
to the time that he moved to vacate the judgment. Finally, the court
emphasized that relief could have been denied based solely on the fact that it
took Phillips seven years to make the motion, during which he made forty-five
court appearances without indicating that he made his plea under duress. In
denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the court emphasized that
Phillips was only punished for two of the seven crimes that he was charged
with committing and that the state had allowed him to postpone his jail
sentence even though a strike was involved.
United States v. Battista8
2
James Battista, a co-conspirator in the NBA gambling scandal involving
former league referee Tim Donaghy, appealed a district court's judgment on
his guilty plea for conspiracy to transmit wagering information that ordered
him to pay restitution to the league as a victim of the offense under federal
law. Under the conspiracy, Donaghy provided picks on NBA games to a
middle man, who then relayed those picks to Battista to place bets. In
exchange, Battista paid Donaghy a fee for every correct pick. The NBA
sought restitution in the form of (1) the compensation it paid to Donaghy for
games in which he had a financial interest; (2) the compensation it paid to
employees to review the tapes of the games Donaghy refereed; and (3) the
attorney fees incurred in assisting the government in its investigation of the
case. The district court ordered Battista, Donaghy, and the middleman to pay
over $217,000 in restitution.
The Second Circuit affirmed the order, holding restitution was properly
imposed under the federal Victims and Witnesses Protection Act (VWPA),
which enables courts to impose restitution for crimes that may or may not be
covered under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), another
federal law. In assessing whether the NBA could recover under the VWPA,
the court emphasized that the league was a "victim," as statutorily-defined,
because it was not only harmed by Battista's use of the nonpublic information
he received, but his role in the conspiracy, which encompassed the acts of his
co-conspirators. The court also found Battista's external financial obligations
were not so great as to exempt him from paying, and that shielding him would
prevent it from according equal treatment to his co-conspirators, who were
ordered to pay mandatory restitution because their crimes fell under the
MVRA. Finally, the court determined the NBA's attorney fees were
82. 575 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2009).
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recoverable because the VWPA allows victims to seek restitution for expenses
related to participation in the investigation of an offense.
United States v. Bonds83
Former professional baseball player Barry Bonds moved in limine to
exclude several categories of evidence from his trial, in which he is charged
with making false statements to a grand jury and obstruction of justice during
the BALCO investigations. Federal agents seized the evidence from BALCO
and the residence of Bonds's personal trainer, who refused to testify at trial.
The court granted the motion with respect to all of the evidence except (1) a
note allegedly written by Bonds's trainer that was seized from BALCO; (2)
part of a tape-recorded conversation between the trainer and Bonds's personal
assistant in the San Francisco Giants locker room; and (3) the expert testimony
of a government witness on the side effects of HGH and anabolic steroid use.
The court also directed the government to file a declaration containing an offer
of proof of adequate factual foundation from its lay witness, Bonds's former
girlfriend Kimberly Bell, before assessing whether she could testify about
changes in Bonds's physical or mental condition. The court excluded the
majority of the evidence because it could not be authenticated, noting that
there was a serious gap in the chain of custody because his trainer refused to
testify and there was no hearsay exception through which it could be admitted.
In excluding part of the tape-recorded conversation, which detailed a strategy
for evading Major League Baseball's drug testing procedures, the court held
that the government could not establish that it was a criminal or civil offense
to help athletes avoid detection at the time the statements were made. Thus,
they were not admissible as statements against interest.
DISABILITY LAW
The rights of disabled athletes have received a renewed focus since the
United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Martin. Their rights are protected chiefly by a series of federal laws, including
the Americans with Disabilities Act. As a general matter, those laws require
both private and public entities to make reasonable efforts to accommodate the
needs of disabled individuals. The following cases exemplify how disabled
individuals have attempted to use both federal and state law to compete
alongside healthy individuals and enjoy many of the luxuries that are often
taken for granted.
83. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16120 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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Barron v. PGA Tour, Inc. 84
Professional golfer Stephen Barron moved for a temporary restraining
order in a lawsuit that he filed against the PGA Tour after he was suspended
from the competition for using banned substances that had helped him offset
his abnormally low levels of testosterone. By taking the prescribed
substances, Barron was able to engage in a normal sex life, avoid chronic
fatigue, and maintain his immune system. However, the PGA Tour denied his
application for an exemption to use them. When he subsequently tested
positive for the drugs during a PGA Tour event, he was suspended from
competition for one year. He challenged the organization's right to impose
that discipline under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and state
contract law, and sought an injunction in order to compete in the second leg of
the PGA Tour's upcoming "Q-School."
The court denied the motion, holding that Barron's inability to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims, the public
interest in protecting other golfers who have abided by the PGA Tour's anti-
doping rules, and the public interest in enforcing anti-doping policies in
professional sports outweighed the irreparable harm caused to Barron by
prohibiting him from competing in the qualifying event. After assessing the
ADA claim, the court concluded that Barron could not show that the PGA
Tour failed to provide him with reasonable accommodations under the law.
Although his condition fit the definition of a disability, the court determined
that the requested accommodation was not necessary for Barron to continue to
play golf. After assessing his remaining claims, the court concluded that the
PGA Tour's drug testing program was not unconscionable under Tennessee
law and that the decision to deny Barron's application for an exemption was
not made in bad faith or arbitrary and capricious. The court emphasized that
the PGA Tour afforded Barron numerous opportunities to appeal its
determination, and that Barron had not taken advantage of all of them. It also
noted that the sanction was imposed retroactively to enable Barron to
participate in Q-School in 2010.
Eames v. S. Univ.
8 5
Southern University moved to dismiss claims brought against it by a
disabled individual who wished to secure access to the school's football and
basketball programs after the university failed to comply with its commitment
to resolve issues related to the accessibility of its facilities, which was
84. 670 F. Supp. 2d 674 (W.D. Tenn. 2009).
85. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97452 (M.D. La. Oct. 16, 2009).
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prompted by the individual's complaint to the Office of Civil Rights. The
individual alleged that the university's failure to make necessary alterations
continued to deprive him of the opportunity to participate in or benefit from
those athletic activities. He brought suit under both the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, as well as two state laws, seeking a
permanent injunction to prevent the school from avoiding compliance with its
commitment and damages associated with its prior violations.
The court denied the motion, holding that (1) the individual's claims were
not barred by the statute of limitations; (2) he could seek damages for
intentional discrimination under the federal laws; and (3) he could seek
specific performance as a third-party beneficiary of the university's
commitment. In assessing whether the complaint was time-barred, the court
emphasized that the individual's claims were not "facility accessibility"
claims, but "program accessibility" claims; therefore, they did not begin
accruing on the date of the university's last alterations to the facilities. The
court found a different interpretation would destroy the requirement to provide
meaningful access to programs because government entities could merely
move them between non-compliant facilities. In assessing whether damages
were available, the court emphasized that the university had knowledge of the
individual's disability and that its breach of the commitment would continue to
deny him access to the athletic programs. Finally, in assessing whether the
individual qualified as a third-party beneficiary, the court emphasized that a
party could be found to have implicitly stipulated to provide a benefit under
state law, and determined that the circumstances in this case allowed for it.
The court noted that the purpose of the commitment was to benefit disabled
individuals, and that the university knew the plaintiffs access to its programs
depended upon its compliance. Moreover, by fulfilling the commitment, the
university knew it would be relieved of potential legal liability for its
treatment of those persons.
DISCRIMINATION LAW
Individuals are protected from discrimination in many sports-related
contexts by both federal laws and the Constitution of the United States
Constitution. These protections primarily relate to discrimination based on
gender, race, or age, which are severely limited or outright barred under the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, both Title VII and Title IX legislation
have provided additional security to athletes, coaches, and other individuals
that are associated with entities that receive federal funds. That legislation not
only prohibits discriminatory acts, but acts that retaliate against individuals
seeking to enforce their rights or the rights of others. The following cases
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demonstrate the types of discrimination that athletes face on and off the field
of play and the types of discrimination that coaches face in the context of their
employment.
Baldwin v. Bd. of Supervisors86
The Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System and the
athletic director at the University of Louisiana-Lafayette (ULL) appealed a
trial court's judgment on a jury verdict in favor of former ULL head football
coach Jerry Baldwin on several claims that he brought against the defendants
after he was terminated in the fall of 2001 following three straight losing
seasons. The defendants claimed that they fired him due to his poor record
and the team's low attendance numbers at home games, which combined to
create a budget crisis. They also argued that the low attendance numbers
posed a threat to ULL's Division I-A status under NCAA rules. However, the
jury awarded $2 million in damages to Baldwin after finding that the
defendants were liable for race discrimination, abuse of rights, tortious
interference with contract, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The
appellate court reversed and remanded, holding in part that the trial court
committed reversible error when it entered judgment on the jury's finding of
race discrimination under state law. It found that the interrogatories on the
verdict form were insufficient to find the defendants liable under state law,
emphasizing that the jury's conclusion that Baldwin's race was a determining
factor in his termination could only support a finding of discrimination under
federal law.
Cookson v. Brewer Sch. Dep 't 87
High School softball coach Kelly Jo Cookson appealed a trial court's
decision to grant summary judgment to the Brewer School Department and its
superintendent on her claim that they violated Maine's human rights
legislation and engaged in slander per se when the supervisor made false
statements about her to the parents of some of her players and the department
subsequently failed to renew her coaching contract. The mother of one of
Cookson's former players had previously complained to the department about
the coach after her daughter quit the team because Cookson subjected the
players to verbal abuse and hazing. The department's former superintendent
investigated the allegations in that complaint and issued a letter of reprimand
after discovering at least one similar hazing incident had occurred the prior
86. 11 So. 3d 1247 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
87. 974 A.2d 276 (Me. 2009).
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season. After the defendant superintendant took over, the mother brought a
tort claim against the school department based on many of the same
allegations in her complaint. The superintendent met with Cookson after
receiving notice of the claim but told her he was not thinking about firing her.
However, he subsequently learned about the earlier complaint and letter of
reprimand, and then found out Cookson was a lesbian. When he met with the
parents of the players, he made a number of specific comments about Cookson
and implied that her situation was similar to the situation of a staff member at
one of his previous schools who had engaged in questionable behavior by
getting involved with a nudist colony.
The Maine Supreme Court affirmed the decision in part and vacated it in
part, finding Cookson had failed to offer evidence disputing the truth of the
superintendent's statements, but had generated a genuine issue as to whether
the department's proffered rationale for failing to renew her contract was a
pretext for discrimination. The court noted the timing of the superintendent's
decision not to recommend rehiring Cookson relative to when he became
aware of her sexual orientation was a disputed fact. It also emphasized that he
had initially indicated he would not request Cookson's resignation and had
relied on hazing incidents for which she had already been punished.
Davis v. Atlantic League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, Inc. 88
The Atlantic League moved for summary judgment on age discrimination
claims brought against it by former league umpire Clark Davis after it decided
not to assign him to umpire playoff games in 2006 and then failed to renew his
contract for the following season. The league's executive director allegedly
told Davis that he was not assigned to playoff games because the league
wanted to give some younger umpires some experience. However, the league
justified both of its employment decisions as legitimate responses to (1) its
assessment of Davis's performance that season; (2) complaints about his role
in a regular season incident involving one of the league's playoff teams and its
owner; and (3) his decision to take approved leave in the middle of the regular
season to enter a poker tournament in Las Vegas.
The court denied the motion, holding a rational jury could doubt the
league's articulated reasons for its decisions. In assessing the decision not to
assign Davis to playoff games, the court emphasized that the league did not
maintain written performance evaluations of its umpires and there was
conflicting evidence related to the executive director's impression of the
umpire's performance in previous years. The court also noted that Davis was
88. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46084 (D.N.J. June 2, 2009).
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still permitted to umpire six games involving the playoff team after their
incident, and that the league could have assigned him to another playoff series
as it had in the past. Moreover, the league had ignored complaints about
another umpire twenty years younger than Davis and given him a playoff
assignment. Finally, the court noted that none of the articulated reasons for
the league's decision were ever actually communicated to Davis. In assessing
the decision not to renew his contract, the court found that the executive
director's alleged statement to Davis related to his continued employment and
constituted direct evidence of discrimination. It determined that there was a
close temporal relationship between the statement and the contract decision,
and that the statement could be interpreted to relate to his ability to do his job.
The court noted that the league's supervisor of umpires had never disciplined
Davis or recommended his termination and was unaware of the reason for the
executive director's decision.
Elborough v. Evansville Cmty. Sch. Dist.89
A school district and its high school football coach moved for summary
judgment on claims brought by female high school football player Ivyanne
Elborough after they failed to ensure that the girls' locker room was unlocked
prior to practice, kept all snacks and the team's practice schedule in the boys'
locker room, and allowed her to participate in a contact drill at practice
without any pads. Elborough also claimed that the coach told her to get her
hair cut "like a boy." The practice incident happened after Elborough's
mother complained about the way that her daughter was being treated and
resulted in serious injuries. The court granted the motion in part and denied it
in part. It held that Elborough failed to support her Title IX and Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process claims because she could not show that
the school district had adequate notice of the discriminatory acts or that either
defendant created the dangerous situation that resulted in her injuries.
However, the court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that the coach
violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by allowing her
to play without pads because of her sex and that both defendants were also
liable for that decision under state law based on either the "known danger"
exception to discretionary immunity or a theory of recklessness. In dismissing
the Title IX claim against the school district, the court emphasized that the
district did not have notice that the coach would allow Elborough to play at
practice without pads, only that she had previously had trouble getting access
to those pads in the locker room. But even if it had notice that the she might
89. 636 F. Supp. 2d 812 (W.D. Wis. 2009).
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get hurt, the court found that notice would not be sufficient to show that the
district was deliberately indifferent to the risk that she might be hurt as a
result of intentional sex discrimination. The court concluded that none of the
other alleged acts could give rise to a cause of action because the complaints
by Elborough's mother did not give the school district reason to believe that
she was the victim of intentional discrimination. It also noted that the acts
themselves were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to prevent her from
engaging in meaningful participation. In dismissing the substantive due
process claim, the court noted that public officials have a duty to protect
individuals only if the officials create a danger that poses a harm, and then
found that the coach did not engage in an any affirmative act or omission
which led to Elborough showing up at practice without pads or forced her to
participate in the contact drill. In upholding the equal protection claim, the
court determined that there was a genuine issue as to whether the coach acted
with discriminatory intent in allowing Elborough to participate in the contact
drill, especially in light of his normal response when a player appeared at
practice without pads and his attitude toward Elborough's mother when she
complained about the way that her daughter was being treated.
Floyd v. Amite County Sch. Dist. 90
High school principal Charlie Floyd appealed a district court's decision to
grant summary judgment to a school district, the school board, and various
board members on claims that he brought after he was fired for allegedly
allowing white students to participate in a private track and field training
program that he conducted on district property. Floyd was serving as both the
principal and track and field coach of the predominantly African-American
school when the school board gave him permission to operate the program in
the summer of 2002. However, he failed to notify the board that he would be
inviting white students from private schools in the community to participate.
Later that summer, the board adopted a policy that prevented school
administrators like Floyd from holding more than one position in the district.
As a result, Floyd resigned as the school's track and field coach to keep his job
as principal. However, that fall, Floyd was fired as principal after an
investigation by the district superintendent revealed that he was improperly
performing his job duties. In response, Floyd sued, claiming his termination
was the result of his decision to allow white students to participate in the track
and field program. He introduced evidence indicating that the president of the
board was biased against him for assisting those students.
90. 581 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2009).
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The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding Floyd could not establish that he was
discriminated against on the basis of his race when he was fired, and that the
district court did not err in dismissing any of his various state law claims. In
assessing the race discrimination claims, the court emphasized that Floyd
failed to assert he was fired because he associated with the white students;
instead, the evidence showed only that the school board president was angry
that Floyd allowed those students to participate. The court noted that Floyd's
attorney admitted animus about mixing races would have cost his client his job
regardless of whether if he was black or white. The court dismissed the state
law claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional
distress because good cause existed for his termination and the defendants'
alleged conduct was not outrageous enough to shock the conscience.
Green v. East Aurora Sch. Dist. No. 13191
A school district moved for summary judgment on claims brought against
it by middle school track and field coach Robert Green after it failed to
appoint him to a coaching position for the 2007-2008 school year and
reprimanded him when it received complaints that he had engaged in
inappropriate conduct. Green had coached a variety of sports at the
elementary, middle, and high school levels after joining the school district as a
certified teacher, and earned as much as $2,000 per year for each of those
additional jobs. He had also completed courses in sports first aid and coaching
principles. But prior to the 2005 track and field season, he was asked to resign
from his position because of complaints about his behavior. Following that
request, Green filed a charge of unlawful discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He was allowed to remain as
coach for that season, but was not appointed to any positions the following
year, despite school district policies that allegedly prohibited teachers who had
not completed courses in sports first aid and coaching principles from
obtaining positions and gave certified teachers a preference over non-certified
teachers in the hiring process. In January 2006, Green filed another charge of
unlawful discrimination with the EEOC. Later that year, he was formally
disciplined for four separate incidents of inappropriate conduct and transferred
to the position of an in-school suspension teacher.
The court granted the school district's motion on one of Green's two Title
VII retaliation claims but denied the motion on all of his other claims. In
assessing his Title VII age and race discrimination claims, the court held that
there was a dispute about Green's record of misconduct that needed to be
91. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9162 (N.D. 11. Feb. 5, 2009).
20101
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
sorted out in order to determine (1) why he was asked to resign from his
position as track and field coach; (2) why younger, white, non-certified
individuals who had not taken the required courses were appointed to positions
over him for the following school year; and (3) why he was not considered for
the position of wrestling coach when it opened up in the fall of 2005. In
assessing his Title VII retaliation claims, the court held that Green had
engaged in protected activity when he filed his first complaint with the EEOC,
and again emphasized that the dispute about his prior behavior needed to be
ironed out. However, it found that Green could not support his retaliation
claim based on the discipline that he received for his allegedly inappropriate
conduct because he could not establish a similarly situated employee was
treated more favorably.
Hemmer v. Gayville- Volin Sch. Dist.92
A school district and its superintendent moved for summary judgment on
claims brought against them by former high school golfer Brook Hemmer after
her coach induced her into a sexual relationship while she was a sixteen-year-
old sophomore. Hemmer had intercourse with the coach for the first time in a
hotel room at the site of the state golf tournament in 2006. She had not
qualified for the event but got permission to accompany a friend on the trip
from the superintendent. Over the next two weeks, Hemmer and her coach
had intercourse on two more occasions at his home. When the school district
finally learned of their relationship, it reported the abuse to the state's
department of social services and forced the coach to resign. Four years
earlier, the coach had been accused of other inappropriate sexual behavior
when he touched a teacher on the buttocks during a conference. Although the
incident was not reported to the school district, the superintendent heard the
news and asked the teacher if she would accept an apology for the coach's
conduct. That same teacher later claimed that she had observed the coach get
too close to female students and received complaints about his conduct. A
second teacher also claimed that she observed the coach flirt with another
female student and overheard him talking with Hemmer about meeting after
school. None of those events were ever reported, but the school district was
aware of the prior questionable behavior. In 2003, a school district board
member publicly stated that the coach should not be placed near high school
girls because another board member noticed that he was spending his free time
with them. In addition, a third teacher held a secret meeting at her house to
discuss the coach's alleged flirting with eighth-grade girls. Two board
92. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14379 (D.S.D. Feb. 20, 2009).
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members were in attendance at that meeting but did not follow up on the
complaints or even document that it took place. Hemmer claimed that the
school district and the superintendent acted with deliberate indifference to the
known risk that her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights
could be violated and engaged in negligent supervision under state law.
The court granted the defendant's motion on all of Hemmer's claims. It
concluded the coach's conduct towards the teacher at the conference and the
other alleged misconduct did not show the existence of a persistent pattern of
unconstitutional misconduct, which is required to establish a § 1983 claim for
failure to investigate and act upon complaints of violations of constitutional
rights. It also determined that any inadequate sexual harassment training
could not be considered the cause of Hemmer's injuries because the coach was
clearly abusing his position of authority. The court found Hemmer's state law
claims lacking for similar reasons. She could not prove it was reasonably
foreseeable to the school district or the superintendent that the coach would
engage in an inappropriate sexual relationship with a student because there
was no evidence that he touched, attempted to touch, or even desired to touch
a student in that manner. In addition, the superintendent could not be found
liable in his individual capacity because none of the policies that he allegedly
violated imposed a ministerial duty to respond in a specific manner.
J.A. v. Vill. of Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.93
The father of a sixth-grade girl who was denied the opportunity to play on
a boys' basketball team in a recreational league sponsored by a private
organization moved for summary judgment on his claim that a school board
and its superintendent violated his daughter's rights under New Jersey's anti-
discrimination law. Both defendants also moved for summary judgment on
that claim. The plaintiffs daughter wanted to play on a boys' team because
the boys used standard ten-foot high hoops, while the girls were forced to use
baskets a foot-and-a-half shorter. The board allowed the private organization
to lease its gymnasiums to hold practices and games even though the state law
prohibited discrimination in places of public accommodation. The court
granted summary judgment to the board and the superintendent, holding that
neither defendant engaged in indirect discrimination or aided and abetted the
private organization in its discriminatory practice. The court noted that the
superintendent would have allowed the girl to play on the boys' team but did
not control the organization or its basketball program. More importantly, the
court found that the defendants did not substantially assist the organization in
93. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41100 (D.N.J. May 13, 2009).
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its discriminatory practice because they did not encourage it to prevent the girl
from playing on the boys' team. In fact, both the superintendent and members
of the board warned the organization against engaging in unlawful
discrimination on multiple occasions and had tried to resolve the dispute
between the organization and the girl's family.
Maier v. Canon McMillan Sch. Dist.
94
A school district and its named employees moved for summary judgment
on claims brought against them by the parents of a high school softball player
after she was coerced into a sexual relationship with a volunteer assistant
coach. The plaintiffs' daughter first met the coach while playing for the
school's recreational fall ball team in 2005. The following spring, she played
on the school's junior varsity squad. Over that time period, the coach
socialized with the plaintiffs and was a guest in their home, but made secret
telephone calls to their daughter on a phone issued by the school district. The
sexual relationship began at some point in the fall of 2005, with activity
occurring during and after school on school property and in the plaintiffs'
home. The coach also gave the plaintiffs' daughter rides home from practice,
despite a directive from the school principal that prohibited coaches from
giving rides to players. However, the plaintiffs were aware of these rides and
did not object. In February 2006, the plaintiffs discovered that their daughter
was engaging in late night phone calls with the coach and notified the director
of the school's softball program, who then relayed that information to the
school's principal. In a meeting held three days later, the school first learned
of the coach's routine of driving the plaintiffs' daughter home from practice.
Following the meeting, the school notified the coach that he was not to make
further contact with softball players until the matter had been resolved.
Subsequently, the school district superintendent decided to formally terminate
the coach from his position and requested that he also quit his IT job with the
district. The coach resigned shortly afterwards.
The court partially granted the defendant's motion, holding that the
parents could not establish to raise a genuine issue of material fact that showed
the defendants violated their daughter's Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily
integrity by failing to adequately investigate, supervise, and train the volunteer
coach or created an environment of sexual harassment that deprived their
daughter of educational opportunities in violation of Title IX. In assessing the
§ 1983 claim against the school district employees, the court found that the
plaintiffs failed to show that any of the employees had actual knowledge of
94. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74342 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2009).
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facts that pointed toward sexual abuse of their daughter, or, even if they did,
that they were deliberately indifferent to it. The court noted that the director
of the softball program only knew that the coach had previously spent the
night at the home of another player with permission from her parents, and that
other members of the team had reported that he was acting differently with the
plaintiffs' daughter. In assessing the § 1983 claim against the school district,
the court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the district's policies and
customs played a role in bringing about the abuse or that the district was
deliberately indifferent to the possibility of it. The court emphasized that the
district did not have to review and investigate all calls made by the coach on
his district-issued phone, and that the director of the softball program was not
required to act on the report from other members of the team, especially when
rumors run rampant in high school settings. The court also pointed out that the
district's employees were aware of the district's views on sexual harassment,
which were spelled out in a written sexual harassment policy and the school's
student handbook. Finally, in summarily dismissing the Title IX claim against
the district, the court noted that the standard for liability was even tougher to
meet than the standard under § 1983 because the employees had to have actual
knowledge of sexual misconduct, not just knowledge of the risk of
misconduct. As a result of its decision, the court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state law claims and dismissed
them without prejudice.
Miles v. Washington95
The state of Oklahoma and three individuals employed by Carl Albert
State College (CASC) moved to dismiss several claims in a lawsuit brought
against them by a former CASC women's basketball player for their actions
after she was allegedly raped by an assistant coach following a party. The
player claimed that the school's head women's basketball coach told her not to
report the incident and that she was harassed and threatened by teammates
when they learned that the assistant had been fired for drinking alcohol with
her at the party. She obtained a protective order against three of her
teammates, including the assistant's stepdaughter, but was forced to sit
through a hearing at which both the head coach and the school's athletic
director allegedly expressed their disgust with her. Both the head coach and
others at the school allegedly knew that the assistant had been partying with
female students and inappropriately interacting with them prior to the alleged
rape.
95. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7300 (E.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 2009).
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The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that the
player had sufficiently alleged causes of action for Title IX sexual harassment,
Title IX retaliation, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, as well as claims against the individual defendants in their
individual capacities for violating her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection and her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. After
assessing the sexual harassment and negligent supervision claims, the court
concluded that the allegations supported a finding that the school had actual
notice of the assistant's behavior, allowing the player to establish that the
defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the risk that he posed. After
assessing the retaliation claim, the court found that the allegations supported a
finding that the defendants knew about the teammates' harassment but
responded in a manner suggesting that they condoned it. After assessing the
equal protection claim, the court determined that the allegations supported a
finding that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the harassment she
suffered and then allowed a hostile environment to develop after she reported
the rape. In assessing the free speech claim, the court noted that reporting a
rape is speech protected by the federal constitution; thus, any retaliation
against a report would be unlawful. Finally, the court found that the
allegations supported a finding that the defendants' behavior was outrageous
enough to bring a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Pettigrew v. Cherry County, Neb. Sch. Dist. No. 696
A school district moved to dismiss an Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) claim brought against it by Bud Pettigrew after the district failed
to hire him as the head coach of its high school football team and instead hired
an individual who was fifteen years younger. The district claimed Pettigrew's
poor interview was the biggest factor in the decision not to hire him. The
court denied the motion, holding that there was direct evidence to support a
prima facie violation of the ADEA and evidence that the district's stated
reason for not hiring Pettigrew was a mere pretext for discrimination. In
finding that Pettigrew had established a prima facie violation, the court noted
that two of the three members of the hiring committee made discriminatory
comments that were directly related to the hiring decision. In assessing
whether the district's stated reason was a pretext for discrimination, the court
noted that the hiring committee members told a state entity investigating
Pettigrew's charge that his interview had went okay, which was arguably
inconsistent with the district's stated reason.
96. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49186 (D. Neb. June 11, 2009).
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Rickert v. Midland Lutheran Coll. 97
Midland Lutheran College (MLC) moved for summary judgment on
claims brought against it by former MLC women's volleyball coach Joan
Rickert after school failed to hire her in a full-time coaching capacity or as its
student activities director (SAD) and dropped the part-time positions that she
previously held while she was being treated for breast cancer. MLC informed
Rickert when she was hired that it hoped to eventually make the coaching
position full-time. However, it also stated it would offer the position to all
potential applicants when that time occurred. Subsequently, Rickert was also
hired as the school's part-time SAD, giving her full-time employment at the
school. Three years later, she was diagnosed with cancer. However, she never
missed any work, and her subsequent chemotherapy treatments only required
minor deviations from the volleyball team's normal practice schedule. But
shortly afterwards, MLC decided to make the SAD a full-time position, and
Rickert was forced to quit that job so she did not have to resign as the
volleyball coach in the middle of the season. As a result, she also lost her
office. At the time, the school was also renovating its athletic facilities.
Office space was scarce, forcing several coaches to work in small, converted
areas. Unable to find immediate room for the plaintiff, the school's athletic
director asked her to work from home until space became available.
Eventually, the athletic department secured her an office in a house located
three blocks from the athletic facilities, but near residential halls, giving her
easy access to student-athletes. However, the office lacked amenities that
Rickert deemed necessary for her to communicate with her players and the rest
of the school's coaching community. To prevent Rickert from losing her
medical benefits, the school also upgraded her to a two-thirds-time position,
only asking that she hold some camps and club tournaments to raise money for
the program.
During this time period, MLC was also implementing a plan to strengthen
its overall athletic program. As part of the plan, the school decided to make
the volleyball coach a full-time position. But rather than give that job to
Rickert, the school opened up the position to all interested applicants. MLC
established a search committee to make a recommendation, just as it had when
it hired two of the other three coaches brought in under the current athletic
director. Rickert was one of five applicants identified as a candidate for the
position. All five interviewed with the committee and met with the current
volleyball players, whose opinions were given weight in the ultimate
recommendation. The only reference to age during the entire process was one
97. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78886 (D. Neb. Sept. 2, 2009).
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committee member's reference to another candidate's "youth" as a positive
trait, and there was no evidence the plaintiffs cancer was identified as a
potential issue. Rickert was eventually identified as the committee's fourth
choice.
The court granted the school's motion, holding Rickert's cancer did not
render her disabled under federal or state law, and that MLC's conduct both
before and during the process of hiring a full-time volleyball coach was not a
pretext for age discrimination. In assessing Rickert's disability discrimination
claims, the court found that the cancer did not cause a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limited her ability to work and that the school
did not perceive her to have an impairment. It noted that the school did not
limit her overall employment opportunities, emphasizing that MLC selected
her as a finalist for the full-time volleyball coach position and that the search
committee identified her ability to work through cancer as a positive trait that
inspired her co-workers. In assessing Rickert's age discrimination claims, the
court determined that MLC had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons to hire
a full-time volleyball coach by using a search committee and to choose
another candidate, and that the plaintiff could not establish those reasons were
a pretext. It noted that MLC was in the midst of revamping its entire athletic
program, and that the search committee considered both objective and
subjective factors when weighing the candidates and making its
recommendation. The court emphasized that Rickert was considered an
average coach with questionable recruiting skills and that her teams had
consistently performed worse as her tenure wore on. Moreover, any emphasis
on another candidate's "youth" was not sufficient to prove intent to
discriminate, especially when the committee ultimately ranked a third
candidate who was similar in age to Rickert ahead of a younger applicant.
Finally, the court found MLC conducted itself appropriately after the plaintiff
lost her position as SAD. By telling her to conduct camps and tournaments, it
helped ensure she was identified as a two-thirds time employee and could keep
her benefits, and her substandard office arrangements had nothing to do with
her age.
Scott v. Haw. Dep 't of Educ. 98
The Hawaii Department of Education and the principal, vice principal, and
football coach at one of the state's public high schools moved for summary
judgment on claims brought by one of school's former football players after he
was kicked off the team for his role in a lunch-room brawl on campus and
98. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16884 (D. Haw. Mar. 5, 2009).
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allegedly forced to complete the remainder of his fall school work from home.
Dontae Scott was scheduled to graduate from high school at the end of that
semester. At a meeting following the brawl, the participants, including the
principal and vice principal, determined that Scott had committed a "Class B"
offense under the state's administrative rules because he engaged in disorderly
conduct by attempting to re-start the fight after it was broken up. Under the
school's parent-student athletic handbook, all student-athletes who committed
a "Class B" offense were automatically suspended from all school athletic
activities for the duration of the applicable sport season. Although all of the
school's football players who were involved in the brawl were told to stay
home from a game the following evening, one accessory did play. However,
the school did not have knowledge that the player was involved in the brawl
until the following week. All three members of the football team involved
with the brawl were eventually kicked off the team for the remainder of the
season. Three of the seven students suspended from school for their roles in
the incident were in special education, including Scott.
The court granted the defendant's motion on all of Scott's claims. It
concluded that Scott's race discrimination claims were either unsubstantiated
or barred by the Eleventh Amendment, noting that both states and state
officials serving in their official capacities have constitutional immunity from
lawsuits for money damages. The court also held that both his Rehabilitation
Act and Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) claims were
unsubstantiated, noting that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
before bringing his IDEA claim. In assessing the merits of the IDEA claim,
the court emphasized that Scott's request for a review of his punishment failed
to describe the problem with the proposed discipline and that he was never
actually barred from appealing his punishment under the state's administrative
rules. Finally, the court found that Scott's claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress failed because he could not prove that the behavior of the
principal, vice principal, or football coach was outrageous or that they acted
with the malice required to bring suit against a non-judicial governmental
official. It noted that the behavior of the individual defendants could only be
outrageous if it was discriminatory and that it was clear Scott was not
punished because of his race or disability.
Solkey v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist. 99
A school district, three district employees, and three of the district's high
school employees moved for summary judgment on claims brought by Terra
99. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43989 (W.D. Wash. May 26, 2009).
2010]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
Solkey after the district failed to re-hire her as its high school girls basketball
coach and allegedly retaliated against her for complaining about gender
inequity. The high school principal claimed that he decided to re-open the
hiring for all coaching positions to draw from a larger pool of potential
coaches. In the past, Solkey had complained about gender inequity in the
treatment of the high school's female athletes. After the district made its
decision to hire another candidate, she continued to complain, but received
negative comments in her performance evaluations that led to the high school
recommending that she be placed in an alternative learning space for the
upcoming school year.
The court granted the defendant's motion on all of Solkey's claims. After
assessing her Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, the court held that
Solkey did not have a property interest in the renewal of her one-year coaching
contract under state law. After assessing her Title VII gender discrimination
and retaliation claims and Title IX retaliation claim, the court concluded that
she did not present evidence to show that the stated reasons for re-opening her
position and hiring another candidate were mere pretexts for discrimination.
In addition, she failed to show why the defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity on the Title VII claim. After assessing her First
Amendment claim, the court held that there was no evidence suggesting that
Solkey's initial complaints about gender inequity were the motivating factor
behind the decision to re-open her position or hire a different coach and that
her continued complaints did not result in an adverse employment action. It
emphasized that her performance evaluations were still solid and that the high
school's plan to place her in an alternative learning space never materialized.
In addition, she failed to show why the defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity on the claim. Finally, the court found that Solkey's state
law discrimination and retaliation claims fell with her federal claims and that
there was no evidence to support her state law hostile work environment claim
or her common law claim for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy.
Williams v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n 100
After a youth tennis player and her mother were given the opportunity to
amend their complaint as pro se litigants, the United States Tennis Association
(USTA), the USTA's Northern California branch, and a tennis club that hosted
a USTA tournament once again moved to dismiss the federal race
100. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57663 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2009), aff'd on reh g, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 117640 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2009).
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discrimination and state law claims brought for failing to respond
appropriately to the plaintiffs' complaints about the actions of another player
and her family following a match between the players. In addition to the
claims arising out of the response to those complaints, the plaintiffs also
alleged that the USTA entities created an unsafe environment at tournaments
for African-Americans and arbitrarily enforced their rules and regulations
when dealing with African-American members. The lawsuit was initiated
after one of the plaintiff's tennis player's opponents allegedly called her
derogatory names and threw an ice pack at her during a tournament match,
then assaulted and threatened the plaintiffs with the help of mother the
following day. The plaintiffs claimed that neither the USTA entities nor the
club assisted them when the assault took place and that the defendants failed to
provide adequate security during the event. In addition, they claimed that the
defendants retaliated against them when they reported the incident between the
players.
The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. In throwing out
the § 1981 race discrimination claim, the court emphasized that the plaintiffs
failed to identify any facts indicating that the defendants' conduct impaired the
contractual relationship between the parties. It noted that the plaintiffs could
not show that any rights guaranteed to the plaintiffs under her USTA
membership agreement were hindered by the defendants' actions in response
to the altercation between the players. In dismissing the § 1982 claim, the
court relied on similar reasoning, noting that the plaintiffs failed to allege any
property interests that the defendants impaired with their conduct. Finally, in
tackling the § 1985(3) conspiracy claim, the court found that the plaintiffs
failed to show that the defendants conspired in their conduct or what they were
conspiring to do. It noted that the allegation that the defendants acted
similarly in response to the altercation between the players was insufficient to
infer a conspiracy. Because it dismissed the race discrimination claims, the
court refused to exercise supplement jurisdiction and rule on the plaintiffs'
state law claims.
DRUG TESTING ISSUES
Although anti-doping rules that apply to athletes are promulgated and
enforced internally within sports leagues and associations, drug testing in
some sports is often conducted by state administrative bodies. Those bodies
use the power given to them under state law to enact regulations that ensure
the health and safety of participants. Although many of the legal issues
tackled through the years have related to the regulation of boxing, the
following cases address another sport that deals with often-perplexing doping
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problems.
Case v. N. Y State Racing & Wagering Bd. 101
Horse racing trainer Timothy Case appealed the New York State Racing &
Wagering Board's (RWB) decision to revoke his license after one of his
horses tested positive for an excess level of carbon dioxide, the latest in a
string of doping violations that he committed. In addition to the penalties
prescribed by the doping rules, the RWB's regulations included a provision
allowing it to sanction trainers in any manner for activities inconsistent with
the best interests of horse racing. The appellate court affirmed, holding that
there was substantial evidence to support the RWB's determination that the
test results were properly obtained and that the revocation was not a
shockingly disproportionate penalty based on Case's history of violations.
P 'Pool v. Ind. Horse Racing Comm 'n 102
Horse racing trainer Mark P'Pool appealed a trial court's judgment
affirming the Indiana Horse Racing Commission's (IHRC) decision to impose
a six-year suspension and a $30,000 fine upon him for violating IHRC rules
when several of his horses tested positive for elevated levels of an anti-
inflammatory medication at a 2006 meet and for making false and misleading
statements to the IHRC executive director when he was investigating the use
of that drug among trainers. The IHRC rules prohibited the medication from
being administered to a horse within one day of a race; drug tests indicating
the medication's presence in urine or blood at greater than specified levels
would indicate whether it was used within that period. After being informed
five of the P'Pool's horses had tested positive, the executive director
interviewed P'Pool as part of his investigation, but did not mention the results
of the tests. When the director queried whether P'Pool had administered any
drugs to any of his horses at the meet, the trainer failed to mention his use of
the anti-inflammatory medication. When asked to forward medication records
for all of the horses he trained that competed in the meet, P'Pool complied, but
those records also failed to mention the use of the drug. After being notified
that two more of P'Pool's horses had tested positive, the executive director
conducted another interview, this time mentioning that one of the trainer's
horses had tested positive and asking for an explanation of the result. P'Pool
claimed that he used the medication as part of a "leg paint," and that he bought
the pre-made concoction from veterinarians. However, he failed to identify
101. 877 N.Y.S.2d 526 (App. Div. 2009).
102. 916 N.E.2d 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
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any of the doctors who had sold him the paint. Later, P'Pool provided two
recipes for making the paint, but a study commissioned by the IHRC based on
those recipes indicated that the anti-inflammatory would have been
undetectable. Therefore, he was charged with administering the drug during
the prohibited period and making false statements to the IHRC. Just before his
disciplinary hearing in front of the IHRC racing judges, three additional
positive tests were announced, bringing the total number of violations to
eleven. The racing judges imposed two sixty-day suspensions and $2,000 in
fines, and referred the charges to the IHRC for additional disciplinary action.
The executive director then proposed the sanctions at issue, and P'Pool
appealed to an administrative law judge (ALJ). P'Pool indicated he would call
four veterinarians as experts on his preliminary witness list, but when those
doctors were contacted by the IHRC for depositions, two indicated that they
were unaware that they were expected to testify. The IHRC moved to exclude
the listed veterinarians as witnesses due to the trainer's failure to cooperate in
discovery, and the ALJ granted the motion. Following a hearing, the ALJ
recommended that the IHRC adopt the proposed sanctions. Shortly afterwards,
the IHRC issued an order formally imposing them.
The appellate court affirmed, holding P'Pool was not denied due process
during the IHRC investigatory and disciplinary proceedings. First, the court
found that the IHRC's failure to provide prompt notice of the positive tests
was not arbitrary and capricious, noting that the delay was entirely justifiable
based on the IHRC's need to police the sport. Second, the court determined
the sanctions were not arbitrary and capricious because state law gave the
IHRC the power to impose penalties above and beyond those imposed by the
racing judges. The court noted the IHRC could have imposed a maximum fine
of $55,000 under the circumstances and stripped P'Pool's license, especially
in light of the false and misleading statements he made to the executive
director. In addition, the sanctions were consistent with those imposed for
similar violations of the medication rules. Third, the court found the ALJ did
not abuse his discretion in preventing P'Pool's proposed expert witnesses from
testifying, emphasizing that state law gave the ALJ broad discretion to impose
sanctions when the discovery process is abused. Finally, the court held the
evidence was sufficient to support the IHRC's finding that P'Pool made false
and misleading statements, especially in light of the results of the
commissioned study on his "leg paint" recipes.
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Vaders v. Pa. State Horse Racing Comm 'n103
Horse racing trainer Jayne Vaders appealed the Pennsylvania State Horse
Racing Commission's (HRC) decision to revoke her license after one of her
horses tested positive for a banned substance. Vaders was warned following a
previous positive test that another violation would cost her the ability to
participate in the sport. Prior to her hearing in front of the HRC, Vaders
requested test documents that indicated the concentration levels of the
substance that was found in the horse, but the Board of Stewards denied her
request. She was the first person to have her license revoked under the HRC's
regulations, which state that trainers should be banned following a second
offense. Vaders had committed at least five previous violations before the
HRC took action.
The appellate court affirmed, holding that the HRC did not violate the
Vaders's due process rights and the decision to revoke her license was not the
result of selective enforcement of the applicable regulations. In assessing the
due process claim, the court concluded that the documents requested by
Vaders would not help her rebut the presumption that there was a banned
substance in her horse's body. It noted that there was no provision in the
regulations that allowed licensees to mitigate their liability by pointing to the
concentration of the drug in a horse's system. The court also pointed out that
Vaders could have obtained the documents through the subpoena process
provided by the state's administrative rules. In assessing whether the HRC
was selectively enforcing its regulations, the court noted that Vaders had been
warned after her previous positive test and could have had her license revoked
after three of her earlier violations. It also emphasized that no other trainer
had broke the HRC's anti-doping rules as many times as Vaders had.
EDUCATION LAW
The rules adopted by high schools, school districts, high school athletic
associations, universities, and the NCAA create a complex body of law
governing the rights and responsibilities of athletes. Although many aspects
of those regulations have been challenged on constitutional grounds, that route
is not an option unless the entity that has enacted them is deemed a state actor.
However, courts have been willing to assess those rules under the law of
private associations, which requires non-governmental bodies to provide basic
due process, follow their own rules, and avoid arbitrary and capricious
behavior. While some of the following cases involve decisions that implicate
constitutional or tort law, most of them assess challenges brought by athletes
103. 964 A.2d 56 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).
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and local educational entities under the aforementioned standard.
Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist. v. Del. Interscholastic Athletic Ass '
10 4
The Delaware Board of Education (BOE) and the Delaware Interscholastic
Athletic Association (DIAA) moved to dismiss a school district's appeal of the
BOE's decision to uphold the DIAA's denial of the district's request to waive
penalties associated with a high school's use of an ineligible basketball player.
The court granted the motion, holding that the BOE's decision was not subject
to appeal under state law. The court noted that the Administrative Procedures
Act appeared to provide for an appeal, but that it conflicted with a new state
law that specifically sets up a process for dealing with disputes over the rules
and regulations promulgated by the BOE. The law gave individuals the ability
to appeal a DIAA decision to the BOE, but stated that the BOE's decision was
final.
Dziewa v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass '12105
The parents of a high school wrestler moved for a preliminary injunction
in a lawsuit that they brought against the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
Association (PIAA) after it allegedly violated the federal constitution and
acted arbitrary and capricious by ruling that the wrestler was ineligible to
immediately participate in varsity athletics following his transfer to a new
school. The PIAA determined that the wrestler had transferred due to
problems with his previous coach and the desire to compete for a higher-
profile program, and the association's rules dictated that any student-athlete
who transferred for athletic reasons must sit out for one year. The wrestler's
parents claimed that the transfer was made only after they separated and their
son decided to move into a new home purchased by his father. They also
claimed that the PIAA violated their privacy rights by punishing their son for
their failure to disclose their separation in their waiver request, and interfered
with their decision to select a school best suited for him. Finally, they claimed
that the PIAA violated their son's equal protection rights because it treated
students who transferred due to parental separations differently than students
who transferred for other reasons.
The court denied the motion, holding that the PIAA did not likely violate
the wrestler's parents' constitutional rights and that ineligibility for
participation in interscholastic athletic competitions alone does not constitute
irreparable harm. In assessing the privacy claim, the court noted that
104. 2009 Del. Super. LEXIS 35 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2009).
105. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3062 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2009).
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protection from disclosing personal matters only extends to particularly
sensitive information, and that the PIAA did not prevent the wrestler's parents
from choosing a particular school for their son. In assessing the equal
protection claim, the court found rational basis review was appropriate and
concluded that there were facially legitimate reasons for the alleged
classification. In assessing the state law claims, the court noted that the ruling
may have been arbitrary and capricious, but found that the wrestler had other
means of receiving exposure that could lead to a college scholarship.
Heike v. Guevara 1
06
The Central Michigan University (CMU) Board of Trustees, CMU
women's basketball coach Sue Guevara, CMU Athletic Director Dave Heeke,
and a CMU financial aid officer moved to dismiss claims brought by a former
CMU women's basketball player after she was kicked off the team by Guevara
and stripped of her athletic scholarship at the end of her sophomore season.
Guevara's predecessor allegedly convinced the plaintiff to accept CMU's
scholarship offer by orally guaranteeing her an education. However, the
plaintiff also received a letter from Heeke's predecessor stating that the
renewal of her yearly scholarship was subject to the conditions listed in the
Mid-American Conference Letter of Intent and National Letter of Intent,
which she subsequently signed. The plaintiff had a relatively smooth
freshman year until Guevara took over as the head coach at the end of the
basketball season. Guevara had been fired as the coach of the University of
Michigan (UM) three years earlier, but it was not clear whether CMU
investigated the reasons behind that decision. Six players left the program
during Guevara's seven-year tenure at UM, all due to poor relationships with
the coach. That pattern apparently continued at CMU. Upon arriving,
Guevara allegedly confronted the plaintiff about wearing make-up, and over
the next eleven months, their relationship soured. According to the plaintiff,
Guevara harassed her, singled her out for disparate treatment, and tried to
force her to transfer, based in part because the plaintiff was heterosexual.
Guevara's actions also caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress,
and at one point it manifested in a medical condition. When the plaintiff
appealed the decision to strip her scholarship to a university committee,
Guevara claimed that she was not meeting the program's expectations, even
though the coach had never informed her of her alleged deficiencies.
The court granted the defendant's motion in part and allowed the plaintiff
106. 654 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Mich. 2009), motion to dismiss remaining claims granted in part
and denied in part, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103600 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 6, 2009).
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to submit supplemental briefs in an attempt to save two of her claims. It never
assessed the plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment claims against CMU,
concluding that the university enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit. The court emphasized that Congress only abrogated that immunity as to
claims brought under federal statutes prohibiting discrimination, not claims
brought under constitutional or state law. It also never assessed the Fourteenth
Amendment "official capacity" claims against the individual defendants,
concluding that the coach, athletic director, and financial aid officer also
enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court emphasized that all
"official capacity" claims based on state law or based on federal law and
seeking monetary damages were barred in order to protect the principles of
federalism. But even without immunity, the court found that all of the above
claims would still be barred because a state and its employees are not
considered "persons" under § 1983. In assessing the negligent hiring and
negligent supervision claims brought against Heeke, the court concluded that
the athletic director would enjoy governmental immunity under state law
based on the current complaint. However, it gave the plaintiff leave to submit
a supplemental brief to explain how Heeke's conduct in hiring and supervising
Guevara amounted to gross negligence. Finally, in assessing the defamation
claims brought against all of the individual defendants, the court emphasized
that the plaintiff failed to establish defamation per se under state law and that
her failure to allege reputational harm or monetary damages would normally
be fatal to her claim. It also found that the plaintiff failed to cite the alleged
defamatory statements made by the athletic director and the financial aid
director. Nevertheless, the court allowed the plaintiff to submit a
supplemental brief that identified special damages and the comments made by
those individuals. It also ordered the plaintiff to respond to the defendants'
argument that all of their statements about her were either privileged or mere
opinions.
In a subsequent decision assessing the plaintiffs supplemental brief, the
court granted the remainder of the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in
part. The court concluded that (1) Heeke was entitled to governmental
immunity from any liability in hiring or supervising Guevara because the
plaintiff could not demonstrate that his conduct amount to gross negligence,
and (2) Heike's defamation claims against Heeke and the university's financial
aid officer were still not plead with required specificity. However, the court
refused to dismiss the plaintiffs defamation claim against Guevara,
emphasizing that there was insufficient evidence to determine whether or not
her testimony during the university committee hearing constituted opinions or
statements of fact. The court noted that Guevara could not be shielded by the
"absolute immunity privilege," which protects only statements made in a
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"judicial function." It found that the hearing did not constitute a "judicial
function" because Michigan courts had demonstrated a reluctance to extend
the privilege beyond a traditional understanding of a judicial proceeding.
Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass 'n v. Schafer10 7
The Indiana High School Athletic Association (IHSAA) appealed a trial
court's decision to award attorneys' fees to a former high school basketball
player and his father after they were successful in obtaining a declaratory
judgment that the application of certain IHSAA rules to the player's
circumstances was unconstitutional and an injunction that prevented the
IHSAA from prohibiting the player from participating in interscholastic sports
beyond his first eight semesters of high school. The IHSAA had refused the
player's request for additional eligibility under one rule, but affirmed on
appeal under a different rule. Then, when the player challenged the decision
in court, the IHSAA argued he was ineligible under a third rule. After finding
the rules unconstitutional as applied, the court allowed the player to recover
fees for over 490 hours of service because the IHSAA continued to litigate
frivolous defenses well after the player had already graduated. The appellate
court reversed and remanded, emphasizing that it was concerned that the
IHSAA was discouraging parents and student-athletes from challenging a
denial of eligibility, but concluding that the trial court needed to further
explain its decision to award attorneys' fees. The court noted that the special
findings of fact requested by the plaintiffs failed to specify what IHSAA
litigation tactics were problematic; instead, the trial court had couched its
findings in conclusory statements. The appellate court noted that just because
the entire record provided support for awarding attorneys' fees did not allow it
to ignore findings that did not support that judgment.
Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Watson 10
8
The Indiana High School Athletic Association (IHSAA) concluded that
(1) the IHSAA Review Committee acted arbitrary and capricious when it ruled
high school basketball player Jasmine Watson ineligible to play her senior
season due for violating IHSAA rules and (2) enjoined the IHSAA from
enforcing its decision or applying its restitution rule against the school that she
attended. During her freshman, sophomore, and junior years, Watson lived
and attended school in Elkhart, Indiana, where she lived with her single
mother and her three minor siblings in the family's six-bedroom house.
107. 913 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
108. 913 N.E.2d 741 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
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However, she transferred schools during the summer prior to her senior year
when her mother decided to move the family to South Bend. Several factors
played a role in that decision. Although her mother was still employed at a
plant in Elkhart, her mother's salary had been cut a year earlier due to a drastic
reduction in her work hours. As a result, she was unable to make the mortgage
payments on the family home, and her lender started foreclosure proceedings.
She would have been able to keep the house until November of Watson's
senior year, but began looking for another home; however, she wanted to
avoid the risk that her children would have to change schools in the middle of
the school year. She attempted to locate another suitable place to live in
Elkhart, but the houses that she qualified to rent were either too expensive, too
small, or located in unsafe areas. Ultimately, she decided to relocate the
family to her hometown, where she not only found a large home at an
affordable rate, but support from her extended family that lived in the area.
Prior to the move, the head coach at Watson's old school in Elkhart
assisted Watson's mother in her attempt to find a place to rent in town. At one
point, he even convinced a homeowner to waive a security deposit and offer
his property at a reduced rate. In the event the family moved out of town, he
offered to provide transportation to Watson so that she could still attend school
in Elkhart. An assistant coach also invited Watson to live with her for the
year. Following the transfer, Watson sought immediate eligibility to play
basketball at her new school based on the family's change in residence.
However, under IHSAA rules, a student who transfers for primarily athletic
reasons or as the result of undue influence must sit out a year, even if the
student's family has changed residences. Watson's old school in Elkhart
refused to approve her request because the head coach believed the transfer
was motivated by athletic reasons and that she had been recruited to South
Bend. His beliefs were based on a comment by Watson's mother, who told
him that Watson was leaving, in part, because of the player's disappointment
with the Elkhart program. The coach also alleged that Watson's grandmother
had told other individuals the previous spring that the family was looking for
another school for Watson to attend. Several other witnesses claimed that they
had heard that the coaches at Watson's new school were recruiting her during
this time. The IHSAA Review Committee determined Watson's move
violated the association's transfer rule and/or undue influence rule.
The appellate court affirmed, holding there was no error in granting the
injunction because Watson was likely to succeed on the merits of her claim
when the IHSAA's ruling on her eligibility disregarded the basic facts and
circumstances surrounding her transfer and the failure to prohibit the IHSAA
from taking action against her new school would render the trial court's
decision powerless. As a preliminary matter, the appellate court determined
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that the action was not moot, even though Watson's eligibility was no longer
an issue, because the IHSAA could still apply its restitution rule in the event of
a reversal and the case involved an issue that was of great public interest and
likely to recur. In assessing the ruling on Watson's eligibility, the court
emphasized that the IHSAA placed too much emphasis on disputed,
unsubstantiated hearsay statements and disregarded the transportation
problems that Watson's family would have faced by continuing to send her to
school in Elkhart. But more importantly, the court found there was no way
that the IHSAA could establish that the transfer occurred for primarily athletic
reasons, even if Watson's basketball future did play a role. The court found
that conclusion would ignore the evidence that Watson's mother made a
decision in the best interests of all her children, especially in light of her
financial problems. In addition, the court admonished the IHSAA for ignoring
the efforts of the Elkhart coaches to keep Watson in town and for questioning
her mother's inability to find a suitable replacement home. It emphasized that
the coaches' efforts were also clearly illegal under the IHSAA undue influence
rule, and that the family's decision to decline those favors could not be used as
a basis for finding an athletically-motivated transfer without resulting in an
inconsistent application of the rule. In affirming the scope of the injunction,
the court emphasized that the IHSAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
determining that the coach at Watson's new school violated the undue
influence rule. It noted that the allegations against the coach would not
amount to undue influence even if they were true, and that the IHSAA's
decision to make that determination in the middle of an eligibility ruling made
it proper to consider when entering the injunction.
Mather v. Loveland City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. 109
The Loveland City School District Board of Education (BOE) appealed a
trial court's decision to grant that prevented the BOE from suspending a high
school football player for part of the high school football season after he was
arrested for underage drinking and possession of alcohol. Both the player and
his father had signed his high school's athletic code, which prohibited the use
or possession of alcohol and specified penalties for violating that rule. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in exercising
jurisdiction and determining that the school illegally acquired the information
used to suspend the player. The court found that the player had no statutory
right to an appeal because the suspension only related to extracurricular
activities, and no constitutional right to an appeal because he had no property
109. 908 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).
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interest in participating in interscholastic athletics. After assessing whether
the school illegally acquired the information used to suspend the athlete, the
court concluded that state law did not make juvenile arrest records
confidential; thus, an in-school law enforcement officer was allowed to tell the
school's athletic director about the incident.
Morgan v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass 'n110
The Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Association (OSSAA)
appealed a trial court's decision to grant an injunction that prevented the
OSSAA from enforcing its transfer rule and declaring a high school basketball
player ineligible to compete in interscholastic athletics for one year. The
transfer occurred after the player's parents were barred from attending athletic
contests at her former high school when her father got into an altercation with
a member of the school board following a game. The player sought a hardship
waiver in order to become immediately eligible at her new high school, but the
OSSAA denied her application. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the trial court erred in granting the injunction because
participation in interscholastic athletics was a privilege subject to the OSSAA
eligibility rules and there was no evidence they were applied in an arbitrary or
capricious manner.
Oliver v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n'11
Former Oklahoma State University baseball player Andrew Oliver moved
for a judgment declaring that two of the NCAA's bylaws violated Ohio law
and for a permanent injunction that would prevent the association from
enforcing them. The NCAA suspended Oliver from participating in
intercollegiate athletics in May 2008 after discovering that he had allowed his
former attorneys to help him attempt to negotiate a professional contract when
he was drafted out of high school. The first bylaw at issue prohibited current
and prospective student-athletes from hiring agents to directly negotiate with
professional teams. The second bylaw was the NCAA's restitution rule, which
allowed the association to vacate the accomplishments of its member schools'
teams of their records if they allowed a student-athlete to compete under a
court order and that person was later deemed to be ineligible.
The court granted both of Oliver's motions. It held the first bylaw was
arbitrary and capricious and violated the public policy of the state of Ohio
because it was virtually impossible to enforce in an even manner and
110. 207 P.3d 362 (Okla. 2009).
111. 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 2009).
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attempted to dictate where, when, and how attorneys could represent their
clients. The court noted that NCAA rules allowed student-athletes to hire
attorneys and that it would be difficult for those athletes to assess when an
attorney was acting in an agent's role. It also emphasized that no entity other
than the state itself could regulate attorney conduct. But most importantly, the
court found that the bylaw failed to serve its intended purpose: preserving the
line of demarcation between amateurism and professionalism. The court also
held the restitution Rule was arbitrary and capricious because it interfered with
the power of the judicial system by forcing member schools to disregard court
orders and sit student-athletes who had been permitted to participate. The
court found that the rule was discouraging student-athletes from using the
judicial system to vindicate their rights.
Ulliman v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass 'n 112
The Ohio High School Athletic Association (OHSAA) appealed a trial
court's decision to preliminarily enjoin the OHSAA from enforcing its transfer
rule against high school football player Benjamin Ulliman to prohibit him
from participating in interscholastic sports during his senior year and from
taking adverse action against his school for allowing him to compete. Ulliman
had previously transferred to a new school during the first semester of his
sophomore year. That school was located in the district where his parents
resided, but he was ineligible to play sports through his junior year due to poor
grades. Following his junior year, he moved to his grandparents' home in
another district and made the transfer at issue in this case. According to the
OHSAA, its bylaws barred Ulliman from playing for one year from the date of
his second transfer unless he could prove there was a change in custody to an
individual living in the new school's district. However, the transfer rule only
states that an athlete is considered to have transferred whenever he changes
from the school he attended as a freshman to any other school. Based on that
language, the trial court determined the bylaw did not apply to Ulliman, who
was not transferring from the school he attended as a freshman.
The appellate court vacated the injunction, holding Ulliman could not
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits when the transfer rule
applied to his case and the OHSAA did not act arbitrary or capricious in
enforcing that bylaw against him. After determining the appeal was not moot
because the OHSAA could still penalize the school for allowing the athlete to
participate, the court found that the OHSAA's interpretation of the bylaw's
language was not mistaken. It noted that a private association's interpretation
112. 919 N.E. 2d 763 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).
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of its own rules is entitled to deference-especially when they appear
ambiguous-and emphasized that the trial court's analysis failed to take to
take into account the bylaw's purpose and listed exceptions. The court
recognized that it would be impossible to prevent athletes from shopping for
schools if the rule only applied to initial transfers, and that the OHSAA would
not have needed to adopt several of its exceptions if that interpretation were
correct. In assessing whether the OHSAA acted arbitrary in applying the rule
in this case, the court noted that the association had consistently barred other
athletes from participating in similar situations. More importantly, it found the
fact that the "change in custody" exception was unavailable to Ulliman did not
indicate the exception was improperly adopted or irrationally based. Although
the athlete was eighteen years old at the time of transfer, the OHSAA was not
required to anticipate every situation in its rules.
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Employment law governs a variety of disputes that arise between sports
industry professionals and their employers that are not covered by collective
bargaining agreements or statutes prohibiting discrimination. Professional
athletes often rely on the unique mechanisms found within this body of law to
protect themselves from financial ruin, especially when they suffer career-
threatening injuries. Coaches can also use employment laws to protect
themselves from liability for their tortious conduct. The following cases
provide insight into how workers' compensation insurance and other state
laws have streamlined the process of resolving employment issues.
Eaton v. Football Nw., LLC 113
Former NFL player Chad Eaton appealed a trial court's judgment that
affirmed an administrative order denying his request to re-open his first
workers' compensation claim against the Seattle Seahawks and vacated
another order granting his request to re-open his second claim against the
team. Eaton joined the Seahawks in 2001 after playing for the New England
Patriots for six seasons. During his final season in New England, he sustained
a right knee injury that required surgery, but he was deemed fit to play the
following year. His first season in Seattle was relatively uneventful, but he
reinjured his knee in preseason camp prior to his second year. Shortly
afterwards, he filed a workers' compensation claim, and the Seahawks were
ordered to pay him a permanent partial disability award. The following
spring, he sustained yet another right knee injury during minicamp, causing
113. 2009 Wash. App. LEXIS 2627 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2009).
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him to miss the entire 2003 season. He filed a second workers' compensation
claim, and benefits were paid once again. But his knee continued to cause
problems. Including the surgery conducted following his latest injury, Eaton
underwent five operations on his right knee between April 2003 and February
2004. His second claim was finally closed in July 2004 without a permanent
disability award. Eaton would play nine games for the Dallas Cowboys that
fall before retiring. In March 2005, he sought to re-open either of the claims
he filed against the Seahawks, hoping to get additional treatment on his knee.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment on the first workers'
compensation claim, but vacated the judgment on the second claim and
remanded for reconsideration. Assessing the second claim first, the court
found that the trial court's findings and conclusions of law were too unclear to
dismiss Eaton's appeal. It noted that the condition of his knee had been
characterized as representing a "continuum" of his pro football career, which
suggested that his April 2003 injury was the result of an occupational disease.
The court found this characterization problematic when there was no evidence
that the department managing the claims or the Seahawks had considered the
"disease" theory and the administrative appeals judge had explicitly labeled it
an industrial injury. The court also noted that Eaton's brief tenure with the
Cowboys was identified as his "last injurious exposure" even though there
were doubts as to whether that exposure would prevent his claim from being
re-opened. It pointed out that the Washington Supreme Court had held that an
employee's previous employer could not be relieved from liability if his last
employer was located in another state, regardless if the employee's latest work
exposed him to dangerous conditions. In affirming the judgment on Eaton's
first claim, the court held that the trial court's findings were supported by
substantial evidence, emphasizing that there was no proximate cause between
the earlier injury and the later aggravation.
Esposito-Cogan v. East Haven Bd. of Educ. 114
The East Haven Board of Education (BOE) moved for summary judgment
on Eva Esposito-Cogan's claim that the BOE violated her Fourteenth
Amendment rights when it voted not to renew her contract to coach the town's
high school girls' volleyball team during a June 2005 meeting. A state law
required any board that declined to renew the contract of a coach who had
served in that same position for at least three consecutive years to inform that
coach of the decision within ninety days of end of the sports season covered
by the coach's contract. The high school girls' volleyball season had ended
114. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28994 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2009).
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the previous November. Esposito-Cogan appealed the BOE's decision and her
contract was renewed two weeks later. However, she was placed on
probationary status due to the complaints about her performance.
The court granted the motion, holding that Esposito-Cogan could not
establish that her procedural due process rights had been violated. First, it
determined that she did not have a protected property interest in the renewal of
her coaching contract. Although the BOE clearly violated the state's notice
requirement, its actions did not guarantee to Esposito-Cogan the right to
continued employment as the volleyball coach. Second, the court concluded
that she was not actually deprived of any tangible benefits during the two-
week period when her appeal was pending, and that the state law implied that
coaches could be given any number of designations following their yearly
evaluations. The court also determined that Esposito-Cogan was not deprived
of a protected liberty interest, even if the BOE's chairman and another BOE
member made false and malicious public statements about her during the June
meeting. Although they may have hurt Esposito-Cogan's feelings, she did not
suffer any loss in benefits when they were made.
Farquhar v. New Orleans Saints115
Former professional football player John Farquhar appealed a workers'
compensation court's decision to award him only $43,000 plus interest in back
supplemental earnings benefits after he suffered a career-ending knee injury
while employed by the New Orleans Saints prior to the 1999 NFL season.
Farquhar had signed a one-year deal that May and the Saints chose to pay him
his entire contract amount despite his failure to make the active roster.
Louisiana law provided that employees were entitled to supplemental earnings
benefits for up to ten years as long as their subsequent earnings did not exceed
ninety percent of their average weekly wage prior to an accident. Farquhar's
subsequent earnings did not exceed the ninety percent threshold until July
2002, 144 weeks after the team released him.
The appellate court affirmed, holding that there was no error in
determining the amount of the award. The court found Farquhar's average
weekly wage was correctly calculated and that the team was entitled to a
twenty-five-week credit against paying the benefits under the NFL Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA). In assessing Farquhar's average weekly wage,
the court emphasized that the wage had to be based on his actual earnings
during the preseason, not on his contract amount. Therefore, he was only
entitled to approximately $53,000 in back benefits based on the 144-week
115. 16 So. 3d404 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
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period. In addition, the court held that he was not entitled to full interest on
his claim because it was stayed while he challenged the constitutionality of
one of the state's workers' compensation laws, which was subsequently
repealed. T he court subtracted $9,000 under the CBA, which allowed a team
to take a credit if it paid a player's full salary even though he did not make the
active roster.
Ledford v. New Orleans Saints116
Former professional football player Dwayne Ledford appealed a workers'
compensation court's decision to deny him supplemental earnings benefits and
reimbursement for his medical expenses after he was released by the New
Orleans Saints prior to the 2006 NFL season and then chose to remove
hardware that was placed in his one of his fingers to stabilize a fracture that he
had sustained during spring workouts, just after he had signed a two-year
contract with the team. The finger fracture had completely healed by the time
he was released that summer. Louisiana law provided that employees were
entitled to supplemental earnings benefits for up to ten years as long as their
subsequent earnings did not exceed ninety percent of their average weekly
wage prior to an accident. After being released, Ledford was offered positions
with two other teams at a salary of up to $100,000, but he chose to decline
those offers without ever trying out. He began a new career as a coach six
months later.
The appellate court affirmed, holding there was no error in the
determination that Ledford was not entitled to benefits or reimbursement for
his medical expenses because he was almost immediately able to earn ninety
percent of his average weekly wage prior to the accident and it was not
medically necessary to remove the hardware from his finger. In calculating
Ledford's average weekly wage, the court emphasized that the wage had to be
based on his actual earnings during the preseason, not his contract amount.
Therefore, it found that he made only $527 per week with the Saints, which
was far less than the offers that he later received from other teams. The court
also noted that his coaching salary started at $2,000 per month and had
escalated to $5,000 per month by 2008.
Matyas v. Bd. of Educ. 117
A school district board of education (BOE) appealed a trial court's
decision to overturn the BOE's ruling that rejected the petition of school
116. 10 So. 3d 866 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
117. 880 N.Y.S.2d 378 (App. Div. 2009).
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district baseball coach John Matyas for a defense and indemnification from
potential liability in a malicious prosecution suit brought by one of his player's
parents after the parent was acquitted of a criminal charge based on Matyas's
statement to police following an altercation with that parent during a game.
Although Matyas admitted that he made the statement without first consulting
the BOE, there was a dispute as to whether he had been informed that the BOE
did not want him to press charges against the parent. Matyas also claimed that
he would have withdrawn the charge if he had been told not to pursue it. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court failed to apply the proper
standard of review to the BOE's determination when it found Matyas was
acting within the scope of his duties when he made the statement. The court
emphasized that the BOE's ruling had to be upheld unless it was arbitrary and
capricious and remanded the case to resolve questions of fact as to whether the
ruling had a rational basis.
Meier v. New Orleans Saints 118
Former professional football player Shadley Meier appealed a workers'
compensation court's decision to deny him supplemental earnings benefits
after he suffered a serious knee injury while in training camp with the New
Orleans Saints prior to the 2005 NFL season and was subsequently released in
the spring of 2006. Maier signed a two-year contract with the team in the
spring of 2005. He earned approximately $554,000 over the first year of the
deal and just over $66,000 prior to being released in year two. Louisiana law
provides that employees are entitled to supplemental earnings benefits for up
to ten years as long as their subsequent earnings do not exceed ninety percent
of their average weekly wage prior to an accident. Maier's subsequent
earnings had not exceeded the ninety percent threshold.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in
determining that Maier re-injured his knee in 2006 and that only the wages
that he earned in a minicamp prior to being released could be used to calculate
his benefits. The court noted that Meier's knee problems could be traced back
to the previous summer; thus, his earnings under the first year of the contract
should have been used to calculate his benefits. The court also emphasized
that his contract covered more than just the football season; therefore, his
average weekly wage had to be based on the amount that he earned over the
entire first year, not just his prorated earnings prior to the injury. After
assessing Meier's average weekly wage, the court determined that he was
entitled to over $34,000 in back benefits, based on a seventy-five-week period.
118. 6 So. 3d 944 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
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It noted that the team was entitled to a twenty-five-week credit against paying
the benefits under the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement because the team
paid Meier's full salary for the 2005 season even though he did not make the
active roster.
Reece v. Event Staffing & Accident Fund Ins. Co. ofAm. 119
A former Arena Football League team-the Grand Rapids Rampage-and
its insurer appealed a workers' compensation commission's decision in favor
of former Rampage player Travis Reece on his claim for disability benefits for
a shoulder condition that developed as a result of multiple tackle-related
injuries. Reece also appealed the commission's decision to include the
compensation that he was paid for participating in training camp and the time
that he attended camp in determining his average weekly wage. As part of its
award, the commission found that Reece was entitled to wage-loss benefits
during the off-season. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in
part, holding the commission's decision to include training camp time and
compensation in determining Reece's average weekly wage was appropriate,
but it erred in granting off-season wage-loss benefits. The court emphasized
that Reece would not have earned wages playing professional football or
engaging in other work for the team during the off-season, whether he was
injured or not.
GENDER EQUITY LAW
Ever since the Office of Civil Rights issued its 1979 Title IX Policy
Interpretation, entities that receive federal funding have faced more pressure to
place female athletes on an equal footing with their male counterparts. Under
the Policy Interpretation, public schools were placed on notice that they had to
provide equal participation opportunities to both men and women, and the
changes made have led to even more scrutiny of other aspects of athletic
programs. However, female athletes are still being treated as substandard in
educational institutions throughout the country. The following cases
demonstrate Title IX's impact on athletic opportunities for females, as well as
its retaliation provisions and public policy implications.
Atkinson v. Lafayette Coll. I2 I
Lafayette College moved for summary judgment on a Title IX retaliation
119. 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 1622 (Mich. Ct. App. July 30, 2009).
120. 653 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
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claim brought against it by its former athletic director Eve Atkinson, after the
school fired her following her decade-long crusade to bring it into compliance
with the law's gender equity mandates. Shortly after she was hired, Atkinson
began complaining that the school's athletic program did not comply with
Title IX, and her recommendations led the school to commission a self-study
to evaluate its efforts to achieve gender equity. That study suggested several
improvements, including those outlined in a gender equity plan developed by
Atkinson. It was eventually submitted to the NCAA, and the school was
provisionally certified as compliant with Title IX less than one year later.
However, Atkinson continued to argue with the school's administration about
the lack of funds to expand women's programs. The administration told her it
was unwilling to allocate any more funds to athletics and that she needed to
work within the department's current budget to achieve and maintain
compliance. As a result, Atkinson submitted a plan to eliminate four varsity
sports. But rather than approve her suggestions, the school decided to conduct
a study on the entire athletic department to determine whether it should drop to
Division III. Atkinson opposed that type of change and called a meeting with
the school's student-athletes to ask for their support and assistance in
advocating her stance. The completed study recommended staying in Division
I and conducting another capital campaign for athletics. That campaign
allowed Atkinson to hire three new coaches in women's sports and put the
school in full compliance with Title IX. However, just seven months later, the
school fired her. Its president claimed the athletic department needed new
leadership, but he never cited Atkinson's specific deficiencies when she asked
for them. Later, he indicated that concerns over her management style and
poor judgment were the biggest reasons that the school decided to make the
change.
The court granted the school's motion, holding that Atkinson failed to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation or show that the school's alleged
reasons for firing her were a mere pretext for discrimination. After assessing
the elements of a prima facie case, the court concluded that Atkinson could
not prove that she had engaged in "protected activity" or that there was a link
between the alleged activity and the school's decision to terminate her. In
discussing the "protected activity" element, the court emphasized that
Atkinson never engaged in "protected activity" that was outside the scope of
her employment, which included ensuring Title IX compliance. It noted that
her advocacy was not adverse to the school's interest, but exactly what she
was hired to do, and that it never opposed her efforts. Moreover, Atkinson's
arguments following NCAA certification only dealt with extra funding and the
school's divisional status, not shortcomings related to Title IX. In discussing
the "causation" element, the court determined that there was no evidence that
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the school terminated Atkinson due to her views on Title IX, emphasizing that
she had been financially rewarded for her efforts in bringing it into
compliance. In addition, the court found a complete lack of temporal
proximity between Atkinson's alleged Title IX complaints and the date of her
termination. It noted that her advocacy had ended at least seven months
earlier, and that, based on her long history of complaints, the school probably
would not have waited a decade to fire her if it really opposed her views. In
fact, Atkinson admitted that she had no idea why she was terminated when the
school made its decision. Finally, after considering whether the school's
stated reasons for firing Atkinson were a pretext, the court concluded that the
athletic director offered an adequate rebuttal, emphasizing (1) that the school's
post hoc explanation could not ipso facto create a pretext; (2) that Atkinson
had failed to depose individuals who had spoken with the school about her
leadership and management skills or would be willing to vouch for her skills;
and (3) that the school's criticism of her meeting with student-athletes did not
have to do with the views she expressed, but the manner in which she went
about expressing them.
Barrett v. West Chester Univ. of Pa. 12'
Current and former members of the West Chester University (WCU)
women's gymnastics team moved for reconsideration of the attorneys' fees
awarded to them in their Title IX lawsuit against the school. The plaintiffs had
successfully persuaded the court to grant a preliminary injunction that
prevented the university from eliminating the program. Later, the parties
settled the suit, and the plaintiffs petitioned for over $220,000 in fees and
costs. After calculating the lodestar, the court reduced it by fifteen percent,
and the final award was only two-thirds of the amount originally requested.
Two law firms engaged as co-counsel for the plaintiffs in the case. The first
was a public interest firm that did not charge clients for its services. The
second agreed to help out based on its belief that there was an important social
value in enforcing gender equity laws and viewed its risk of loss as a pro bono
contribution. The court denied the plaintiff's motion, holding that it did not
commit a clear error of law or create a manifest injustice when it decided to
reduce the lodestar because both Pennsylvania taxpayers and the university's
students would ultimately feel the brunt of those fees. The court noted that
WCU was a public institution that was facing budgetary problems and that it
would have to cut back on programs in order to pay off a large fee. The court
found that the amount awarded reasonably balanced the parties' competing
121. 636 F. Supp. 2d 439 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
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interests and accomplished the goal of deterring future Title IX violations.
Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ. 122
Current and future Quinnipiac University women's volleyball players and
their coach moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the school from
eliminating its women's volleyball program before the court could consider
the merits of their claim that the school's athletic program did not comply with
Title IX. The university's athletic department elected to cut the women's
volleyball program and two men's teams after being informed that its budget
was being cut by five-to-ten percent in the upcoming school year. At the same
time, it decided to elevate the competitive cheerleading program to varsity
status. The athletic department had previously implemented a roster
management policy with roster floors for each sport in order to ensure
participation opportunities for men and women were substantially
proportionate to their respective enrollments. However, there was substantial
evidence indicating that coaches were permitted to artificially inflate or deflate
the number of student-athletes on their rosters prior to beginning of the school
year, when universities are required to submit their annual Equity in Athletics
Disclosure Act (EADA) report.
The court granted the motion, holding that the players and the coach had
sufficiently demonstrated that the athletic department's decision would cause
them irreparable harm and that they were likely to succeed on the merits of
their Title IX claim. In assessing irreparable harm, the court noted that the
school had agreed to honor the players' scholarships, but found that the
decision to eliminate the program at the end of the previous school year
limited their chances of transferring. It also emphasized that they would be
required to sit out a season, which would affect their skills and their
marketability in the recruiting process. The court noted that college athletes
have a brief period of time in which they are eligible to participate and that
any movement between schools will necessarily stunt their development. In
assessing the merits of the Title IX claim, the court found that the decision to
cut the volleyball program prevented the school from complying with the safe
harbor for universities that provide substantially proportionate participation
opportunities to men and women. The court emphasized that the school's
roster management policy was not providing genuine participation
opportunities to women because coaches were adding players who did not
truly qualify for the teams based on their interests or abilities and cutting those
players after the EADA reports were submitted. It also noted that the budgets
122. 616 F. Supp. 2d 277 (D. Conn. 2009).
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for those sports were not increased as spots were added. When coupled with
the fact that men were added to teams after the reports were submitted, the
court found that the participation gap for the upcoming school year would
throw off gender proportionality to such a degree that retaining the women's
volleyball program was the only immediate way to restore it. The court
refused to allow the university to rely on the projected number of participants
in its competitive cheerleading program to comply with the law because its
estimate of the number of student-athletes that it would be able to offer
genuine participation opportunities appeared to be overly optimistic.
Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep 't of Educ. 123
A non-profit organization consisting of athletic boosters, coaches, fans,
alumni, and parents, moved for summary judgment on its claim for a judgment
declaring that the three-part test announced in the 1979 Title IX Policy
Interpretation of regulations implementing Title IX violated the Fourteenth
Amendment and Virginia law, and James Madison University (JMU) violated
Title IX by relying on that interpretation in its decision to eliminate ten of its
athletic teams in 2007. The U.S. Department of Education (DOE) and several
other defendants, including James Madison University (JMU), also moved to
dismiss that claim. JMU made its decision to drop its teams in order to satisfy
Title IX's regulations' mandate to provide equal athletic participation
opportunities. The DOE assessed compliance with that mandate through the
three-part test, which included a safe harbor that JMU tried to satisfy by
providing its female students with participation opportunities that were
substantially proportionate to the school's enrollment numbers.
The court granted the defendants' motion on all of the organization's
claims. Tackling the Fourteenth Amendment claim first, the court held that
the three-part test did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, concluding that
it did not require gender-based quotas when there were two other ways for
universities to establish compliance with the regulations. The court noted that
JMU could have avoided eliminating any athletic teams if it would have
demonstrated that the interests and abilities of its female students were fully
and effectively accommodated. It also emphasized that gender could play a
role in Title 1X compliance if it was rationally related to effectuating the
government's interest in eliminating sex discrimination. Although the
organization maintained that compliance should be based on actual interest in
athletic participation, the court maintained that athletic interest was fostered by
actual participation and that to allot participation opportunities based on actual
123. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121275 (W.D. Va. Dec. 30, 2009).
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interest would only reinforce gender roles that Title IX was enacted to combat.
The court relied on similar reasoning to dismiss the organization's state law
claims that were not already barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Finally, the
court held that JMU's decision to eliminate ten teams did not violate Title IX
itself. It noted that the safe harbor-the first prong of the three-part test-did
not require exact proportionality in athletic participation opportunities;
therefore, the two-percent imbalance that still existed as a result of JMU's
actions did not violate the law.
Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist. 12 4
Current and future female athletes at one of a school district's member
schools moved for partial summary judgment in their Title IX gender equity
lawsuit against the local school district. In one of their claims, the plaintiffs
alleged that the school district did not provide equal athletic participation
opportunities for female students. The court granted the motion on that claim,
holding that the school district failed to satisfy any of the three options for
establishing compliance that are laid out in the 1979 Title IX Policy
Interpretation. After assessing the first option, the court determined that the
district did not provide female students with athletic participation
opportunities that were substantially proportionate to their enrollment at the
high school because the six-point-seven percent difference reflected forty-
seven additional female students who could have participated in sports. After
assessing the second option, the court determined that the district did not show
a history and continuing practice of expanding athletic participation
opportunities for female students because there was no steady increase in the
percentage of females participating. Finally, after assessing the third option,
the court found that the district did not demonstrate the interests and abilities
of female students were fully and effectively accommodated because it had
eliminated its girls' field hockey program twice in the previous ten years
without evidence that interest in the sport had waned and did not offer girls'
tennis or girls' water polo in previous years despite evidence that enough
female students expressed interest in fielding teams.
Parker v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n 125
The Indiana High School Athletic Association and thirteen Indiana high
schools moved to dismiss Title IX and Fourteenth Amendment claims brought
by one of the state's high school girls' basketball coaches on behalf of her two
124. 604 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (S.D. Cal. 2009).
125. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113395 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 2, 2009).
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daughters, a sixteen-year-old who currently played high school basketball and
a ten-year-old who hoped to play it in the future. The claims arose out of the
defendants' decision to schedule their boys' sports in a more favorable way
than their girls' sports.
The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. First, it
dismissed all claims relating to the coach's youngest daughter because any
potential injury to her was too speculative and remote. After assessing the
Title IX claims, the court held that the coach had sufficiently alleged that the
thirteen members schools had violated the law based on their decision to
schedule boys' events on more favorable days and at more favorable times.
However, it dismissed the Title IX claim against the IHSAA because the coach
had failed to demonstrate that the association was a recipient of federal funds.
After assessing the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims, the court
concluded that the coach's had sufficiently alleged that the IHSAA was
sufficiently involved in the process of scheduling the boys' teams to play on
more favorable days. However, it concluded that the claim against the schools
was barred by the "sea clammers" doctrine, even though the U.S. Supreme
Court had previously declared that Title IX was not the exclusive remedy for
addressing gender discrimination in schools in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School
Committee.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
Intellectual property rights are becoming more and more valuable
throughout the sports industry, as athletes, teams, schools, associations, and
leagues find new and more innovative ways to exploit their trademarks and
common-law publicity rights in the name of the bottom line. But the
explosion in value has also forced rights-holders to take more precautions to
protect those assets. The following cases demonstrate not only some of the
methods used to take advantage of these rights, but how far the sports industry
has sought to extend its control over them.
CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass 'n 126
Fantasy football provider CBS Interactive, Inc. (CBS) moved for partial
summary judgment in a lawsuit that it brought against the NFL Players'
Association (NFLPA) and one of its for-profit subsidiaries after they declared
that CBS had to enter into a licensing agreement in order to use information
about NFL players in its game. CBS sought a declaratory judgment extending
the Eighth Circuit's decision in a similar case which held that a fantasy
126. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36800 (D. Minn. Apr. 28, 2009).
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baseball provider violated Major League Baseball players' rights of publicity
by using a similar package of information but that those rights had to give way
to First Amendment considerations because the information was already in the
public domain.
The court granted the motion, holding that the decision in the fantasy
baseball litigation was controlling because the only distinction between the
cases was the sport involved. It dismissed the NFLPA's argument that the
package of information used by CBS implicated more publicity rights than the
package used by the fantasy baseball provider and the NFLPA's assertion that
the manner in which CBS used the information amounted to a greater
exploitation of the rights. The court also determined that CBS's use of the
information could not cause fantasy football consumers to believe any players
endorsed its game and refused to speculate on whether the public had a lesser
interest in football statistics than in baseball statistics.
Con- Way, Inc. v. Conwayracing.com 127
A NASCAR Craftsman Truck Series team sponsor moved for a default
judgment in an in rem action that it filed against a domain name registrant for
violating the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). The
domain name resolved in a website that provided links to other websites
offering goods and services associated with all forms of racing, including
NASCAR. The sponsor owned a variety of registered trademarks that either
incorporated or were derived from the term "Con-Way." When it contacted the
domain name registrant via email, an individual responded with an offer to
transfer the name for $250. Although the registrant received actual notice of
the lawsuit, he failed to appear.. According to the domain name registrar, the
registrant has been located at a variety of international addresses through the
years, but has never been based in the United States. The court granted the
motion and ordered the domain name registrar to transfer the domain name to
the sponsor. After determining that it had personal jurisdiction over the
registrant and service of process was proper, the court found the domain name
created a likelihood of confusion with the sponsor's marks. It also determined
that the registrant registered and used the name in bad faith because it
attempted to sell the name for a fee. The court concluded that the domain
name evidenced intent to divert customers to a website that could damage the
goodwill engendered in the sponsor's mark, and all in the name of commercial
gain.
127. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67111 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2009).
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Cummings v. ESPN Classic, Inc. 128
Television network ESPN Classic, Inc. moved to dismiss former
professional boxer Floyd Cummings's claim that it violated the Illinois Right
of Publicity Act when it re-broadcasted a 1981 match between Cummings and
former heavyweight champion Joe Frazier. The publicity law protected an
individual's right to control how his identity was exploited for commercial
purposes and Cummings claimed that the network did not get his permission
to re-air the bout. The court granted the motion, holding that the re-broadcast
did not violate the law because the law exempts the use of an individual's
identity for non-commercial purposes and it specifically mentions sports
broadcasts as a non-commercial purpose.
Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. v. America's Team Props., Inc. 129
The Dallas Cowboys moved for summary judgment on claims that the
team brought against an apparel manufacturer for allegedly infringing the
team's trademarks associated with the phrase "America's Team" by producing
merchandise emblazoned with those words. The manufacturer was assigned a
federal trademark registration on that phrase by the owner of another entity
that had applied for it in 1990. The registration was finally granted in 1995
and the mark had been continually used in commerce since that year. The
Cowboys were granted a Texas state trademark registration on that phrase in
1992, but had been using it in commerce since 1978. The court granted the
motion, holding that the Cowboys had trademark priority over the phrase and
that the manufacturer's use created a likelihood of confusion as to the source,
affiliation, or sponsorship of the merchandise that it sold. The court also
concluded that the Cowboys had provided sufficient evidence to establish
violations of both federal and state anti-dilution laws because the mark was
famous and the manufacturer's use blurred its uniqueness and tarnished its
reputation. Based on its decision, the court cancelled the manufacturer's
federal registration and enjoined it from using the mark.
Frayne v. Chicago 2016130
The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and thhe entity formed to
128. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17764 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2009), motion for relief from judgment
dismissed, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63769 (S.D. Ill. July 25, 2009), motion for relief from judgment
denied, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71937 (S.D. Il1. Aug. 14, 2009)
129. 616 F. Supp. 2d 622 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
130. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1267 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2009), motion for summary judgment granted
in part, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92778 (N.D. I11. Oct. 2, 2009).
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promote Chicago's failed bid to host the 2016 Olympic Games (Chicago 2016)
moved for summary judgment on free speech and equal protection claims
brought by Stephen Frayne after they instituted a WIPO proceeding against
him in an attempt to acquire the domain name "chicago2016.com." The
defendants also moved for summary judgment on their Ted Stevens Olympic
and Amateur Sports Act (Stevens Act) and Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (ACPA) counter-claims. Frayne acquired the disputed domain
name in 2004 through an online website. It was just one of over 1,000 domain
names pairing a city and a future Olympic year that Frayne had registered over
a six-year period ending in 2008. He claimed that he purchased the domains
to provide forums for discussing issues related to hosting the Olympic Games.
However, it was not until August 2008, after the defendants had initiated their
WIPO proceeding, that he linked forum-generating information to the disputed
domain name. Prior to that point, the domain name was being used as a
parking page, although none of the revenues generated by it were forwarded to
Frayne. Chicago 2016 registered a domain name that was substantially similar
to the disputed domain name just four days after Frayne's original registration.
Later, both Chicago 2016 and the USOC obtained federally registered
trademarks on the phrase "Chicago 2016." Approximately six months after the
USOC designated Chicago as its bid city for the 2016 Olympic Games,
Chicago 2016 contacted Frayne to discuss obtaining the disputed domain
name. One month later, Chicago 2016 implicitly threatened him by
mentioning a favorable WIPO ruling on the domain name "madrid2012.com."
However, Frayne maintained that he intended to use the disputed domain
name as a forum and had no interest in selling it, and then resisted similar
overtures from the Tokyo Organizing Committee on his "tokyo2016.com"
domain name.
The court granted the defendant's motion on Frayne's constitutional
claims, but denied the motion on the defendants' counter-claims, holding that
there were genuine issues of material fact as to Frayne's knowledge that the
disputed domain name was being used as a parking page and the time that
"Chicago 2016" became associated with the Olympic Movement. Assessing
the counter-claims first, the court determined that Frayne's current
noncommercial use of the domain name was not relevant to the Stevens Act
claim, which was based on his pre-August 2008 conduct. However, it also
noted that Frayne did not receive any revenue from the domain name's use as
a parking page, and ultimately concluded that there was uncertainty as to
whether he "used" or "consented to the use" of a protected mark, which is
required to find Stevens Act liability. The court also found that domain names
pairing a city and a future Olympic year were not automatically protected by
the statute, noting nothing in its language or history suggested its scope ranged
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that far. The court also emphasized that a jury would have to determine when
the phrase "Chicago 2016" became associated with the USOC, thereby
creating common law trademark rights. Addressing the ACPA counter-claim,
the court emphasized that the defendants would again have to prove that the
phrase "Chicago 2016" was protected. In addition, the court found a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Frayne had a bad-faith intent to profit from
that term. Finally, in granting the defendant's motion on Frayne's claims, the
court concluded that both the USOC and Chicago 2016 were shielded from
liability under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and similar state law
immunities. In assessing Frayne's federal law claims, the court emphasized
that the WIPO proceeding was not a "mere sham," especially when panels had
previously held in favor of Olympic-related entities on identical domain name
issues. Thus, even if those proceedings were initiated in a discriminatory
manner, Frayne's claims were barred. In assessing Frayne's state law claims,
the court noted that the defendants could not single out one domain name if it
was unrelated to protecting their trademark interests. However, the court
found no evidence to suggest that the USOC or Chicago 2016 acted with
actual malice when they ignored other similar domain names, citing the lack of
commercial content on those sites.
In an earlier decision in the same litigation that partially granted a motion
to dismiss all of Frayne's claims, the court concluded that Frayne could not
maintain his cause of action for attempted reverse domain name hijacking
because no language in the ACPA, which creates a cause of action for reverse
domain name hijacking, also creates a separate cause against parties that
attempt to suspend, disable, or force the transfer of a domain name.
Heisman Trophy Trust v. Smack Apparel Co. 131
After the court granted its earlier motion for a preliminary injunction to
prevent an apparel company from infringing and diluting its trademarks, the
Heisman Trophy Trust (HTT) moved for partial summary judgment on its
claim against the company for breaching a settlement agreement arising out of
a prior trademark infringement lawsuit and for a permanent injunction to bar
the company from continuing to manufacture and market t-shirts that use a
derivative of the word "Heisman" in referring to specific college football
players. The court granted the HTT's motion, holding the apparel company's
use of the HTT's marks created a likelihood of confusion as to the t-shirts'
origin or endorsement, which automatically established both the likelihood of
131. 595 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), motion for partial summary judgment and a
permanent injunction granted, 637 F. Supp. 2d 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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success on the merits and irreparable harm needed to grant the injunction. In
weighing the factors used to assess a likelihood of confusion, the court noted
the strength of the "Heisman" marks in connection with promoting college
football, and the strong similarity between those marks and the marks used on
the apparel manufacturer's t-shirts. It emphasized that the company's marks
could create a false impression when viewed from a distance, especially when
they used the same type of font that is used in the "Heisman" marks. The
court also recognized the close competitive proximity between the parties'
products, which are both available on websites and in retail stores that cater to
college football fans. In dismissing the company's parody defense, the court
emphasized that the t-shirts did not convey two simultaneous and
contradictory messages because they failed to demonstrate that they were not,
in fact, officially-licensed products. Instead, they gave the impression that
they were approved by the marks' owner.
John Daly Enters., LLC v. Hippo Golf Co.132
Professional golfer John Daly and his wholly-owned LLC moved for
partial summary judgment on claims that they brought against a golf
equipment manufacturer after it continued to use Daly's name, likeness, and
signature following the expiration of their endorsement and licensing
agreements and failed to make all royalty payments due under the licensing
agreement. Under the endorsement agreement, Daly earned $200,000 per year
to make public appearances and display the manufacturer's logo on his
clothing during tournaments. However, when the contract expired, the
manufacturer continued to display Daly's name and likeness on its website
without authorization. Under the licensing agreement, Daly earned royalty
payments in exchange for the right to use his name, likeness, and trademarks
in the sale of the manufacturer's equipment. When that contract ended, Daly
agreed to give the manufacturer three additional months to sell off its
remaining merchandise linked to him. However, the manufacturer continued
to sell Daly-branded equipment beyond that three-month period and failed to
make all royalty payments due on those sales.
The court granted the plaintiff's motion as to the manufacturer's liability
on all of the claims, but denied it as to the question of damages on those
claims. In addition, the court denied the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment on Daly's claim for alter ego liability stemming from a judgment
obtained against the manufacturer's parent company in prior litigation. In
assessing the plaintiffs trademark infringement claims, the court noted that
132. 646 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
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the only trademark in existence at the time of the alleged infringement covered
Daly's signature and swing logo in combination, and that the merchandise that
the manufacturer continued to sell only featured the golfer's signature.
However, the court found the signature was enough to establish liability
because it was a colorable imitation of Daly's registered mark that was likely
to cause confusion. In assessing the plaintiffs state law claim for
unauthorized use of his name and likeness on the manufacturer's website, the
court found that the manufacturer could not rely on a fair use defense because
Daly's features were used in a manner that continued to constitute commercial
exploitation. But in declining to establish damages on that claim, the court
emphasized that the alleged fair market value of those features far exceeded
the compensation that Daly was guaranteed under the endorsement agreement.
Finally, in assessing Daly's breach of contract claim, the court determined that
the manufacturer's admission that it failed to make royalty payments on sales
following the expiration of the licensing agreement conclusively established
liability.
Marcinkowska v. IMG Worldwide, Inc. 133
Former professional tennis player Renata Marcinkowski appealed a trial
court's decision to dismiss claims that she brought against an Argentina-based
advertising agency and IMG for allegedly infringing her patent on dual-
surface tennis courts, engaging in false advertising, and violating South
Carolina law when they staged a match between Roger Federer and Rafael
Nadal in Mallorca, Spain. The court used in the match had a clay surface on
one side of the net and a grass surface on the other side of the net. IMG
promoted the exhibition on its website and controlled the rights to broadcast it
in the United States. The circuit court affirmed, holding that the advertising
agency was not subject to personal jurisdiction on any of Marcinkowski's
claims and IMG did not violate any federal or state laws through its activities.
In assessing whether there was personal jurisdiction over the advertising
agency, the court noted that Marcinkowski had initiated all email
correspondence between the parties in her effort to license her patent. In
assessing the claims against IMG, the court emphasized that patent laws had
no force or effect outside of the United States, and that the tennis court created
for the match was only used in Spain. Although that use was broadcast in the
U.S., none of IMG's allegedly infringing activities were conducted within the
country. The court also concluded that a statement on the IMG website
asserting that the president of the advertising agency came up with the idea for
133. 342 F. App'x 632 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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the court was not false advertising because the Lanham Act only protects
inventions associated with goods or services.
Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo134
Native Americans appealed a district court's decision to reverse the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's order cancelling the federal trademark
registrations of the Washington Redskins and grant summary judgment to the
team on the Native Americans' petition under the defense of laches. The
Native Americans claimed the registrations disparaged members of their
ethnic group in the manner prohibited by section two of the Lanham Act. The
D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly assessed the
evidence of prejudice in applying the laches defense to the facts of the case.
First, the court resolved a conflict over the standard for reviewing a laches
determination by concluding that it could only overturn a district court's
decision on how to apply the defense to the facts if there was an abuse of
discretion. In assessing that decision, the court agreed that the Redskins could
suffer trial and economic prejudice based on the Native Americans' delay in
bringing the petition. In tackling trial prejudice, the court found that the
Redskins would have difficulty gathering evidence to support its mark because
the team employee who met with Native Americans to discuss their views on
the team's name before it was registered had died, and it took eight years after
the youngest petitioner reached the age of majority before the claim was made.
In tackling economic prejudice, the court found the team had engaged in a
significant expansion of its merchandising efforts and invested heavily in its
mark during the eight-year delay, and that the delay could be viewed as
unreasonable when the youngest petitioner was exposed to the team's
trademarks prior to reaching the age of majority. Finally, the court held that a
claim relating to the trademark associated with the team's cheerleaders was
also barred by the laches defense, even though the mark was not registered
until 1990. The court found that the two-year delay in bringing that claim
could be viewed as unreasonable in light of the mark's similarity to the other
trademarks at stake.
Steele v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 135
After the court denied their earlier motion to dismiss copyright
134. 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
135. 607 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D. Mass. 2009), motion for summary judgment granted, 646 F. Supp.
2d 185 (D. Mass. 2009), motion for reconsideration denied, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98739 (D. Mass.
Oct. 13, 2009).
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infringement claims brought by Samuel Steele, all but one of the remaining
media defendants moved for summary judgment on those claims, which arose
after a song that Steele wrote about the Boston Red Sox during the team's
2004 World Series championship season was allegedly used to create an
advertisement promoting Major League Baseball post-season telecasts three
years later. Steele's song was well-known around Boston's Fenway Park, and
he received a federal copyright to protect it in 2006. He also created a
derivative version of the song that removed specific references to the Red Sox
and allowed the names of other team and cities to be filled in. Steele claimed
a TBS network promo featuring a song by Bon Jovi infringed his copyright
because the visuals were derived from Steele's song and the Bon Jovi song
was based on those visuals, Steele's song, or both.
The court granted the media defendant's motion, holding there was no
substantial similarity between Steele's song and either the promo's visuals or
the Bon Jovi song to sustain his claims. Applying the "ordinary listener"
standard, the court found there was not enough musical similarity or lyrical
similarity between the songs. It noted that an expert report submitted by
Steele admitted there was a weak musical link, and that the few phrases in
Steele's song that were actually protectable were eclipsed by the fact that the
Bon Jovi song was not about baseball. After comparing Steele's work to the
visuals from the promo, the court concluded that any matches between the
images and his protectable lyrics were the inevitable result of playing a song
about baseball under an advertisement about the sport. It also found that the
number of times the promo corresponded with the Bon Jovi song exceeded the
number of times it corresponded with Steele's work. Finally, the court
emphasized that Steele's concept of an adaptable song was not protected under
federal copyright law, and that his rights were not violated just because the
promo's visual sequences appeared synchronized to his song's beat.
Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks 136
An online retailer moved for judgment as a matter of law following a jury
verdict in favor of the University of Kansas (KU) on trademark dilution claims
that the university brought against the retailer after the retailer sold t-shirts
incorporating the school's trademarks and fans attending KU athletic events
complained that those t-shirts had a negative effect on the school's reputation.
KU also moved for contempt sanctions and to amend the permanent injunction
granted against the retailer because the retailer continued to sell infringing t-
shirts following the trial court's judgment. The court denied the retailer's
136. 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. 2009).
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motion and KU's motion for contempt sanctions, but granted KU's motion to
amend the permanent injunction. After assessing the retailer's motion for
judgment as a matter of law, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could
find that the retailer's use of KU's athletic trademarks caused actual dilution
through tarnishment, and that those marks had achieved more than niche fame.
The court noted that tarnishment could be established by reviewing the
offending t-shirts in concert with fan complaints, and that KU's marks enjoyed
widespread recognition outside the context of collegiate sporting events.
However, the court refused to assess contempt sanctions against the retailer
after determining that it could have reasonably misunderstood the scope of the
permanent injunction. The court recognized that the injunction failed to
specify that it also covered t-shirts similar to those that were previously found
to have infringed KU's trademarks in a summary judgment order. For that
reason, the court amended the permanent injunction to make it clear that it
prohibited the retailer from selling t-shirts found to be infringing by either the
jury or the court.
U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Xclusive Leisure & Hospitality Ltd.137
The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) moved for a preliminary injunction in a lawsuit
that they brought against the operators of seven websites that allegedly
incorporated the committees' trademarks into the names and pages of the sites
in order to mislead consumers into believing that the products offered for sale
were official tickets to events at the 2008 Olympic Games. Both the USOC
and the IOC had been using the words and symbols that make up those marks
since the nineteenth century and owned several federal trademark registrations
that incorporated them. The marks represented the goodwill that both the
USOC and the IOC have engendered through the years and were used to
generate revenue through the sale of broadcast rights and the promotion of
marketing, licensing, and sponsorship programs. They are also protected
under the Stevens Act, which gives the USOC the exclusive right to use and
exploit them in the United States. Using its power under that law, the USOC
entered into an exclusive licensing agreement with a third party that made that
company the sole provider of official Olympic tickets in the United States.
However, at least one major media company incorrectly reported that one of
the defendants' websites also offered official tickets. More importantly, the
consumers who bought tickets off any of those sites never received them.
The court granted the motion, holding that the USOC and the IOC
137. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12698 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2009).
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established a likelihood of success on the merits of all their claims and would
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction. In assessing the
trademark infringement claims, the court found that the defendants' actions
would create a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the tickets because
they used the same, well-known, heavily-protected trademarks in the same
service that was offered by the USOC and the 1OC. Because they established
a likelihood of success on the merits of those claims, the USOC and the IOC
were entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm. But even in the absence of
that presumption, the court would still have found irreparable harm, noting
that the defendants had crippled the value of the marks because they used them
to defraud the public and harmed the plaintiffs relationships with their
sponsors. The court concluded that the public interest militated against
allowing the defendants to continue to confuse consumers and place them at
the risk of being defrauded.
Young v. Vannerson 13
8
Three individuals and the joint venture that they formed after one of them
filed applications for registered trademarks on the terms "VY" and
"Invinceable" moved to dismiss professional football player Vince Young's
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief that would prevent them from
exploiting the marks. Young alleged that the defendants' use of those marks
would infringe his common law trademark rights in his initials and nickname.
He had applied for similar registered trademarks on those terms and previously
entered into an endorsement contract with a shoe company that sells products
with a "NY" logo. The defendants had already engaged in substantial
preparations to commercially exploit the marks, including the development of
a marketing logo that was similar to the "VY" logo used by the shoe company.
The defendants also created sample products using those terms that they hoped
to license directly to Young.
The court denied the defendant's motion, holding that it had subject-
matter jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment and that Young had
adequately alleged a cause of action for trademark infringement. The court
noted that it could not issue relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA)
unless there was an actual controversy that was justiciable under Article III of
the federal constitution. But after analyzing relevant case law, the court
concluded that Young did not have to possess a reasonable apprehension of
suit before bringing his claim and that the totality of the circumstances
suggested the existence of an actual controversy. It emphasized that Young
138. 612 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
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was in the position of pursuing arguably illegal behavior or abandoning
activities that he believed that he had a right to do and that the defendants had
engaged in meaningful preparation to conduct potentially infringing activities.
In assessing the motion to dismiss, the court found that Young's allegations
sufficiently addressed whether he was the owner of protectable trademarks and
whether the defendants were attempting to use those marks in a manner
creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, endorsement, or
sponsorship of their products.
LABOR LAW
Federal labor laws govern the relationship between employers and
employees who are currently unionized or seeking to create a union. Because
the athletes in almost every major professional sports league in the United
States have established players' associations, these laws play a leading role in
some of the most highly-publicized legal issues in sports. Most of those issues
relate directly to collective bargaining agreements, which govern the rights
and responsibilities of both athletes and the teams that employ them. A couple
of major disputes unfolded in this realm over the past year; however, their
outcome may have a profound impact on the future of the National Football
League.
Williams v. Nat 'l Football League139
The NFL, one of its vice presidents, and its drug policy administrator
appealed a district court's decision to deny their motion for summary
judgment on state statutory claims brought by Minnesota Vikings players
Kevin Williams and Pat Williams after they were suspended for four games
for violating the league's drug policy by ingesting a banned substance
contained in an over-the-counter weight-loss supplement called "StarCaps."
The players also cross-appealed the district court's decision to grant the
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the players' state common law
claims and confirm arbitration awards that upheld the suspensions. Both the
league and the drug policy administrator knew some of the StarCaps contained
the banned substance. In 2006, several players tested positive after using the
supplement, but the administrator chose not to discipline them. The vice
president subsequently informed the administrator that he did not have the
discretion to determine whom to discipline under the drug policy; however,
nobody warned the players that StarCaps contained a banned substance.
Instead, the vice president chose only to inform the NFL Players' Association
139. 654 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D. Minn. 2009), affd, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009).
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(NFLPA) that the league would no longer allow players to provide
endorsements for the supplement's distributor. After the plaintiffs tested
positive, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell designated the league's chief
legal officer to rule on their appeals at the arbitration hearing, even though that
officer had previously given legal advice to the league on the matter.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed in all respects, holding that the players' state
statutory claims were not barred by section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA) but that their state common law claims were pre-
empted, and that there was no statutory or judicially-created reason for
vacating the arbitration awards. Assessing the state statutory claims first, the
court concluded that pre-emption was not mandated because neither the
Minnesota law governing drug testing in the workplace (DATWA) nor the
Minnesota law governing consumable products (CPA) required it to interpret
the league's drug policy or other aspects of the league's collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) to determine if a violation had been committed. The court
noted that the NFL had conceded that the league's drug testing procedures did
not comply with the letter of the DAWTA and found that it would only have to
compare those procedures with the law's requirements to determine if a
violation had taken place. The court also emphasized that the LMRA did not
give the league the power to avoid any state regulatory law just to ensure
uniform enforcement of the drug policy. The court found that the CPA claim
was not barred for similar reasons, emphasizing that it did not need to
determine whether the policy's ban on diuretics was a bona fide occupational
requirement because those requirements were defenses to liability, and thus
not relevant to a section 301 analysis. The court also noted that the CPA's
application to the use of products off an employer's premises or during non-
working hours was irrelevant because there were no provisions in the CBA
that suggested players were always on the clock in training camp, which is
when the positive tests occurred. However, after assessing the state common
law claims, the court determined that it would have to interpret the drug policy
or CBA to determine whether the NFL owed the players a duty to warn against
using StarCaps and whether the players were justified in relying on the
league's silence. It noted that those issues would depend entirely on the
parties' legal relationship and expectations, which would require an
examination of the agreements between the league and the union.
Finally, the court concluded that the arbitration award was not contrary to
public policy, contrary to the essence of the drug policy, or rendered by a
biased arbitrator. In assessing whether the award was contrary to public
policy, the court concluded that no fiduciary duty was breached because the
administrator would have told any player who called him that StarCaps
contained the banned substance, and he had the discretion under the policy to
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send a general warning-rather than a product-specific warning-if he believed
that all weight-loss products carried risks. In assessing whether the award was
contrary to the essence of the drug policy, the court noted that a policy
provision prohibiting the vice president from influencing the administrator's
decision whether to discipline players was added over one year after the
alleged influence in this case. But even if it had applied, the court found the
award still drew its essence from the policy, emphasizing that the
administrator's actions prior to hearing from the vice president were not an
issue. In assessing whether the arbitrator who rendered the award was biased,
the court found no evidence in any of the testimony at the hearings or in the
arbitrator's rulings that suggested he was one-sided, and determined that the
plaintiffs waived their right to object to his appointment because it was
foreseeable that he would provide legal advice to the league. The court also
emphasized that both the NFLPA and the players actually requested him
because of his involvement with the case.
White v. Nat'l Football League140
The NFL appealed (1) a district court's decision to overturn a special
master's determination that the Atlanta Falcons could recover prorated
portions of the $29.5 million in roster bonuses that the team had paid to
quarterback Michael Vick before he pled guilty to federal dog fighting charges
and was suspended indefinitely by the league, and (2) the district court's
decision to deny the NFL's subsequent motion to vacate the judgment.
Relying upon the consent decree that it issued following the historic 1993
antitrust settlement agreement between the NFL and the NFL Players'
Association (NFLPA) to assert jurisdiction, the district court held that Vick
was entitled to keep the bonus payments that he had received because they had
already been earned under the terms of the updated settlement agreement and
the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). In its motion to vacate, the
NFL claimed that (1) the court did not have jurisdiction over the dispute
because the consent decree should have been modified to eliminate the court's
oversight, and (2) the district court judge should have recused himself from the
case.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. First, it concluded that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. and changes in
factual circumstances were not significant enough to warrant a modification of
the settlement agreement. The court emphasized that the law in the Eighth
Circuit when it entered the consent decree was consistent with the holding in
140. 585 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 2009).
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Brown and that changes in factual circumstances rarely provide a basis for
modification when they are expected from the outset of a settlement
agreement. Second, the court held that the judge's statements to the press
about his role in the 1993 settlement agreement may have been unwise, but did
not constitute evidence of a bias towards the NFLPA that required recusal. It
noted that the statements did not even reference the Vick matter, only events
that occurred over a decade earlier. Finally, the court concluded that the
"already-earned" test was the appropriate test to apply in determining whether
Vick was entitled to retain his bonus payments. It emphasized that roster
bonuses were not considered signing bonus allocations under the terms of the
settlement agreement and the CBA; thus, they were not subject to forfeiture
for the years not performed on Vick's contract with the team.
PROPERTY LAW
Since the late 1980s, record numbers of professional sports franchises
have sought financial assistance from their host cities in building new state-of-
the-art playing facilities. However, many members of the public have openly
vocalized opposition to these requests, especially property owners in the
vicinity of a planned project. Relying on the constitutional and state laws
governing real property and its use, property owners have sought to prevent
proposed facilities from being constructed or compensation for the facilities'
impact on the enjoyment of their land. This section analyzes litigation arising
out of these disputes, as well as cases related to the faulty construction of
facilities.
Cascott, L.L.C. v. City ofArlington 141
Property owners appealed a trial court's decision granting summary
judgment to the City of Arlington on their claim the city violated the Texas
Constitution's ban against taking land for a purely private purpose when it
exercised its eminent domain power to build a new stadium for the Dallas
Cowboys and entered into a favorable lease with the team. The appellate court
affirmed, holding that both the stadium project and the lease served a public
purpose. In assessing the stadium project, the court emphasized that voters
approved the city's actions and that any approved venue project was
considered owned, used, and held for a public purpose under state law. In
assessing the lease, the court emphasized the city's agreement only had to
further and promote the established public purpose, regardless of whether a
private actor benefited from it.
141. 278 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App. 2009).
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Enclave Arlington Assocs. Ltd. P 'ship v. City ofArlington 142
The City of Arlington moved for summary judgment on claims brought
against it by the owner of a 348-unit apartment building after some residents
of the building submitted notices to the owner they intended to move out due
to noise and traffic problems created by nearby Cowboys Stadium, the new
home of the Dallas Cowboys. The city had approved the plans for the
construction of the stadium. The building owner claimed the city's decision
violated the Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Fourteenth
Amendment, and created a private nuisance. The court granted the motion on
all of the owner's claims. After assessing the Fourth Amendment claim, the
court concluded the owner failed to demonstrate that a property seizure
"meaningfully interfere[d] with its possessory interests." While the additional
traffic and noise were "disruptive or inconvenient," those interferences were
not sufficient to sustain the owner's claim. After assessing the Fifth
Amendment claim, the court concluded that the additional traffic did not
constitute a physical taking, because it was only a residual effect of the
completion of the new stadium. It emphasized the city's authority to regulate
traffic fell within the city's police power, and that the stadium's construction
constituted a public purpose because it was approved under Texas law. After
assessing the owner's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim,
the court held that the city's decisions related to the regulation of traffic
around the stadium were rationally related to the legitimate state interest of
maintaining safe roads. Finally, the court summarily dismissed the private
nuisance claim because the city never waived its immunity to tort suits
brought against it. Because there was no violation of the Fourth or Fifth
Amendments, the city retained its immunity from liability.
Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp. 143
Develop Don't Destroy v. Urban Dev. Corp. 144
In companion cases, Brooklyn property owners: (1) sought a declaration
that the New York Constitution prevented the New York State Urban
Development Corporation (UDC) from taking property for a redevelopment
project, including a new basketball arena for the New Jersey Nets, and (2)
appealed a trial court's decision to dismiss claims relating to the administrative
findings made by the UDC to green-light the project. The project's co-
developer was a company owned by the same individual who owned the Nets.
142. 669 F. Supp. 2d 735, (N.D. Tex. 2009).
143. 879 N.Y.S.2d 524 (App. Div. 2009), aftd, 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).
144. 874 N.Y.S.2d 414 (App. Div. 2009).
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Nevertheless, the Second Circuit had previously affirmed a district court's
decision to dismiss the property owners' claim that the takings violated the
Fifth Amendment, holding that the UDC's determination that the project
advanced several public purposes was not a pretext for providing a new
publicly-financed arena to the privately-owned team.
The appellate court held that the state constitution did not prevent the
corporation from condemning the property and affirmed the decision related to
the administrative findings of the UDC. In assessing the constitutional claim,
the court concluded the state's takings clause was no more restrictive than its
federal counterpart, refusing to read the public use language in a manner that
would allow takings only when the property was held open for use by the
entire public. The court noted that a court expressly rejected this view in a
previous decision and would be at odds with the statutory authority that
allowed the court to review the UDC's determination. The court also followed
the federal district court in finding that the public benefits of the project were
not illusory. In assessing the administrative claim, the court concluded the
UDC's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) complied with the
requirements of the state's environmental quality review law, and the
corporation's decisions to include property located outside a designated urban
renewal area within the project area and to designate the arena as part of a
"civil project" were permitted under state law. In assessing the EIS, the court
found the UDC was not required to address the risk of terrorism, did not
arbitrarily select the project's build years in order to skew the analysis of the
environmental effects, and did not irrationally select the project over other
feasible alternatives. In assessing the UDC's discretionary decisions, the court
held that it had to defer to the agency's determinations that the project area
was blighted, and that the arena had a public purpose unless those
determinations were entirely baseless.
Myers v. Wild Wilderness Raceway L.L. C. 45
Wild Wilderness Raceway L.L.C. and its owners appealed a trial court's
decision to partially deny their motion for a new trial in a lawsuit brought
against them by surrounding property owners who claimed the noise, dust, and
light emanating from the racetrack constituted a private nuisance and
tortiously interfered with their businesses. The raceway's owners originally
constructed the facility on the family's property so their son, a burgeoning
motocross star, could practice the sport. But the track eventually grew into a
prime venue to hold races, which took place several days a week and ran as
145. 908 N.E.2d 950 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).
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late as 10:30 p.m. The trial court permanently enjoined the raceway's owners
from using the facility and awarded damages and attorneys' fees to the
surrounding property owners. But following a motion for a new trial, a new
judge modified the injunction's scope, preventing only commercial use and
vacated the award of damages and attorneys' fees.
The appellate court affirmed, holding there was evidence to support the
determination the raceway constituted a nuisance and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in fashioning the permanent injunction. The court also
denied the surrounding property owners' cross-motions arising out of the new
judge's decision to modify the injunction and vacate the award of monetary
damages and attorneys' fees. In finding a nuisance, the court noted there was
substantial testimony indicating noise came from the Wild Wilderness
Raceway and it rose to a level that prevented the surrounding property owners
from enjoying their land, deterred people from patronizing businesses, and
caused property values to decline. The court determined the injunction was
not overbroad because it did not prevent the raceway's owners from using the
facility for its original purpose. It also noted there would be an absence of any
real harm because the raceway's owners were already operating at a loss. In
denying the surrounding property owners' cross-motions, the court
emphasized that they had not proven their monetary damages with reasonable
certainty and that the raceway's owners had a right to use the property for
personal enjoyment.
Wash. State Major League Baseball Stadium Pub. Facilities Dist. v. Huber,
Hunt & Nichols-Kiewit Constr. Co. 146
The Washington State Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities
District appealed a trial court's decision granting summary judgment to a
construction company on the district's breach of contract claims against it after
determining the state's six-year statute of limitations had expired. The district
was created under state law to develop and own Safeco Field, the home of the
Seattle Mariners. It sought damages from the company for its alleged failure
to construct the stadium in accordance with their contractual provisions after
the team discovered a construction defect related to fire coating protection and
was forced to pay over two million dollars in repairs. The Washington
Supreme Court reversed, holding the statute of limitations did not bar the
district's claims because lawsuits brought for the benefit of the state are
exempt from the statute of limitations. The court emphasized that municipal
bodies that initiate actions arising out of the exercise of traditional sovereign
146. 202 P.3d 924 (Wash. 2009).
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functions delegated to them by the state are brought for the benefit of that state
and that building Safeco Field involved a traditional sovereign function
because the state was responsible for providing public recreational benefits.
STATUTORY LAW
There are few federal and state statutes that are directed specifically at
some aspect of the sports industry. However, many seemingly innocuous laws
have also had an indirect but profound impact on private associations, leagues
and teams, as well as third parties. This section analyzes issues arising from
these statutes, which have resulted in some of the most highly-publicized cases
this year.
Herman v. Admit One Ticket Agency L.L. C. 1
47
Colman Herman appealed a decision to reverse a trial court's ruling that a
licensed online ticket reseller violated Massachusetts law by offering to sell
Red Sox tickets to him at a price higher than the limitations established by a
state statute. Herman claimed he was willing to pay the maximum amount
allowed by law for the tickets, but never purchased them after the reseller
sought $500 per ticket to a game against the Yankees and $165 per ticket to a
game against the Orioles. The tickets had a face value of eighty-five dollars.
State law proscribed unfair practices in conducting a business, and a state
statute established it was an unfair practice for a licensee to resell a ticket to a
professional sporting event at more than two dollars above face value.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, holding Herman lacked
standing to bring a claim under state law because he failed to actually purchase
a ticket. Although one could violate state law without the actual sale of a
ticket, the court emphasized the state statute allowed resellers to impose
certain fees, including service charges, in every transaction, and that there
were no stated restrictions on those fees. Therefore, it found that purchasers
would be unable to establish that they were able to pay for a ticket at a price
consistent with the statute, and that they would actually have to purchase a
ticket to have standing to maintain a claim for unfair practices. In a vigorous
dissent, Justice Cowan argued that the majority confused the issue of standing
with the amount of evidence necessary for Herman to prevail on the merits of
his claim.
147. 912 N.E.2d 450 (Mass. 2009).
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Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n v. Associated Press 148
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) appealed a trial
court's judgment in favor of the Associated Press and other news
organizations on their public records claim against the NCAA that required it
to disclose documents related to disciplinary action taken against Florida State
University for providing improper academic assistance to student-athletes in
violation of the NCAA's rules. After the university reported its findings of a
self-investigation, the NCAA initiated proceedings to determine how to punish
the school for its misconduct. Following a hearing in front of the Committee
on Infractions (COI), the NCAA imposed a variety of penalties. Among those
penalties was vacating victories by the football team, which inhibited former
coach Bobby Bowden's quest to have the most coaching in Division I history.
The transcript from the hearing was not made available to the public, and
neither was the COI's subsequent response to the university's appeal.
However, both of those documents were made available to lawyers for an
outside firm hired to represent the school. The NCAA placed the documents
on a secure website, which required the firm to sign a confidentiality
agreement that promised none of the information obtained would be disclosed.
The lawyers viewed the transcript in preparing the school's appeal, and the
COI's response just over a month later.
The appellate court affirmed, holding that: (1) the transcript and response
were considered public records under state law, (2) the law did not violate the
federal constitution, and (3) the documents at issue were not exempt from
disclosure under federal statutory law. The court concluded both of the
documents were public records under state law because an agent of the state
government received them. It emphasized that the state constitution gave the
public broad rights to inspect governmental records, and that the state law
enforcing those rights covered documents maintained on a secure website, as
long as they contained material prepared in connection with official agency
business. The court found that the law firm qualified as an agent of the state,
and that it viewed the documents in connection with its public function. The
court also noted that the confidentiality agreement had no bearing on its
determination because public records could not be transformed into private
records just because a government agency promised not to disclose them.
After assessing whether the Florida public records law was unconstitutional as
applied, the court found the statute did not run afoul of either the Dormant
Commerce Clause or the First Amendment. It emphasized the law did not
deal with the subject of commerce, and even if it had an indirect effect, the
148. 18 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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impact would be heavily outweighed by the state's interest in promoting open
government. The court also distinguished NCAA v. Miller on the grounds that
the public records statute was a law of general application, not a law designed
to regulate the NCAA's disciplinary proceedings. Moreover, based on the
variety of other state statutes that would be interpreted to provide the same or
even better access, the court found that the law did not force the NCAA to
conform its conduct to Florida's standards. The court dismissed the NCAA's
freedom of association argument because the statute did not impair its ability
to reject the values it wished to promote. Finally, in assessing whether the
documents were exempt from disclosure under federal law, the court
emphasized that the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act only protects
educational records, which have been defined as records containing
information directly related to a student. The court noted that the documents
at issue only tangentially related to Florida State student-athletes, and that,
even if there was a more direct connection, they were still not protected
because every individual's identifying information had been redacted.
Office of the Comm 'r of Baseball v. Markel 149
Professional sports leagues appealed a district court's decision to deny
their motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent Delaware state officials
from implementing a sports lottery involving single-game betting on nearly all
collegiate and professional sporting events under regulations proposed
pursuant to the Delaware Sports Lottery Act (DSLA). The leagues argued that
the DSLA and the proposed regulations violated the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act (PASPA), a federal law that prohibits state-sponsored
sports gambling. However, the PASPA contains an exception that authorizes
gambling schemes in individual states to the extent those schemes were
conducted between 1976 and 1990. In 1976, Delaware conducted a sports
lottery that involved parlay betting on NFL games. In March 2009, the state
governor asked the state's high court for its interpretation of a provision in the
state constitution to determine if he could legally implement a sports lottery
that was approved by the state legislature. That court concluded that the
parlay betting authorized by the lottery was constitutional because chance was
its dominant factor; however, it refused to pass judgment on whether the
lottery could involve bets on single games. 150
The Third Circuit reversed, holding the DSLA and the proposed
149. C.A. No. 09-538 (GMS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69816 (D. Del. Aug. 10, 2009), vacated,
579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2009).
150. See In re Governor for an Advisory Opinion, 2009 Del. LEXIS 255 (May 27, 2009).
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regulations violated the PASPA because they expanded Delaware's 1976
sports lottery scheme to cover new sports and single-game betting. After
determining it had jurisdiction to look beyond whether the district court
abused its discretion and assess the merits of the leagues' claim, the court
determined that the plain language of the PASPA exception only allowed
Delaware to conduct a sports lottery scheme that was substantially similar to
the scheme conducted in 1976, regardless of whether a larger scheme had been
authorized at that time. It noted that minor alterations in the scheme would not
violate the PASPA's language or undermine its central purpose, but found
expanding betting to include single-game action and sports outside of the NFL
would create the same problems that the law was intended to combat.
Yousoufian v. Office of Ron Sims 151
The Office of the Executive of King County, Washington appealed an
appellate court's decision reversing a trial court judgment imposing a fifteen-
dollar per day fine on the county for its gross negligence in failing to comply
with Washington's public records law when dealing with an individual that
requested studies on the impact of sports stadiums on the local economy. The
request came just weeks prior to a referendum election in which voters would
decide whether to publicly finance a new venue for the Seattle Seahawks.
However, the county repeatedly deceived and misinformed the individual over
a period of four years before it finally provided access to all the records that it
either possessed or failed to attempt to locate. The public records law
included a penalty provision allowing a court to impose a fine ranging from
$5-$100 per day, depending on the agency's actions. The appellate court
concluded the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a fine on the lower
end of the range scale. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
the absence of economic loss and the lack of actual public harm did not call
for a lower penalty, and the fine imposed must be adequate to deter future
violations. It noted that actual economic damages might call for a higher
penalty, but emphasized that the penalty's main purpose is to promote access
to public records. The court also emphasized that penalties are not contingent
on actual public harm, only whether there is the potential for it.
TORT LAW
The final section of this survey tackles cases centered on tort issues, which
continues to be the most-litigated aspect of sports law. As a general matter,
tort law governs the duties of care that event organizers and facility owners
151. 200 P.3d 232 (Wash. 2009).
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and operators owe to participating athletes and spectators, as well as the duties
that athletes owe to each other. However, these duties have been limited by
courts, which have traditionally been unwilling to impose liability for the risks
inherent to both participants and spectators in each sport. Thus, in certain
situations, only conduct that unreasonably increases inherent risks or amounts
to recklessness will be actionable. The following cases provide a sample of
the different types of torts that can apply in the sports context, including a
potentially pioneering case that dares to question the "baseball rule."
Abato v. County of Nassau 152
The County of Nassau, the property manager of the Nassau Veterans
Memorial Coliseum, and the Long Island Industrial Hockey League (LIIHL)
appealed a trial court's decision to deny their motion for summary judgment
on negligence claims. A spectator at a LIIHL game brought these claims after
she suffered injuries after other spectators ran her over in a scrum for a
souvenir T-shirt tossed into the stands. The appellate court affirmed, holding
the defendants failed to demonstrate they could not foresee the scrum or that it
was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of attending the game. A
concurring opinion emphasized that defendants could only use primary
assumption of risk as a defense against injuries caused by inherent risks, and
that the spectator did not know team employees might throw t-shirts into the
stands because she had never attended a sporting event where that occurred.
Ackerman v. Paulauskas1
53
Assumption College and its athletic director moved for summary
judgment on defamation claims brought against them by the school's former
men's basketball coach after the athletic director made allegedly false
statements to a local newspaper following the coach's resignation. The
comments could be construed to suggest the coach did not work long enough
hours, did not have passion, did not project well in the community, and did not
aid the school's fundraising efforts. The court denied the motion, holding the
coach did not have to demonstrate that the defendants made the comments
with actual malice because he was not a limited purpose public figure. It
emphasized the coach did not participate in any controversy that gave rise to
the alleged defamation, regardless of the number of times he was quoted by
the local newspaper during his tenure.
152. 886 N.Y.S.2d 218 (App. Div. 2009).
153. 25 Mass. L. Rep. 527 (Super. Ct. 2009).
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Baker v. Major League Baseball Props. 154
Major League Baseball (MLB), MLB Properties, the MLB Players'
Association, the San Diego Padres, and the World Baseball Classic, Inc.
(WBC) moved to dismiss negligence and premises liability claims brought
against them by a spectator at the 2006 WBC Championship Finals after he
suffered a severe leg injury when he fell in a parking lot at PETCO Park. The
spectator alleged that all five defendants were responsible for the management
of the lots surrounding the stadium, some of which were used to house
attractions relating to the WBC. Those lots included several raised surfaces, in
which there were no signs indicating the presence of a possible hazard. The
spectator was walking through the attractions when he unknowingly stepped
off a curb onto the parking surface and landed on his knee. The court granted
the motion in part and denied it in part, noting that there was no state law
imposing strict premises liability, but holding that the spectator's allegations
were sufficient to state a claim for negligence. In assessing that claim, the
court emphasized that owners and occupiers of land are not relieved of all
duties merely because a hazard is open and obvious. Although such hazards
may obviate the duty to warn, they may still have to remedy the danger if it is
foreseeable that injuries could occur. The court noted that the reasonable
anticipation that the WBC attractions could distract spectators may have
increased the necessity to take extra precautions.
B.R. v. Little League Baseball, Inc. 155
A Little League baseball player appealed a trial court's decision to grant
summary judgment to the Little League Baseball (LLB) national organization
on negligence claims brought against it by the player after one of his local
league's employees, who was also a registered high-risk sex offender,
molested him on multiple occasions. The molestations took place at the local
league's facility, but not during its sponsored activities. The sex offender had
been involved with the league for a number of years, first as a volunteer
umpire, and later as a team manager and coach. The league eventually hired
him as the league's umpire-in-chief, a paid position. LLB has an operating
manual and regulations for local leagues to follow, but they do not give the
organization control over their day-to-day operations. Each local league is
responsible for selection and supervision of its volunteers and employees.
Although the operating manual recommended that local leagues conduct
background checks on those individuals, it did not require those checks when
154. No. 09cv982-WQH-CAB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81982 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 8,2009).
155. No. E045946, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7652 (Cal. App. Sept. 24, 2009).
2010]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
the events giving rising to this lawsuit took place. The local league did not
require its volunteers or employees to fill out a written application or undergo
a background check when the sex offender became involved with the program.
The appellate court affirmed, holding the molestations were not the proximate
cause of LLB's breach of its duty to screen and supervise local officials for the
benefit of the participants. The court emphasized that public policy
considerations precluded the player's claims when the connection between the
offensive acts and the LLB's breach were too attenuated. It also noted that the
player was seeking to impose liability on an organization that merely chartered
local leagues, and that the molestations took place on occasions well after a
local league's activities had concluded.
Brush v. Jiminy Peak Mountain Resort, Inc. 
1 56
A ski area operator, collegiate ski competition organizers, and the
competition's race referee and International Ski Federation (FIS) technical
delegate moved for summary judgment on negligence and gross negligence
claims brought against them by collegiate skier Kelly Bruch after she suffered
injuries when she lost control during the race and collided with a ski lift
stanchion located just off the trail. The competition was held under the
auspices of the United States Ski and Snowboard Association (USSA) and the
FIS; therefore, all competitors had to be members of the national governing
body. Brush's mother had filled out registration forms for both organizations
the previous summer, and the USSA form included a clearly-labeled waiver
purporting to release it and its associated entities from negligence liability for
any injuries suffered in connection with any activities in which the USSA was
involved. Both the ski area operator and competition organizers were parties
to an agreement with the USSA that required them to assure the facilities
conformed to the applicable rules and the requirements of the competition's
jury. Under National Collegiate Athletic Association and USSA rules, a jury
had to inspect the layout of the trail prior to its use in a race. In this case, the
competition jury was comprised of two individual organizers, the race referee,
and the technical delegate. The rules also required the trails to meet relevant
FIS regulations, set forth in relevant "homologation" reports. However,
netting was not set up according to the diagram included in the
"homologation" report for the trail used in Brush's race. More importantly, no
nets were installed around the lift tower, and neither the tower nor its
supporting stanchion was equipped with padding regularly used in ski events.
The court granted the motion, holding that the Massachusetts ski safety
156. 626 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D. Mass. 2009).
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statute barred Brush's negligence claim against the ski area operator and the
USSA waiver barred her negligence claims against the competition organizers
and officials. The court also concluded that no reasonable jury could find that
the defendants' alleged conduct rose to the level of gross negligence because
there was no evidence their actions amounted to anything more than simple
advertence. In dismissing the negligence claim against the ski area operator,
the court emphasized that state law made skiers responsible for any injuries
resulting from skiing off the trail and did not place a duty on operators to
provide netting or padding around obstacles in those areas. The court also
noted that the operator did not contractually obligate itself to provide specific
safety measures, only to work with others to ensure the facilities were
prepared according to the applicable rules. In dismissing the negligence
claims against the organizers and officials, the court found the waiver's
language clear and unambiguous and that it could not constitute a contract of
adhesion because recreational activities are not essential public services.
Carter v. Baldwin 15
7
Off-road racer Phil Carter appealed a trial court's decision to dismiss a
gross negligence claim that he brought against the promoters of an event after
lack of adequate emergency medical care at the track allegedly exacerbated
injuries he suffered in a collision with another car. The appellate court
affirmed, holding the promoters did not breach any duty they owed to Carter
because he assumed the risk of injury from the risks inherent in the sport. The
court noted that the alleged lack of proper medical care may have increased
the severity of the injury, but Carter did not claim the promoters increased the
risk a collision would occur. The court did not address whether the promoters
had a duty to provide reasonable medical care on the premises.
Clemens v. McNamee158
The former trainer of former professional baseball player Roger Clemens
moved to dismiss defamation claims brought against him by Clemens on both
procedural and substantive grounds. In the alternative, he sought to transfer
the litigation to New York. During conversations that took place in or around
Clemens's hometown of Houston, Texas, Brian McNamee allegedly told one
of Clemens's teammates that Clemens used human growth hormone and
steroids. Later, federal authorities investigating illegal steroid use summoned
157. No. D052696, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 529 (Cal. App. Jan. 22, 2009).
158. 608 F. Supp. 2d 811 (S.D. Tex. 2009), motion to reconsider denied by, 638 F. Supp. 2d 742
(S.D. Tex. 2009).
2010]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
McNamee to New York where he allegedly told them he had injected Clemens
with those drugs within the state. The authorities asked the trainer to speak
with the Mitchell Commission, which was investigating the use of
performance-enhancing drugs in Major League Baseball (MLB). The Mitchell
Commission's investigation was not associated with the government's
investigation, but McNamee repeated his allegedly false statements to that
body and they were later published in a report to MLB Commissioner Bud
Selig. After that report was released to the public, McNamee also spoke with
an online reporter at his home in New York, where he repeated his statements
once more. They were subsequently published in an online article.
The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. First, it held it
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the claims based on McNamee's
alleged statements to the Mitchell Commission and the online reporter because
those remarks did not mention Texas, were not made by an individual based in
Texas, and were focused on drug use that took place in New York while
Clemens was playing for a New York team. Therefore, they were likely to
attract the attention of Clemens's fans both in and outside of Texas. The court
also determined McNamee was immune from liability for his statements to the
Mitchell Commission because he had to make them to avoid being targeted by
the government's investigation. However, the court refused to dismiss the
claims based on McNamee's alleged statements to Clemens's teammate under
the statute of limitations because a reasonable jury could find that Clemens
only recently discovered McNamee had spoken to the teammate about the
alleged drug use. The court noted Clemens had subsequently participated in or
overheard conversations involving the teammate in which drug use came up,
but it could not conclude that they put Clemens on notice that the statements
had been made. The court allowed Clemens to amend his complaint to
provide the exact statements made to the teammate. After determining that
McNamee's statements did not rise to the level of defamation per se, the court
also allowed Clemens to amend his complaint to present proof of actual
damages. Because the only claims remaining were based on statements that
occurred in Texas, the court determined it would not be in the interest of
justice to transfer the case to New York.
Subsequently, the court denied Clemens's motion to reconsider the
decision to dismiss the claims based on McNamee's alleged statements to the
Mitchell Commission and its determination that the alleged statements to the
teammate did not constitute defamation per se. The court held that McNamee
should not be forced to explain how his alleged statements to the Mitchell
Commission specifically furthered the government's investigation into illegal
drug use or the government's specific motive for compelling him to speak in
order to obtain immunity. It noted that McNamee had submitted an
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uncontested affidavit from a federal investigator that generally outlined the
reasoning behind the government's action. The court also reiterated its view
that McNamee's alleged statements to Clemens's teammate did not clearly
articulate that Clemens was committing a crime. Finally, the court refused to
exercise "pendent" personal jurisdiction over the claims based on McNamee's
statements to the Mitchell Commission or the online reporter because they
were made to different audiences at different times and in vastly different
contexts.
Cooper v. Unthank159
Two high school basketball players and their mothers appealed a trial
court's decision to grant summary judgment to a church and its in-house
academy on claims brought against them by the players and their mothers after
the academy's volunteer girls' basketball coach induced one of the players into
a sexual relationship and sexually assaulted the other. Shortly after he was
hired, the coach began calling one of the players and driving her home after
practice. The player's mother believed the contact between her daughter and
the coach was inappropriate and informed the school's principal, who assured
her that the coach would be supervised. The principal then met with the coach
and told him to stop calling and giving rides to the players. But one week
later, the coach and player had the first of two sexual encounters. Between
those encounters, the team had a road game. Following that game, the coach
lured another player into the school's van and assaulted her. However, he
denied that an assault took place. Other members of the squad testified the
coach had made several sexual advances toward individual players, and one
player had informed the principal she suspected the coach was engaging in a
sexual relationship with her teammate before it actually happened.
The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the academy had negligently
retained the coach following reports of his conduct, but that there was no
evidence of intent to inflict emotional distress that could sustain a claim for
outrage. After assessing the negligence claim, the court emphasized that a
jury should determine whether it was foreseeable that the coach would
sexually abuse the players. It noted that both members of the team and one of
the mothers had warned the principal that the coach was engaging in
inappropriate behavior. Although the principal had reprimanded him on one
occasion, a jury could still conclude that her knowledge of his behavior made
his subsequent action foreseeable and required additional action to prevent it.
159. No. 2007-CA-002576-MR, 2009 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 883 (Ky. App. Oct. 16, 2009).
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Corona v. State]60
A boxing referee and his wife appealed a trial court's decision to dismiss
mandatory duty claims that they brought against the State of California, its
Department of Consumer Affairs, and its State Athletic Commission (SAC)
after the SAC licensed a boxer to compete in a match supervised by the referee
without proof he had tested negative for HIV. Following the match, the
SAC's executive director notified the referee that the fighter had tested
positive at some point in time, and that he needed to take precautions just in
case he was exposed to the disease. However, the referee had already engaged
in unprotected sex with his wife. The appellate court reversed, holding the
defendants were not entitled to governmental immunity because the SAC had
a mandatory duty to ensure that all boxers provided a negative HIV test before
being licensed. The court emphasized that the state statute governing boxing
licensing did not give the SAC any discretion to waive the requirement, noting
its language made testing a condition precedent to approval. It also found that
the statute imposing liability for mandatory duties trumped another statute
granting licensing immunity, which was intended to protect only discretionary
activity.
Correa v. City of New York161
The New York Yankees appealed a trial court's decision to deny the
team's motion for summary judgment on a negligence claim brought against it
by one of its security guards after he suffered injuries during a game when a
foul ball that snuck through a window in the screen behind home plate struck
him. The window had been opened to allow for the placement of a television
camera, but the employee of a third-party defendant failed to secure the netting
around it. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the limited duty "baseball
rule" did not bar the guard's claim because there was a genuine issue as to
whether the screen behind the plate was sufficient to provide adequate
protection to the individuals seated behind it. The court found that the
Yankees failed to establish the club did not retain the third-party defendant
and that, even if he was not, the team had a non-delegable duty to provide its
employees with a reasonably safe place to work. The court also emphasized
that there was a genuine issue as to whether ballpark employees could assume
the risk that a proprietor would expose them to risks of injury beyond those
inherent to the average spectator.
160. 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (Ct. App. 2009).
161. 890 N.Y.S.2d 461 (App. Div. 2009).
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Crespin v. Albuquerque Baseball Club, L.L.C.162
The parents of a spectator at an Albuquerque Isotopes minor league
baseball game appealed a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to
the Isotopes, the City of Albuquerque, the Houston Astros, and Matranga, an
Astros minor league player on negligence claims brought against them by the
spectator after he suffered injuries when he was struck in the head by a
homerun hit by the player during batting practice. The spectator was sitting at
a picnic table in an unscreened area beyond the left field wall, participating in
a pre-game Little League party. The picnic tables were situated so that the
spectators were not facing the field, and batting practice began without a
warning. The stadium included protective netting behind home plate, but no
other area of the stands was screened.
The appellate court affirmed the decision on the claims brought against the
Astros and Matranga, but reversed the decision on the claims brought against
the Isotopes and the city. In assessing the claims against the latter defendants,
the court declined to adopt the limited duty "baseball rule," under which
stadium owners and operators satisfy their duty of care to spectators by
offering screened seating behind home plate that is sufficient to provide
protection to as many spectators as may reasonably be expected to desire it in
the course of an ordinary game. Instead, the court followed the minority's
approach, holding the team and the city owed a general duty of reasonable
care to all spectators, and whether they breached that duty should depend on
the facts and circumstances in each case. The court found that there was no
compelling reason to adopt the "baseball rule" under the state's comparative
negligence regime, which could take into account the usual risks that
spectators assume when they attend games. Applying traditional tort law
principles, the court deemed summary judgment inappropriate, emphasizing
that a jury should determine whether the defendants breached their duty to the
spectator by failing to screen the picnic area or warn that batting practice was
underway.
Cusumano v. U.S. Over Thirty Baseball League163
A recreational league baseball player appealed a trial court's decision to
grant summary judgment to the league and enter judgment on a jury verdict in
favor of an opposing team and its coach on negligence claims brought against
them by the player after he suffered a severe foot injury when a "throw down"
base moved when he stepped on it during a game at a local public high school.
162. 216 P.3d 827 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009).
163. No. A-4771-07T2, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2217 (App. Div. Aug. 13, 2009).
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The league was responsible for scheduling and assigning venues for all of its
games, but was not responsible for obtaining use permits or supervising the
contests. In the game at issue, the opposing team's coach provided the bases;
however, he did not monitor how they were placed on the diamond. Although
"throw down" bases were common in league games, the venue was designed
to use "fixed" bases. In fact, the league had previously purchased "fixed"
bases for the field. But at the time of the game, they were in possession of the
coach of another team that primarily played its home contests at the school.
As a result, the iron spikes to which those bases attached were left exposed,
and the plaintiffs foot struck one when a substitute "throw down" bag moved.
He stumbled and broke his other foot trying to catch his balance. The
appellate court affirmed, holding the league owed no duty to the player to
ensure teams used proper bases on the fields. The court emphasized that the
league's teams were responsible for setting up the field, and that the league did
not supervise the games. Although the league may have purchased and
provided "fixed" bases for the venue at issue, the court noted that the teams
determined which type of bases to use.
Cyprien v. Bd. of Supervisors for the Univ. of La. Sys. 164
The Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System, the
University of Louisiana-Lafayette (ULL) athletic director, and another ULL
employee appealed an appellate court's decision to affirm the denial of their
motion for summary judgment on claims brought against them by Glynn
Cyprien after ULL revealed that he had misrepresented his educational
qualifications on his resume and rescinded his contract to coach the ULL
men's basketball team. Cyprien alleged that he had delivered a correct copy
of his resume when he interviewed for the job, but a copy faxed to the school
by a student working for his former employer indicated that he had received a
degree from an accredited university. In reality, Cyprien had not received a
degree, one of the prerequisites to coaching at ULL.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board of
Supervisors, the athletic director, and the ULL employee did not commit
defamation or breach Cyprien's coaching contract with the school. The court
determined the defendants did not make any false accusations when they
revealed that Cyprien had submitted a false resume and that they had good
cause to rescind his contract if he did not actually qualify for the position he
was hired to fill. It emphasized there was no reason for Cyprien to have a
false resume on file at his previous school and ULL would not have entered
164. 5 So. 3d 862 (La. 2009).
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into the contract had it known he did not possess the required degree.
Elie v. City of New York 16 5
The St. Louis Cardinals moved for summary judgment on a negligence
claim brought against the team by a spectator at a minor league baseball game
after he suffered injuries when he was struck by a baseball bat propelled into
the stands by a player on one of the franchise's former short-season Class "A"
affiliates. The spectator was sitting approximately ten feet from the player
when the player lost control of the bat while allegedly horsing around during
warm-ups. The court granted the motion, holding the team did not breach any
duty it owed to the spectator because he assumed the risk of injury from the
risks inherent in the event. The court emphasized that almost all spectators
consent to the danger that a loose bat may end up in the stands, regardless of
when or how that result occurs. This view is consistent with the limited duty
"baseball rule," under which a team's duty to protect spectators is fulfilled by
providing screening behind the plate.
Esshaki v. Millman 166
Basil Esshaki appealed a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment
to Scott Millman on Esshaki's tort claims, which arose out of injuries he
suffered when struck in the face by Millman while competing in a recreational
league soccer game. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part,
holding that there was a genuine issue as to whether Millman committed a
battery or engaged in reckless conduct, but there was no question on Esshaki's
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In assessing the battery
claim, the court found that the testimony of the Esshaki and the game's referee
was sufficient to support a finding that Millman intentionally struck Esshaki
with his fist or elbow, and that the action was not within the scope of assumed
risks within the sport. The court also believed the referee's testimony could
support a recklessness claim because a jury might find Millman threw out his
elbow only in frustration, but in a manner evincing a conscious disregard for
the safety of Esshaki, who was standing next to him. However, the court
dismissed the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the
problems Esshaki encountered after the incident were not sufficiently severe.
165. No. 20244/03, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2256 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 19, 2009).
166. No. 283297, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 582 (Mich. App. Mar. 17, 2009).
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Farrell v. Hochhauser167
A school district and two high schools appealed a trial court's decision to
deny their motion for summary judgment on claims brought against them by a
wrestler that competed for one of the schools after he contracted herpes while
participating in a match against a student that competed for the other school.
The appellate court reversed, holding that neither the district nor the schools
breached any duty they owed to the wrestler because he assumed the risk of
injury from the risks inherent in the sport. The court noted wrestling involves
close contact between participants, and that both the wrestler's coach and own
trial expert admitted the possibility of contracting a disease through skin-to-
skin contact was well-known by the sport's participants. It also emphasized
that the wrestler was aware skin diseases could be passed in competition, and
the district had informed him, both orally and in a packet that was distributed
prior to the start of the season, of the specific risk of contracting herpes.
Godfrey v. Iverson 168
Professional basketball player Allen Iverson appealed a district court's
judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Marlin Godfrey on the negligent
supervision claim he brought against Iverson after he suffered injuries in a
nightclub brawl when Iverson's bodyguard attacked him while Iverson stood
by and watched. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding Godfrey did not have to
establish the standard of care that Iverson owed to him through expert
testimony because Iverson was present during the attack. Therefore, a jury
could find that he had the ability to supervise and control his bodyguard's
behavior, unlike other cases where supervisors were not present, necessitating
experts to evaluate if they had properly trained security personnel.
Hansen Beverage Co. v. Innovation Ventures, L.L.C. 169
Professional football player and Innovation Ventures, L.LC. (Innovation
Ventures) spokesman Braylon Edwards moved to quash a subpoena duces
tecum that he was served by the Hansen Beverage Company (Hansen) in its
suit against Innovation Ventures for false advertising under the Lanham Act.
Innovation Ventures produced 5-Hour Energy, a product that Edwards
endorsed in a television commercial. The court granted the motion, holding
that Hansen had not proven Edwards's deposition or compensation agreement
167. 884 N.Y.S.2d 261 (App. Div. 2009).
168. 559 F.3d 569 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
169. No. 2:09-mc-50356, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46217 (E.D. Mich. June 2, 2009).
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with Innovation Ventures was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence that would justify the burden imposed on Edwards if he
was compelled to comply. The court noted Edwards was not subpoenaed
because of any special information that he had or to contest the truth of his
statements, but only to testify about his experience using the product. The
court emphasized that Edwards had never indicated that other users would feel
the feelings he felt using the product; thus, the only information that Hansen
could obtain was available by less-intrusive means. The court also noted that
Edwards's personal experience was irrelevant because it said little about the
product's aggregate effects on all of its users.
Jackson v. Balanced Health Prods., Inc. 170
Dietary supplement retailers and the manufacturer of an over-the-counter
weight-loss supplement called "StarCaps" moved to dismiss claims brought
against them by professional football player Grady Jackson and another
individual after the NFL suspended Jackson for four games for taking the
supplement, which contained a prescription drug that was banned by the
league. The manufacturer sold and marketed StarCaps as an all-natural
supplement, but an academic journal later discovered that it contained the
banned diuretic. Although the manufacturer stated that it had suspended
shipping the supplement to its retailers, those retailers continued to sell
StarCaps until the manufacturer issued a voluntary recall. The retailers also
claimed to have quality control procedures to ensure that the products that they
received from vendors met certain standards. The court granted the motion in
part and denied it in part. Relying on a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision,
the court emphasized that none of the plaintiffs' claims were pre-empted by
the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). However, the court held
that the plaintiffs' state law claims for strict product liability and negligence
were barred by the economic loss rule, which limits damages to physical harm,
and that their Sherman Act claim was precluded because no private right of
action existed to enforce it.
Jamgotchian v. Slender' 7'
Race horse owner Jerry Jamgotchian appealed a trial court's decision to
grant summary judgment to racing steward George Slender on Jamgotchian's
claim Slender committed a trespass to chattels when he allegedly prevented
the owner from removing one of his horses from a racetrack's grounds prior to
170. No. C 08-05584 CW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48848 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2009).
171. 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122 (Ct. App. 2009).
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a race causing the horse to subsequently come up lame in the event.
Jamgotchian attempted to get permission to remove the horse from the race
that morning, but the stewards unanimously voted to turn down his request
because he made it after the previously designated scratch time. Slender did
not tell the other stewards that Jamgotchian wanted to scratch the horse so it
could run in a stakes race, which an owner can do without permission, or that
the track's racing department would accept the scratch. After the stewards'
vote, Slender ordered California Horse Racing Board investigators and racing
security staff to prevent Jamgotchian from removing the horse.
The appellate court reversed, holding that Slender was not immune from
liability under state law, and that Jamgotchian had raised genuine issues as to
whether Slender intentionally interfered with his right to possess his horse and
whether the alleged interference was a proximate cause of the horse's injuries.
In assessing whether Slender was automatically entitled to immunity, the court
determined he would not be engaging in a proper exercise of discretion if he
ordered a horse to race and took steps to prohibit its removal because those
actions were not among the disciplinary measures authorized under state
regulations. The court also emphasized that quasi-judicial immunity was only
available for judges acting in their judicial capacity and that Slender's alleged
conduct was outside the scope of his authority.
Klutman v. Sioux Falls Storm172
An Indoor Football League team appealed a trial court's judgment on a
jury verdict in favor of a teenage boy and his parents on a negligence claim
they brought against the team after the boy suffered devastating knee injuries
while playing an informal game of touch football during a preseason
promotional event. The team invited all children in attendance at the event to
participate in the game, but did not require them to sign waivers or warn them
about the condition of the field. During the game, the boy's foot allegedly got
caught in a gap between two pieces of the synthetic turf that covered the field,
causing permanent injuries. The team did not have an established protocol for
ensuring proper installation of the turf, even though it was common for gaps to
exist. During trial, the team president admitted the franchise began taping the
seams in the turf the following season; however, a team trainer claimed the
team also used tape during games prior to the incident. The president had also
previously sought funding for new turf because its current turf endangered
players.
The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding there was no abuse of
172. 769 N.W.2d 440 (S.D. 2009).
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discretion in the decisions made at trial, and the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury verdict. First, the court determined there was no error in
preventing a chemical engineer secured by the team from testifying as to his
opinion about the cause of the boy's injuries. It noted that the engineer could
be considered an expert on issues related to the synthetic turf, but had no
training, education, or experience in medical matters. The court also
emphasized that the boy's treating surgeon admitted he could not tell exactly
how the injuries happened. Second, the court found there was no error in
refusing to issue a jury instruction on contributory negligence, noting there
was no open and obvious danger that the boy should have avoided. It
emphasized that the team itself was arguing there was no gap in the turf that
could have caused the injuries. Third, the court determined there was no error
in allowing the plaintiff to impeach the testimony of the team's president with
evidence showing the team had subsequently taped the seams in the turf. It
noted that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible when
offered to impeach and, more importantly, that the team's actions did not
actually constitute a remedial measure because the team had taped the seams
on prior occasions. Fourth, the court held that there was no error in denying a
motion for a new trial because the record did not contain the evidence needed
to show the boy's injuries may not have been as severe as the plaintiffs
articulated. Finally, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
support the verdict because (1) the team failed to warn the game's participants
about the condition of the turf; (2) the turf had a tendency to separate; (3) there
was no protocol for monitoring the condition of the turf; (4) the team had
labeled the turf dangerous when seeking a new field from the city; and (5) the
seams in the turf were not taped during the event.
Midwest Employers Cas. Co. v. Harpole173
An insurance company appealed a trial court's decision to grant summary
judgment to five high school football officials on negligence claims brought
against them by the company after high school football coach Terry English
suffered injuries when one of the referees collided with him in a restricted area
along the sidelines during a game. The company paid workers' compensation
benefits to English and filed a lawsuit as his subrogee. School district rules
prohibited coaches and players from being in the restricted area while the ball
was in play. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the referee that
collided with English did not breach any duty he owed to the coach because
the incident took place in the midst of a play while the referee was performing
173. 293 S.W.3d 770 (Tex. App. 2009).
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his job. The court emphasized the referee had to focus on the football field
and not look for coaches in the restricted area. Relying on the school district's
rules, the referee could not have anticipated the encroachment by English
while he was sprinting down the sidelines. The court also held that the
referees, as a unit, did not breach any duty that they owed to English because
there was no evidence to support the company's contention that they allowed
coaches to move into the restricted area while the ball was in play. In fact, the
referees continually instructed both the coaches and the players to stay out of
the area.
Milne v. USA Cycling, Inc. 1
74
A bicycle race participant and the mother of another race participant
appealed a district court's decision to exclude their expert's opinion on
organizing and supervising races and then dismiss the gross negligence claim
that they brought against the race's organizers, promoters, and supervisors
after the participants were struck by a vehicle during the race, causing serious
injuries to the first participant and killing the second participant. Although the
majority of the race took place on off-road paths, the first six miles were
conducted on an "open course" road that participants shared with vehicles, and
it was on this opening stretch that the accident occurred. However, the entire
race was governed by mountain bike racing rules adopted by USA Cycling,
and those rules did not prohibit participants from crossing the center-line of a
road. "Open course" races were also common in mountain bike racing, and
the first participant admitted that roughly one quarter of the races in which he
had competed were of this variety. The race at issue included an "open
course" stretch at least the previous seven times it was conducted and no
bicycle-vehicle accident had ever occurred. Both of the participants were
considered expert racers with a significant amount of mountain bike racing
experience. They had competed in the race in prior years and were familiar
with the course that was used. Prior to the race, they signed forms that
purported to release the race organizers from liability for negligence and
warned all participants that they assumed the risk of colliding with a vehicle.
Nevertheless, race organizers took additional precautions to avoid the risk of
an accident, including: (1) posting warning signs; (2) having attendants warn
drivers in the area on the day of the race; (3) posting marshals throughout the
course to supervise the event; and (4) ensuring there was personnel available
to administer aid to injured participants. The accident occurred on a section of
the course that was straight and wide, and the driver's vehicle was visible from
174. 575 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 2009).
[Vol. 20:2
ANNUAL SURVEY
at least thirty yards away.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding there was no abuse of discretion in
excluding the plaintiffs' expert testimony on the standard of care in mountain
bike racing, and that no reasonable jury could conclude that the race
organizers were grossly negligent. In assessing the decision to exclude the
expert testimony, the court found that the expert was not qualified to render an
opinion on the care that race organizers owed to participants, noting that he
was not an experienced mountain bike racer and his experience in supervising
races on paved roads was not sufficient to provide him with expertise on the
vastly different practices and rules used in the sport. Even if he was qualified,
the court concluded that his opinions were unreliable because they were not
based on studies analyzing the precautionary measures taken in mountain bike
racing and the risks and benefits of those measures. After determining that
federal law dictated the standard needed to grant summary judgment on the
gross negligence claim, the court concluded that there was no evidence to
suggest that the defendants were indifferent to the possibility that an accident
might occur. It emphasized that the organizers took a number of precautions
designed to prevent accidents, and that the lack of problems in the past showed
there was no serious risk of one occurring.
Nofjke v. Bakke 175
Former high school cheerleader Brittany Noffke appealed an appellate
court's decision to affirm in part and reverse in part the grant of summary
judgment to teammate Kevin Bakke and the Holman Area School District on a
negligence claim brought against them by Noffke after she suffered injuries
when she fell on a tile floor during a stunt because Bakke failed to spot her.
Both Bakke and the school district also appealed the appellate court's
decision. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part,
holding that both Bakke and the school district were immune from negligence
liability under state law, and that Bakke's acts were not reckless as a matter of
law. The Court found Bakke was immune from negligence liability because
both he and Noffke were engaged in a sport involving amateur teams that
included physical contact between the participants. It concluded he could not
be liable for recklessness because his acts did not evince a conscious disregard
for Noffke's safety. In assessing whether vicarious liability could be imposed
for the high school cheerleading coach's failure to require a second spotter or
use mats, the Court determined that the school district was immune because
those acts arose out of discretionary decisions, and that the danger involved in
175. 760 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 2009).
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performing the stunt was not so known and compelling as to give rise to a
ministerial duty to provide the additional protection.
NPS, L.L.C. v. StubHub, Inc. 176
StubHub, Inc. (StubHub) moved for summary judgment on the claim for
tortious interference with advantageous relations brought against it by the New
England Patriots as part of the team's lawsuit against the online ticket broker
for allegedly inducing the team's season ticketholders to breach their
agreement not to resell their tickets. The consequences for breaching the
agreement were printed on the back of the tickets and included the team's right
to revoke the privilege of using them. However, Massachusetts law also
prohibited individuals or entities from reselling tickets for more than two
dollars above face value. The broker alluded to the law and other state
regulations on its website and required any person who wished to sell tickets
to comply with them. The Patriots prevented season ticketholders from using
online ticket brokers because they had more fans who wanted to buy season
tickets than tickets available and wanted to monitor who was sitting in the
team's seats in order to deter unruly behavior. To cater to its prospective
buyers, the club established a waiting list. For a $100 deposit, fans could join
the list and get access to the team's online ticket exchange forum, which
allowed them to buy seats to individual games from current season
ticketholders. Neither the Patriots nor the ticketholders profited from the
exchanges, but the broker earned a twenty-five percent commission from each
sale on its website: fifteen percent of the sale price from the seller, and another
ten percent added to the sale price from the buyer. In exchange for their
customers' loyalty, the broker also offered top sellers extended privileges,
including the ability to purchase underpriced tickets with no buy-side fee. It
also gave all buyers a guarantee that StubHub would honor the tickets.
However, buyers had to obtain independent confirmation that the tickets were
invalid before they were entitled to a refund.
The court denied the motion, holding that the Patriots had provided
sufficient evidence for a jury to find that (1) the team had advantageous
relationships with both its current and prospective season ticket holders; (2)
the ticket broker's interference with those relationships was improper in
means; and (3) the team was harmed by that interference. In assessing
whether the team had advantageous relationships, the court found that the
Patriots may have had a reasonable expectancy of financial benefit from the
prices that both current ticket holders and waitlist members would pay for
176. 25 Mass. L. Rep. 478 (Super. Ct. 2009).
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season tickets. In assessing whether the ticket broker's interference was
improper, the court emphasized that the broker's conduct had to violate a state
statute or common-law tort, but found that StubHub may have induced or
encouraged current ticket holders to violate the state's anti-scalping law or
profited from those violations while positioned to stop them. Although the
language on the broker's website suggested it did not knowingly aid in
breaking the law, the court emphasized that its pricing structure allowed for it
to profit more when the sellers exceeded the two-dollar threshold and that the
broker did not require or even ask those sellers to reveal the face value of the
tickets. The court also noted that a jury could infer that the broker encouraged
its top sellers to buy underpriced tickets so they would resell them at higher
prices and StubHub could profit from a higher commission. In assessing
whether the Patriots suffered any economic injuries, the court concluded that a
loss of goodwill among current and prospective season ticket holders was
merely speculative, because there was no evidence suggesting that the broker's
buyers were more unruly than other fans or that more individuals would seek
to buy season tickets if more tickets were available through the team's online
forum. However, the court found that the team may have suffered increased
administrative costs because the team's personnel had to deal with several of
the broker's buyers whose tickets were declared invalid.
Parrish v. Nat'l Football League Players Inc. 177
National Football League Players Inc., the fully-integrated marketing
company of the NFL Players' Association, moved for judgment
notwithstanding a verdict in favor of a class of retired NFL players on the
class's claim that the company breached a fiduciary duty to promote and
market members of the class. Class members had signed a group license
agreement with the company with the hope of earning royalties for the use of
their names and likenesses. The court denied the motion, holding the evidence
was sufficient to support the verdict because the jury could have believed the
company undertook a fiduciary duty but made no effort to promote or market
the retired players. In fact, the jury could have found the company's true
motive was to create an illusion of representation so that no other company
would attempt to sign them. The court emphasized the company had not paid
a single cent to any retired players under the program despite fourteen years of
lobbying efforts to get them to sign the agreements. It also noted that the
company kept a larger share of the money generated in marketing active
players. In assessing whether the company had a fiduciary duty, the court
177. No. C 07-00943 WHA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4239 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2009).
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noted that the company did not pay the retired players anything to sign the
agreements; thus, they could have reasonably expected efforts to market them
in order to receive compensation.
O'Connor v. Syracuse Univ. 178
The father of a Syracuse University (Syracuse) hockey player appealed a
trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to Syracuse, Slippery Rock
University (SRU) of Pennsylvania hockey player Matthew DiSanti, and
Syracuse student Brian McNeil on negligence claims that he brought against
them after he suffered injuries when he attempted to keep McNeil from being
pulled out of the stands and into a group of SRU players by DiSanti following
a game between the schools. The SRU players were waiting in a pathway
between the ice and the visitors' locker room at Syracuse's home arena when
DiSanti shouted at McNeil, starting a physical altercation along the barrier
between the pathway and the stands. During the fracas, DiSanti grabbed
McNeil and attempted pull him into the pathway. At that point, the plaintiff,
who was standing next to McNeil, grabbed the student around the waist to try
to keep him out of danger. However, SRU players pulled both McNeil and the
plaintiff across the barrier and piled on them. Although those players only
struck McNeil, he escaped relatively unscathed, while the plaintiff broke his
ankle and shinbone. The entire altercation, which lasted only a few seconds,
was quickly broken up a Syracuse officer.
The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding there
was no evidence Syracuse breached any duty it owed to the plaintiff, but that
there was a genuine issue as to whether the "rescue" doctrine allowed the
plaintiff to recover against DiSanti and McNeil. In assessing the negligent
supervision claim against the school, the court emphasized that Syracuse owed
the plaintiff a duty to exercise reasonable care in attempting to maintain safe
conditions at the arena, which included the obligation to minimize foreseeable
dangers arising from the acts of third parties. However, that duty did not
extend to protect spectators from the side effects of unexpected assaults, which
is how the court characterized the altercation at issue. The court also noted
that the school followed its written policies by requiring the use of barriers and
stationing safety officers in the pathway, even though there had never been a
physical confrontation between a player and a spectator. After assessing the
claims against DiSanti and McNeil, the court determined it was fair to infer
that the plaintiffs motive in restraining McNeil was to keep him out of
imminent danger. It emphasized that the "rescue" doctrine could apply
178. 887 N.Y.S.2d 353 (App. Div. 2009).
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regardless of whether the danger materialized, as long as the plaintiffs beliefs
were reasonable. Based on the surrounding circumstances, the court
concluded that it was reasonable for the plaintiff to believe that McNeil was in
trouble.
Podgorski v. Pizzoferrato 179
The Town of Glastonbury, its board of education, its high school athletic
director, and the school's lacrosse coaches moved for summary judgment on
negligence claims brought against them by one of the school's lacrosse players
after he suffered injuries when he was struck by a ball thrown by one of his
teammates at the school's field house prior to a practice. As a general matter,
the players were prohibited from tossing balls around while waiting to be
taken to the field. However, they broke that rule almost every day, sometimes
while a coach observed. The school's coaches' handbook did not include
specific mandates related to field house conduct, but required coaches to
"properly" supervise players at "practice." The plaintiff alleged that the
lacrosse coaches not only failed to "properly" supervise the athletes, but also
failed to supervise at all. The court denied the defendants' motion, holding
that they were not entitled to governmental immunity because the coaches had
a ministerial duty to supervise the teams during practice. It emphasized the
policy in the school's coaches' handbook mandated some level of supervision,
even if there was discretion as to what was "proper." The court noted the time
between the players' arrival at the field house and the time they reached the
field was within the scope of "practice" because they would not have been
able to participate without changing their clothes and obtaining their
equipment.
In an earlier decision in the same lawsuit, a rehabilitation provider and one
of its physical therapists moved to dismiss apportionment claims brought
against them by the defendant lacrosse player and his parents. The plaintiff
alleged that those defendants had cleared him to attend practice even though
he sustained a head injury during the school's previous game, and that the
player threw the ball at him even though he was aware of that injury. The
court granted the motion, holding state law disallowed apportionment liability
between parties liable for negligence and parties liable for their intentional
acts. It noted the plaintiff accused the rehabilitation provider and physical
therapist of mere negligence, while the defendant player's act was clearly
purposeful.
179. No. CV075010288, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1886 (Conn. Super. July 15, 2009),
defendants' motion for summary judgment denied, No. CV075010288, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2777 (Conn. Super. Oct. 7, 2009).
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Roe v. Doe 180
The Dallas Mavericks and Mavericks owner Mark Cuban moved to strike
a defamation claim brought against them as part of a lawsuit filed by former
Mavericks coach Don Nelson after they failed to make a severance payment
they allegedly agreed to pay him in order to terminate his consulting contract
with the team. The contract included a non-compete clause. After the parties
reached the alleged oral agreement, the team sent Nelson a document
suggesting the consulting contract remained valid, but the terms of his
employment were amended. Nelson refused to sign that document and
subsequently signed a contract to coach the Golden State Warriors. The
Mavericks withheld the salary owed to him under the consulting contract and
other deferred compensation, claiming he violated the non-compete provision.
Nelson filed a claim against the team in arbitration, seeking to recover the
compensation owed to him under the contract. But before the hearing, Cuban
appeared as a guest on a Bay Area sports radio show and made a number of
comments that incorrectly described the details of the team's contract dispute
with Nelson and the coach's role in it. Cuban also allegedly sent emails with
similar comments to newspapers throughout the world.
The court granted the motion, holding that Nelson's claim should be
struck under the California anti-SLAPP statute because the comments were
made in furtherance of Cuban's free speech rights in connection with a public
issue, and Nelson was unable to establish a likelihood of success on the merits
of his claim. The court found that Cuban's statements concerned an issue of
public interest because the contract dispute involved individuals well-known
in the National Basketball Association community and who occupied high-
profile positions, and it had already received significant national attention and
publicity. The court also noted that broadcasting the statements contributed to
the public's discussion of the issue. It found that Nelson was not likely to
succeed on the merits of his claim because an average listener would not have
considered the comments assertions of objective fact and, as a limited public
figure, Nelson could not show that the comments were more than an
inaccurate characterization of the contract dispute. Put succinctly, the
comments were not defamatory, and, even if they were, Nelson could not
demonstrate that Cuban made them with actual malice.
Special Olympics Fla., Inc. v. Showalter18 1
Special Olympics Florida (SOF) appealed a trial court's judgment on a
180. No. C 09-0682 PJH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59440 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2009).
181. 6 So. 3d 662 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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verdict in favor of two developmentally-disabled athletes on claims that they
brought against the nonprofit corporation after they suffered injuries when a
volunteer sexually molested them in a parking lot prior to a practice for a
bowling event. Practices for the event were scheduled to begin on Saturdays
at 1:30 p.m., and athletes were told not to show up earlier than one-half hour
prior to it. However, athletes routinely ignored this instruction, and volunteers
often arrived early because they anticipated the need to provide supervision.
On the day of the molestations, SOF had also scheduled physicals for some
athletes at the bowling facility, starting at 10:00 a.m. The plaintiffs did not
have physicals scheduled, but arrived early to socialize before practice. The
volunteer had been the head bowling coach for fourteen years before quitting
in 1994 after accusations of molesting another athlete and her sister arose.
However, the SOF did not investigate those claims. In the ten years prior to
the incidents at issue, the current bowling coach had also been notified that the
volunteer had molested one of the plaintiffs on more than one occasion and
that he took developmentally-disabled adults to and from his vehicle during
organized dances. However, she accepted his denials of wrongdoing and did
not warn anyone associated with SOF or the athletes' parents about any
suspicions.
The appellate court reversed, ordering the trial court to direct a verdict for
SOF on the athletes' state statutory and vicarious liability claims and a new
trial on the athletes' negligence claim. In assessing the vicarious liability
claim, the court emphasized that the volunteer was not acting within the scope
of his agency at the time of the incident, because the conduct was not in
furtherance of SOF's mission. Based on that finding, it also concluded that
SOF did not violate any Florida statutes. However, the court held the
negligence claim was viable because it sought to impose direct liability on
SOF for breaching its duty to supervise the athletes and control the volunteer.
The court noted there was a genuine issue as to whether SOF had those duties
prior to the scheduled events, but refused to affirm the verdict because the
court incorrectly instructed the jury on the law.
Spence v. United States182
The federal government moved for summary judgment on negligence
claims brought against it by cyclist Jeanine Spence after she suffered injuries
during an event when she was thrown off her bicycle after striking a gap in the
pavement at a military training facility. The race organizers obtained
permission from the government to have the event pass through the facility,
182. 629 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
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but did not pay a fee because it was open to the public. The asphalt leading to
gaps on a bridge was marked with bright paint, a typical method employed by
cycling event organizers to warn of potential hazards. No participant had ever
been injured as a result of those gaps and Spence had cycled the same route
past them during the previous year's event. She was drafting behind a fellow
cyclist at the time of the incident. Prior to the race, she completed a
registration form that included a release purporting to shield the government
from liability for injuries that she might suffer during the race.
The court granted the motion, holding that the registration release, the
California recreational immunity statute, and Spence's assumption of the
inherent risks of cycling barred Spence's claims. In assessing the purported
release, the court emphasized the release language was not buried or hidden
within the registration form and found it was broad enough to contemplate all
acts of negligence. The court also determined the release did not have to
include language giving Spence knowledge of all road hazards that she could
encounter during the event, because some of those hazards were improbable
and others were inherent risks of the sport. In assessing the impact of the
recreational immunity statute, the court held the government did not act in a
manner that would give rise to liability under any of the law's exceptions. It
noted the government (1) did not have actual or constructive knowledge that
the gaps posed a risk; (2) did not request any consideration in exchange for
permission to allow the event; and (3) did not expressly invite any cyclist onto
the property. The court also found the government did not have a duty to
protect Spence from the risk injury caused by striking a gap because road
hazards are risks inherent in the sport and the participants assumed all inherent
risks.
Sweeney v. City of Bettendorl 83
Tara Sweeney appealed a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment
to the City of Bettendorf and its department of parks and recreation (DPR) on
a negligent supervision claim she brought against them after she suffered
injuries when a flying bat struck her while attending a minor league baseball
game on a field trip sponsored by the DPR. Sweeney was sitting a few rows
up from the field, in an unscreened portion of the stands, when a batter lost
control of his bat on a swing. It was in the air for two-to-three seconds before
hitting Sweeney, who was not paying attention to the game at the time. Before
the trip, Sweeney's mother had signed a permission slip that purported to
release the defendants from liability for any injuries caused by their negligent
183. 762 N.W.2d 873 (Iowa 2009).
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conduct at the game. The trial court held the slip constituted an enforceable
exculpatory agreement and barred Sweeney's claim. In the alternative, it
found that the city did not breach any duty that it owed to Sweeney because
the risk of being hit by a flying bat in an unscreened portion of the stands is a
risk inherent in attending games, and spectators generally assume inherent
risks.
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held the
permission slip was not an enforceable exculpatory agreement and that
Sweeney had provided sufficient evidence to support her claim for negligent
supervision because she was seated in a hazardous location. However, the
court also concluded the defendants did not breach their duty to provide direct
supervision because the incident took place so quickly they could not have
stopped the bat from hitting Sweeney. In assessing the legal force of the
permission slip, the Court found a lack of clear and unequivocal language that
would notify parents that they were waiving all claims related to future acts of
negligence by the defendants. In assessing whether the defendants engaged in
negligent supervision, the court found Sweeney did not assume the risk of a
bat striking her because she did not get to choose where to sit, and neither she
nor her parents were warned of the danger of flying bats.
Villegas v. Feder18
4
Ithaca College and a physician with a fellowship in sports medicine at the
school moved for summary judgment on negligence claims brought against
them by one of the school's football players after the physician cleared him to
play prior to his freshman year and allowed him to continuing competing that
fall despite his complaints about ankle problems stemming from a wrestling
injury he suffered in high school. Prior to enrolling at the school, the player
had undergone several months of physical therapy to rehab the ankle.
However, in filling out the player's medical records, his personal doctor stated
that he had no injuries that would inhibit his ability to participate in sports.
The doctor who operated on him following the injury also did not caution him
against playing. Upon arriving at the school, the player underwent an
additional series of medical evaluations, including one performed by the
defendant physician. The physician was aware that the player had suffered an
ankle injury, but did not have his medical records. Nevertheless, he cleared
the player because his personal doctor had already evaluated him and a
significant amount of time had passed since the injury. During his first few
weeks of practice, the player suffered two minor injuries to the ankle. He did
184. No. 022381/07, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2926 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 14, 2009).
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not miss any time, but went to see the physician again a month and a half later
because the ankle was still bothering him. The physician still did not have the
player's medical records, so he had to rely on the player's description of his
prior injury to make a diagnosis. Ultimately, he recommended more physical
therapy, but asked the player to return with his medical records. A few weeks
later, he re-evaluated the player with the help of the records, and determined
the ankle was improving. He advised the player to continue his exercises and
told him it could take up to a year before the ankle fully healed. The player
was able to finish the season, practice in the spring, work as a custodian in the
summer, and then compete without complaint during his sophomore year.
However, following that season, he complained that he had a limited range of
motion and tenderness in the ankle, and went back to the doctor who had
operated on him in high school. The doctor diagnosed him with an injury
requiring another surgery.
The court granted the motion, adopting the defendants' expert's opinion
that the physician's treatment conformed to notions of the accepted standard of
care, and that it was highly unlikely that any of his acts were the proximate
cause of the player's subsequent ankle injury. After assessing the physician's
decision to originally clear the player, the court determined he was entitled to
rely on the player's representations alone, based on the surrounding facts and
circumstances. It noted the physical limitations the player was experiencing
were not evidence of an underlying condition given the surgery and the short
amount of time that had passed since the injury occurred. After assessing the
physician's later treatment, the court found his evaluation and advice to seek
more physical therapy was appropriate. It noted that nothing in the physical
exam or the player's medical records indicated a need for x-rays or a referral
to a specialist. Most importantly, the court concluded that the player's
intervening acts between the last time he saw the physician and his later
diagnosis negated the possibility that the injury existed earlier. It emphasized
that he would not have been able to participate in athletic activities through his
sophomore season if the injury had been there when the physician re-evaluated
his medical fitness as a freshman.
Vivyan v. Ilion Cent. Sch. Dist. 185
A spectator at an American Legion baseball game appealed a trial court's
decision to grant summary judgment to the local American Legion Post and
the owners and operators of the field where the game was played on
negligence claims that he brought against them after he suffered injuries when
185. 886 N.Y.S.2d 268 (App. Div. 2009).
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he was hit in the head by a foul ball while seated in an unscreened area of the
stands down the first-base line. The defendants had placed a screen on the
backstop behind home plate, where the danger of a ball striking a spectator
was the greatest; however, there were no bleachers or other seats located in
that area. The appellate court reversed, holding the "limited duty" baseball
rule did not bar the spectator's claim because the defendants could not show
that their screened seating was sufficient to provide protection for spectators
that may reasonably be expected to desire it in the course of an ordinary game.
In fact, no screened "seating" existed at all. The court emphasized that the
availability of space behind the backstop did not automatically establish that
the defendants satisfied their duty of reasonable care, and that whether the
spectator assumed the risk of injury would have to be determined at trial.
Ward v. Mich. State Univ. 186
Michigan State University (MSU) appealed a trial court's decision to deny
its motion for summary judgment on a negligence claim brought against it by a
minor spectator at one of MSU's hockey games and her parents under
Michigan's public building exception to governmental immunity. The
spectator and her parents also appealed the court's decision to grant the
school's motion for summary judgment on their negligence claim under
Michigan's proprietary function exception to governmental immunity. The
claims arose out of injuries that the spectator suffered when a hockey puck that
flew into the stands during the game struck her in the head. The appellate
court reversed the decision to deny summary judgment on the claim brought
under the public building exception and affirmed the decision to grant
summary judgment on the claim brought under the proprietary function
exception. In barring the use of the public building exception, the court held it
could not assess liability for MSU's failure to install Plexiglas to protect the
section of the stands where the minor was sitting because the plaintiffs did not
serve the school requisite notice of the occurrence of the incident, which was a
precondition to bringing the claim under Michigan law. In barring the use of
the proprietary function exception, the court noted the operation of an
intercollegiate athletics program fits in the broad definition of a governmental
function immune from liability and held the plaintiffs failed to show that the
school's primary purpose in operating that program was to generate a profit.
Nine months later, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated the decision of the
appellate court and remanded to the case to reconsider the university's appeal
186. No. 281087, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 169 (Jan. 27, 2009), vacated by 773 N.W.2d 666
(Mich. 2009).
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in light of the court's order on reconsideration in Chambers v. Wayne County
Airport Authority.
Welch v. Sudbury Youth Soccer Ass 'n 187
Youth soccer player Dustin Welch appealed a trial court's decision to
dismiss the negligence claim he brought against a youth soccer association and
its parent association after he suffered injuries when a goal post fell on him
during a game. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
nonprofit associations were immune from liability for negligence in
conducting a sports program under Massachusetts law. The Court noted that
those associations were not immune for their acts relating to the care and
maintenance of real estate that they controlled and used in connection with a
sports program. However, it determined that the goal posts were not real
estate under state law, and that the associations were acting in furtherance of
the program when setting them up.
Williams v. Middletown Bd. ofEduc. 188
A school system's board of education, the board's members, the Amateur
Athletic Union (AAU), and the AAU president moved for summary judgment
on negligence claims brought against them by the parent of an AAU basketball
player after the player suffered injuries when he slipped on a high school gym
floor covered with dust during his team's practice. The player's team paid the
board just over $100 to use the gym approximately two weeks before the
injury occurred. The school system's policies allowed it to rent the gym, but
still made school personnel responsible for eliminating any known hazard that
could jeopardize the safety of the public. The policies also emphasized that
renters could not waive custodial fees, which were set at thirty-five dollars per
hour and accrued a minimum of one-half hour prior to functions until a
minimum of one hour after functions.
The trial court denied the motion, holding that the parent's allegations
were sufficient to support a finding that the AAU and its president had
possession and control of the gym at the time that the player was injured, and
that the board and its members were not entitled to municipal immunity. In
rejecting the immunity defense, the court emphasized that the board and its
members could be held liable if they were acting in a proprietary capacity in
leasing the gym or violating a mandatory public duty by failing to ensure a
custodian attended the practice. The court also noted that a jury could infer
187. 901 N.E.2d 1222 (Mass. 2009).
188. No. CV075002093, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 435 (Conn. Super. Feb. 20, 2009).
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that school system designed its policy of charging custodial fees prior to the
beginning of a function to give it the opportunity to eliminate any hazard that
might be in place.
Zeidman v. Fisher189
A recreational golfer appealed a trial court's decision to grant summary
judgment to one of his playing partners on a negligence claim brought by the
golfer after he suffered injuries when he was struck by a ball hit by the partner
during a charity outing. Prior to the errant shot, the golfer drove over the crest
of a hill that blocked the view of the green in order to ensure the group ahead
of them was out of harm's way. Subsequently, he began following the cart
path back to the tee box, which ran alongside the fairway, to inform his
partners that the green was clear. The golfer was not watching the tee box at
this time; thus, he never saw the defendant prepare to swing. However, he was
less than 100 yards from the box, in full view of the partners, when the
defendant took the shot.
The appellate court reversed, holding that there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the "assumption of the risk" doctrine or the "no
duty" rule barred the golfer's negligence claim. In assessing the assumption of
risk defense, the court determined that the golfer may not have consciously
assumed the chance of being struck by a ball while he was driving back to the
tee box because he did not anticipate that his playing partners would take a
shot until they were assured the green was clear. In assessing the "no duty"
defense, the court emphasized that the defense shields participants only from
liability for injuries caused by risks inherent in the sport, and that they still
have a duty to avoid exposing their co-participants to other foreseeable risks of
harm.
CONCLUSION
Throughout 2009, both courts and arbitral bodies made a number of
decisions that are sure to have an indelible impact on the field of sports law.
The cases presented in the survey offer a glimpse at how the law continues to
evolve, especially with respect to the bankruptcy, labor, and intellectual
property issues that stole the headlines and captivated legal analysts
throughout the year. But 2010 promises to be even better, as the United States
Supreme Court prepares to rule on American Needle v. National Football
League,190 a case that could redefine how antitrust laws apply to professional
189. 980 A.2d 637 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
190. 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009).
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sports leagues. The growth of sports on an international scale also promises to
expand the influence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, which just
celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary. Clearly, the world of sports will
continue to be an exciting lens through which to view the convergence of
many areas of the law, regardless of the interests at stake.
